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ABSTRACT
Totty, Evan S. PhD, Purdue University, August 2016. Essays in Labor Economics and
Panel Data Analysis. Major Professors: Mohitosh Kejriwal and Kevin Mumford.
This dissertation is composed of three independent chapters. The first chapter
studies the impact of minimum wage hikes on employment of low-skill workers in the
United States. The second chapter studies the lasting impact of attending a higher
value-added high school on college performance. The third chapter studies the impact
of stuttering on labor market outcomes.
The first chapter resolves issues in the minimum wage-employment debate by
using factor model econometric methods to address concerns related to unobserved
heterogeneity. Recent work has shown that the negative effects of minimum wages
on employment found using traditional methods are sensitive to the inclusion of controls for regional heterogeneity and selection of states that experience minimum wage
hikes, leaving the two sides of the debate in disagreement about the appropriate approach. Factor model methods are an ideal solution for this disagreement, as they
allow for the presence of multiple unobserved common factors, which can be correlated with the regressors. These methods provide a more flexible way of addressing
concerns related to unobserved heterogeneity and are robust to critiques from either
side of the debate. The factor model estimators produce minimum wage-employment
elasticity estimates that are much smaller than the traditional OLS results and are
not statistically different from zero. These results hold for many specifications and
two datasets that have been used in the minimum wage-employment literature. A
simulation shows that unobserved common factors can explain the different estimates
seen across approaches in the literature.

xi
The second chapter studies whether there is any lasting benefit to attending a
better ”value-added” high school. Many states and school districts have tied teacher
and school evaluation to value-added scores, which attempt to assess the impact
that teachers and schools have on student test scores. Much work has been done to
develop value-added models that can provide unbiased estimates of the impact that
teachers and schools have on test scores. Much less work has been done to determine
whether these higher value-added teachers and schools have a lasting impact on their
students. This chapter address this issue by estimating value-added scores for high
schools in Florida and North Carolina and then linking these value-added scores to
a student-level dataset on college performance that includes the high school that the
student attended. Results suggest that attending a higher value-added high school
has a positive and statistically significant impact on college GPA, although the impact
is small; a one standard deviation increase in high school value-added increases first
semester GPA by 0.022 points and final GPA by 0.017 points. The effect on graduation
is not statistically significant. Results are consistent across race and gender, although
the effect is slightly larger for White students.
The third chapter quantifies the difference in labor market outcomes between people who stutter and people who do not. Stuttering is a neurodevelopmental disorder
of speech which is characterized by repetitions and prolongations of sounds, syllables,
and words. It is estimated that 70 million people stutter worldwide and 3 million
in the United States. Despite this prevalence, no study has adequately quantified
the impact of stuttering on adult labor market outcomes; considering the ubiquitous
nature of communication, it is likely that communication differences and difficulties
would affect labor market outcomes. Results suggest that stuttering impacts employment status, labor force participation, receipt of public assistance, and hourly
earnings. Additionally, stuttering seems to impact males and females differently.
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CHAPTER 1. THE EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGES ON EMPLOYMENT: A
FACTOR MODEL APPROACH
1.1

Introduction
Understanding the effect of minimum wages on employment has long been of inter-

est to economists, with empirical work on the subject dating back approximately 100
years [Obenauer and von der Nienburg, 1915]. Despite this long history of attention,
economists are still very much divided on the effect of minimum wages. The last two
decades, in particular, have produced an abundance of work on the subject, without
providing a consensus. The empirical evidence in these studies differs depending on
both the datasets used and the methodology1 . The goal of this paper is to resolve the
issues in the minimum wage-employment literature by using panel data econometric
methods that are robust to critiques from either side of the debate. Specifically, this
study uses the common correlated effects estimators developed by [Pesaran, 2006]
and the interactive fixed effects estimator developed by [Bai, 2009]. These estimators
are applied to many datasets and specifications that have recently been used in the
literature. The factor model methods used in this paper are well suited for a wide
variety of empirical studies, although they have not yet received much use.
Minimum wage hikes are very common in the United States. There have been
three instances of federal minimum wage hikes since 1990, each of which involved
phasing in a higher minimum wage through two separate hikes in consecutive years.
1

The theory is also ambiguous. While the simple competitive model predicts a decrease in employment in response to a minimum wage hike, the monopsony model can predict no effect or even a
small positive effect. Additionally, there are many other channels through which minimum wages
could impact firms and employees that would mitigate the employment effect, such as labor-labor
substitution, decreased costly labor turnover, reductions in non-wage benefits, improved organizational efficiency, increased worker effort, price increases, or reductions in profit [Schmitt, 2013].
Evidence on these other channels is sparse and mixed, but the most convincing evidence may support decreased labor turnover [Dube et al., 2014] and price increases [Aaronson et al., 2008, Lemos,
2008, Harasztosi and Lindner, 2015].

2
However, much of the minimum wage policy variation takes place at the state level:
there has been at least one state-level minimum wage hike in every year since 1990.
Additionally, state-level minimum wage hikes have become very common. In 2016, for
example, 17 states will increase their minimum wage. Several states have even begun
indexing their minimum wage to adjust annually based on inflation. In total, 29 states
currently have a minimum wage higher than the federal minimum wage. Recent campaigns among US workers to increase the federal minimum wage from $7.25/hour to
$15.00/hour have received a lot of attention in the media. Not surprisingly, the merits
of minimum wage hikes have been heavily debated by media members and politicians.
However, minimum wages have also been heavily debated among economists in recent years. A 2015 poll by the Institute for Research on Global Markets asked 37
prominent economists if they agreed with the following statement: ”If the federal
minimum wage is raised gradually to $15-per-hour by 2020, the employment rate for
low-wage US workers will be substantially lower than it would be under the status
quo.” Nine-percent strongly agreed, twenty-five percent agreed, thirty-seven percent
were uncertain, and twenty-nine percent disagreed.
Much of the reason why there is still an ongoing debate regarding the employment
effects of minimum wage hikes is that, while the abundance of state-level minimum
wage variation is useful for empirical studies, minimum wage hikes are, of course, not
randomly distributed across space or time. Figure 1.1 shows the average minimum
wage in each state from 1980-2015 and the total number of minimum wage hikes in
each state during the same time period. Minimum wages are generally higher and
raised more frequently in the Northeast, parts of the Midwest, and the West Coast.
Because regions of the US differ along many dimensions other than just minimum
wage policy, such as employment patterns, demographics, education levels, industrial
compositions, and any number of unobservable variables, estimating an unbiased employment effect of minimum wage hikes using aggregate state-level employment data
is challenging. As evidence of this, note that case studies which compare adjoining
local areas with different minimum wages around the time of a policy change have

3
tended to find small or no disemployment effects [Card and Krueger, 1994, Card and
Krueger, 2000], while panel studies using data aggregated to the state or county level
have tended to find larger disemployment effects [Neumark and Wascher, 1992, Neumark and Wascher, 2007]. One potential reason for the inconsistency across methods
could be that the panel studies are producing spurious estimates due to unobserved
confounders in the aggregate data which are correlated with both employment and
minimum wages.
This challenge associated with minimum wage-employment studies using aggregate panel data has led to an abundance of new research on the topic in recent years;
the recent debate in the minimum wage-employment literature has focused on how
to generate credible estimates of employment effects when using aggregate state- or
county-level panel data. An incomplete but representative summary of the recent
literature is shown in Table 1.1. The traditional approach in early panel studies was
to include two-way fixed effects (one for each time period and one for each state or
county) in order to address the concerns about unobserved heterogeneity across areas
and time periods [Neumark and Wascher, 1992, Neumark and Wascher, 2007]. This
approach tends to find minimum wage-employment elasticity estimates in the range
of -0.1 to -0.2, meaning that a 10% increase in the minimum wage causes a 1%-2%
decrease in employment for low-skilled workers such as teenagers. The recent minimum wage debate began when [Dube et al., 2010] and [Allegretto et al., 2011] argued
that two-way fixed effects are not sufficient to fully address concerns about unobserved heterogeneity. They propose the use of state-specific time trends and Census
division-by-period fixed effects in order to allow for even more heterogeneity. [Dube
et al., 2010] also uses a border discontinuity approach for county-level analysis, which
uses policy discontinuity at state borders to identify the effect of minimum wage hikes.
This essentially embeds the case study approach into the panel setting by restricting the sample to all contiguous counties along state borders and adding contiguous
county-pair fixed effects to the two-way fixed effects. Each of these approaches pro-
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duces minimum wage-employment elasticity estimates that are much smaller than the
traditional two-way fixed effects approach and not statistically different from zero.
There are several potential issues associated with the approaches in [Dube et al.,
2010] and [Allegretto et al., 2011]. [Neumark et al., 2014b] argue that the Census
division-by-period fixed effects and border discontinuity approach throw out too much
valid identifying information. This conclusion is reached based on the weights that a
synthetic control approach places on same-division or border-county areas. They have
also argued in a subsequent paper that Census division-by-period fixed effects and the
border discontinuity approach may actually worsen policy endogeneity by changing
the identifying variation from both state and federal variation, to only state variation,
which is more likely to be endogenously determined [Neumark et al., 2014a]. [Neumark et al., 2014b] also argue that specifications with state-specific time trends may
suffer from endpoint bias or the lack of flexible higher order state-specific time trends.
They show that negative and statistically significant elasticity estimates return when
they account for potential endpoint bias or allow for higher order state-specific time
trends. Essentially, [Neumark et al., 2014b] argue in favor of the traditional two-way
fixed effects specification over one that adds Census division-by-period fixed effects
or state-specific time trends.
Synthetic controls have also been used in the literature as an alternative way to
address the concerns about unobserved heterogeneity discussed above. Unsatisfied
with the approaches in [Dube et al., 2010] and [Allegretto et al., 2011], [Neumark
et al., 2014b] proposed a synthetic control-style matching estimator as an alternative
way to address the concerns about unobserved confounders influencing the aggregate
panel data. Their synthetic control approach produces large negatively elasticity estimates. However, [Allegretto et al., 2013] have shown that a synthetic control approach
that more closely follows the approach outlined in [Abadie et al., 2010], with cleaner
identification of treatment vs controls groups and longer pre- and post-treatment windows, produces small elasticity estimates that are not statistically different from zero.
The two camps have continued to debate the Census division-by-period fixed effects,
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state-specific time trends, border discontinuity approach, and synthetic controls in
follow-up work [Neumark et al., 2014a, Allegretto et al., 2013, Allegretto et al., 2015].
[Allegretto et al., 2015] also use the double-selection post-LASSO approach advanced
by [Belloni et al., 2014] as a way of letting the data determine which, if any, additional
controls should be included beyond the traditional two-way fixed effects. This procedure selects Census division-by-period fixed effects from one Census division and 29
state-specific linear time trends (no higher order trends) and produces small elasticity
estimates that are not statistically different from zero.
The contribution of this paper is to bring a different econometric approach to
the data. The factor model estimators advanced by [Pesaran, 2006] and [Bai, 2009]
are well-suited to address the issues described above: the methods in these papers
allow for consistent estimation of regression parameters under the presence of multiple
unobserved common factors influencing the data. The unobserved common factors
are allowed to be correlated with the independent variables as well, which makes the
estimators very useful for studies with aggregate panel data, as both the dependent
and independent variables are likely to be influenced by unobservable confounders in
such studies. The intuition for the estimators in [Pesaran, 2006] and [Bai, 2009] is to
use either cross section averages of all the variables or principal components to proxy
for the unobserved common factors in the data, so that they can be controlled for
directly. Essentially, the factor model estimators apply a very flexible structure to the
error term of a given specification which embeds many other structures, including,
for example, state-specific time trends and Census division-by-period fixed effects.
By using the factor model estimators, rather than ordinary least squares (OLS), to
estimate the traditional two-way fixed effects specification, it is possible to control
for unobservable heterogeneity without having to make specific assumptions about
the form of the unobserved heterogeneity. Importantly, the factor model estimators
have been shown to perform well even when there are no unobserved common factors
in the error term. This means that using the factor model estimators will produce
estimates similar to OLS if the specification is correct. As described below in Section
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2.3, the factor model estimators both address the concerns associated with each camp
in the recent minimum wage-employment debate and have specific advantages over
each of the other approaches used in the literature.
Minimum wage-employment elasticity estimates based on the factor model estimators are significantly different than estimates based on OLS. Using the same datasets
from the papers discussed above, OLS estimates based on the two-way fixed effects
specification replicate the -0.2 to -0.1 elasticity estimates from the literature. The
factor model estimators produce elasticity estimates that are much smaller than OLS
and not statistically different from zero: restaurant elasticity estimates are in the
range of -0.01 to -0.05 while teenage elasticity estimates are in the range of -0.03
to -0.07. These small elasticity estimates are robust to different data sources, different assumptions about the number of common factors in the data, different time
and cross section samples of the data, and different specifications that model time
trends explicitly. Analysis of the factor structure estimated from the data suggests
the common factors are capturing time trends, among other things, and also suggests
time-varying regional heterogeneity in the effect of the common factors, which could
roughly be approximated by a Census division-by-period fixed effect. However, the
factor structure also captures factors that appear to be unrelated to time trends and
shows some neighboring or same-Census division counties that appear to experience
very different effects from common factors. Thus, while analysis of the factor structure
does lend support for preferring specifications with state-specific time trends and/or
Census division-by-period fixed effects as in [Dube et al., 2010] and [Allegretto et al.,
2011] over ones without them, it is also supports the broad points in [Neumark et al.,
2014b] and [Neumark et al., 2014a] that time trends may not always be appropriate
and that proximate places do not always make ideal control groups. Simulations at
the end of the paper show two key findings: First, the pattern of results discussed
above, in which OLS produces relatively large negative elasticity estimates and the
factor model estimators produce estimates close to zero, cannot be produced from the
data if the two-way fixed effects specification is correct. Second, the OLS estimate
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of the minimum wage-employment elasticity produced from the two-way fixed effects
specification is negatively biased by the common factors present in the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the factor model setup of which the [Pesaran, 2006] and [Bai, 2009] estimators make use,
describes the estimators themselves, and discusses the relative merits of the factor
model approach over other approaches from the literature. Section 3 describes how
the variables are constructed and provides summary statistics for the data. Section
4 discusses the results. Section 5 discusses the simulations. Section 6 concludes.

1.2

Empirical approach

1.2.1

Multi-factor error structure

The factor model setup is based on a model in which the error term is characterized
by a multi-factor error structure. Specifically, the traditional error term in a regression
equation is decomposed into time-specific ”common factors” that can affect all cross
section units, heterogeneous ”factor loadings” that represent how a common factor
affects a particular cross section unit, and an idiosyncratic error term. In the analysis
below, the factor structure will be applied to the traditional two-way fixed effects (one
fixed effect for each time period and one for each state or county) specification, which
is the most saturated specification on which the literature has been able to agree.
Factor model estimators from [Pesaran, 2006] and [Bai, 2009] will then be used for
estimation.
The traditional specification for estimating the effect of minimum wages on employment, originating from [Neumark and Wascher, 1992], is given by

ln(Eit ) = βln(M Wit ) + ΓXit + αi + δt + εit .

(1.1)

Depending on the dataset used in the analysis below, Eit is either a count of the
number of restaurant/teenage employees in county i and period t or the fraction of
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teenagers employed in state i and period t. M Wit is the higher of the federal and state
minimum wage in state or county i and period t. Employment and the minimum wage
are measured in logs so that β represents the minimum wage-employment elasticity2 .
The term Xit is a vector of control variables defined in Section 3 that are intended to
proxy for supply and demand forces on employment. Unit and period fixed effects are
represented by αi and δt , respectively. Several studies have estimated this two-way
fixed effects specification with OLS and no additional controls for unobserved heterogeneity and found large negative effects of minimum wages on employment [Neumark
and Wascher, 1992, Neumark and Wascher, 2007, Sabia, 2009]. The identification
assumption for this specification is that minimum wage variation is uncorrelated with
the error term εit , conditional on the two-way fixed effects and other controls3 .
The difference with the factor model approach is that it allows for the presence of
cross section dependence remaining in the error term εit . Cross section dependence is
the tendency of outcomes, or residuals in this case, to be correlated across areas. This
dependence could be spatial, caused by similarity in geographic characteristics. However, unlike spatial econometric methods, factor models also allow this dependence
to depart from geographic proximity, which could occur if two areas experience the
same industry-specific shock because of industry specialization, even if they are not
neighbors. Cross section dependence is problematic for inference [Andrews, 2005], but
will also cause bias if unobserved common factors are correlated with the regressors.
The factor model approach facilitates the control of cross section dependence with
time-specific common factors that can have heterogeneous effects over areas:

εit = λ0i ft + uit
2

(1.2)

The log-log specification imposes a linear relationship on the size of the minimum wage hike and
the size of the employment change: doubling the size of the minimum wage hike will double the
employment effect. In reality, the relationship may not be linear. Firms may be more able to
absorb small minimum wage hikes without changing employment than large minimum wage hikes.
The reason why this specification is used is that it has been the common approach in the recent
literature and because there is relatively little variation in the size of minimum wage hikes during
the time frame of analysis in this paper: most minimum wage hikes from 1990-2013 were in the
range of 5-15%.
3
More formally, E(εit |ln(M Wit ), Xit , αi , δt ) = 0.
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where ft is an (r x 1) vector of unobserved common factors and λi is an (r x 1) vector
of factor loadings that capture unit-specific effects of the common shocks. These
common factor may be thought of as omitted variables. As discussed below, the
factor model estimators from [Pesaran, 2006] and [Bai, 2009] allow these unobserved
common factors to be correlated with the regressors. Therefore, the identification
assumption is no longer that minimum wage variation is uncorrelated with εit , but
that it is uncorrelated with uit . That is, minimum wage variation is uncorrelated
with the error term, conditional on the two-way fixed effects, other controls, and the
common factors and factor loadings4 .
It is possible to think of examples of omitted variables that could cause bias in the
OLS estimate of β from equation (1) in either direction, but could also be captured
by the factor structure in equation (2). [Neumark et al., 2014b] argued that minimum
wages may be more likely to be raised when labor markets are tight, citing [Baskaya
and Rubinstein, 2011]. This would suggest that minimum wage hikes are associated
with positive employment shocks, which would cause positive endogeneity bias in the
OLS estimate of β from equation (1). These types of general macroeconomic shocks
could be captured by the factor model structure: a common factor could represent a
macroeconomic trend and the factor loadings represent how the macroeconomic trend
affects each county/state, which would vary depending on characteristics of the area
such as demographics and industrial composition. Alternatively, technological change
could produce negative endogeneity bias. [Smith, 2011] studied teenage employment
rates from 1980 to 2009 and showed that job polarization due to technological change
pushes middle-skill adults into low-skill jobs traditionally held by teenagers, thus
lowering teenage employment. [Allegretto et al., 2013] showed that between 1990 and
2007, high minimum wage states experienced greater job polarization, on average,
than low minimum wage states. Combining these results suggests that high minimum
wage states have experienced greater job polarization, which puts downward pressure
on teenage employment. This would cause negative endogeneity bias in the OLS
4

More formally, E(uit |ln(M Wit ), Xit , αi , δt , λ0i ft ) = 0.
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estimate of β from equation (1), but could be captured by the factor structure: a
common factor could track skill-biased technological change at the country level,
which the factor loadings capture the heterogeneous effects of technological change
across areas, which would vary according to characteristics such as education level
and industrial composition.
It is worth noting that the factor structure shown above can be rewritten to
incorporate lagged common factors. This is appealing in the context of the minimum
wage-employment data, given that it is reasonable to assume that both employment
and minimum wages may be slow in responding to economic conditions due to social
norms against laying off workers and the delay between when minimum wage hikes
are approved and actually implemented. In this sense, it is intuitive to think that
employment and minimum wages may have a lagged response to common factors.
The factor model can be rewritten to incorporate lagged responses by rewriting a
dynamic factor model as a static factor model, with the error term in equation (1)
0
0
)0 is an (r(s + 1) x
, ..., ft−s
now taking the form εit = Λ0i Ft + uit , where Ft = (ft0 , ft−1

1) vector of common factors, Λi = (λ0i0 , λ0i1 ,...,λ0is )0 is an (r(s + 1) x 1) vector of factor
loadings, and s represents the number of lagged factors.

1.2.2

Factor model estimators

There are two commonly used approaches for estimating regression equations with
a multi-factor error structure, each of which will be used in the analysis below. The
first method is the common correlated effects approach from [Pesaran, 2006]. This
method does not attempt to estimate the common factors and factor loadings directly.
Rather, Pesaran shows that, in a large N and large T setting, you can proxy for the
factors with cross sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables. This
estimator has the added benefit that it can be computed by ordinary least squares
applied to regressions where the observed explanatory variables are augmented with
cross sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables. Pesaran proposes
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two versions of this method: the common correlated effects mean group (CCEMG) estimator and the common correlated effects pooled (CCEP) estimator. The CCEMG
estimator allows minimum wages to have heterogeneous effects over areas by estimating a separate regression coefficient for each cross section unit. The individual
slope coefficients can then be averaged to obtain a single mean group estimate. The
CCEP estimator is a generalized version of the standard fixed effects estimator that
estimates a single pooled regression coefficient but still allows the common factors to
have heterogeneous effects over areas. Standard errors are calculated using equations
(58) and (69) in Pesaran (2006) for the CCEMG and CCEP estimators, respectively.
The variance of the CCEMG estimator is estimated non-parametrically as the variance of the individual slope coefficients. The variance of the CCEP estimator takes
on the common sandwich estimator form and is also based on the variance of the
individual slope coefficients. More details are provided in the appendix. Confidence
intervals and significance reported in the results section are based on bootstrapped
t-statistics using the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure from [Cameron et al., 2008],
clustered at the state level.
The second method is the interactive fixed effects (IFE) approach from [Bai, 2009],
which does involve directly estimating the common factors and factor loadings. This
is done by jointly estimating the regression coefficients and the factor structure in
an iterative process. The IFE approach is based on the fact that, given the common factors and factor loadings, the regression coefficients can be estimated using
OLS after subtracting the factor structure from the data, and given the regression
coefficients, the factors and factor loadings can be estimated by performing principal
component analysis on the regression residuals5 . However, the regression coefficients
and factor structure are both unknown in practice. Therefore, Bai proposes an itera5

Because the IFE estimator actually estimates the factor structure, the number of common factors, r,
must be pre-specified. One approach is to use the information criteria from [Bai and Ng, 2002], which
estimates the number of strong factors in the data. Alternatively, IFE results could be provided for
different numbers of common factors. [Moon and Weidner, 2015] showed that the IFE estimator still
performs well if the number of common factors is over-estimated, but can suffer if too few factors
are included.
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tive procedure in which, given an initial guess of either the regression coefficients or
the common factors and factor loadings, one iterates between estimating one, given
the other, until the percent change in the sum of squared residuals falls below a
pre-specified threshold6 . A threshold of 10−9 is used in this paper. Bias-correction
for serial correlation, cross sectional correlation, and heteroskedasticity is performed
using equations (23) and (24) in Bai (2009). Standard errors are calculated using
Theorem 4 in Bai (2009). The variance of the IFE estimator takes on the standard
sandwich estimator form, based on the square of the residuals. More details are
provided in the appendix. Confidence intervals and significance reported in the results section are based on bootstrapped t-statistics using the wild cluster bootstrap-t
procedure from [Cameron et al., 2008], clustered at the state level.
Neither estimator is considered to dominate the other, which is why both are used
in the analysis. The most significant difference between the two is the assumption
about the number of common factors. The CCE estimators assume that the number
of common factors is less than or equal to the number of dependent plus independent
variables, whose cross sectional averages proxy for the common factors. The IFE
estimator assumes that the number of common factors is known to the researcher.
[Pesaran, 2006] and other papers have shown that the CCE estimator continues to
perform well even when the number of common factors exceeds the number of cross
sectional averages, although this flexibility comes at a cost: the factor loadings must
take on a random coefficients form. The IFE assumption that the number of common
factors is known may seem more restrictive, but in practice IFE results can just
be reported for many potential number of common factors. Additionally, [Moon
and Weidner, 2015] have shown that the IFE estimator still performs well when
6

[Bai, 2009] suggests initiating the iteration two different ways: (1) with the OLS estimates of
the regression coefficients, ignoring the factor structure, and (2) with the principal components
estimates of the factor structure from the raw data, ignoring the independent variables. Then,
one keeps whichever set of results has the lowest final sum of squared residuals. Analysis was also
performed using the individual slope coefficients from the CCE approach as an initial guess of the
regression coefficients. The results were nearly identical between the starting methods, but the
results generally converged faster when using the CCE estimates as the starting values. Therefore,
analysis below is based on the CCE starting method.
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the number of common factors is over-estimated. Therefore, the most significant
assumption of the IFE estimator may be that the factors that are most relevant for
bias and inference are among the strongest factors, so that they are picked out even
when a small number of factors is assumed.
[Westerlund and Urbain, 2015] also address the relative merits of the two approaches. The authors are actually comparing the relative merits of principal components versus cross sectional averages as a means of controlling for cross section
dependence in regression errors rather than comparing IFE and CCE exactly; the estimators they consider are slightly different from those considered in [Pesaran, 2006]
and [Bai, 2009], and they therefore caution against extrapolating too widely the
conclusions to the use IFE and CCE. Nonetheless, they find that the principal components approach is more efficient when β = 0, while the cross sectional averages
approach is expected to perform best when β 6= 0. They also find that each estimator
performs better when the cross section dimension is larger than the time dimension.
For examples of other applied work using these estimators, see [Bailey et al., 2016],
[Kim and Oka, 2014], [Cavalcanti et al., 2014], [Eberhardt et al., 2013], [Hagedorn
et al., 2013], and [Bertoli and Moraga, 2013].

1.2.3

Factor model approach versus other approaches in literature

As described in the introduction, three different methods have been used in the
recent literature that have produced conflicting results and/or much debate about
their appropriateness: 1) adding Census division-by-period fixed effects and/or statespecific time trends to the two-way fixed effects specification 2) using a border discontinuity approach to identify the effect based on policy changes between two neighboring counties and 3) using synthetic controls. The factor model approach discussed
above has specific advantages over each of these approaches and can address the broad
concerns from both sides of the debate.
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The advantage of the factor model approach over the inclusion of Census divisionby-period fixed effects and/or state-specific time trends is that the factor model approach embeds these controls as special cases of the factor structure: they can be
rewritten as the inner product of a vector of time-specific common shocks, ft = (t, δt )0 ,
and unit-specific factor loadings, λi = (αi , ζCD )0 , where t is a time trend, δt is a time
period dummy variable, αi is a state dummy variable, and ζCD is a Census division
dummy variable. When multiplied together, this produce state-specific time trends
and Census division-by-period fixed effects7 . So the factor model approach embeds
these controls, but the important difference is that the factor approach lets the data
determine the form of the common shock, ft , and the nature of the spatial correlation
in λi , whereas modeling state-specific trends and Census division-by-period fixed effects explicitly imposes a fixed form for the unobserved heterogeneity ex ante. This
is significant because, while incorrectly imposing Census division-by-period fixed effects and/or state-specific time trends could discard valid identifying information or
cause bias, the factor model estimators have been shown to perform well in terms of
bias and efficiency even when there are no common factors in the data. This means
that the factor model estimators should produce elasticity estimates very similar to
OLS even if the traditional two-way fixed effects specification is correctly specified.
Therefore, the factor model approach allows for a much more flexible form of unobserved heterogeneity than either only using two-way fixed effects or modeling Census
division-by-period fixed effects and state-specific time trends explicitly.
The border discontinuity approach moves away from the panel specification debate
and instead tries to embed the case study approach into the panel data setting by
comparing employment in cross-state neighboring counties before and after one state
implements a minimum wage hike. In [Dube et al., 2010], this is done by limiting the
7

The two-way fixed effects themselves could also be rewritten as a special case of the factor structure, where ft = (1, δt , t, δt )0 and λi = (αi , 1, αi , ζCD )0 . However, the analysis below will model them
separately for two reasons: First, the goal of this paper is to start with the most saturated specification that the literature can agree on and let the factor structure handle the rest. Second, it is more
efficient to model a variable explicitly if it is part of true DGP. While Census division-by-period fixed
effects and state-specific time trends are debatable, there is almost certainly unobserved differences
across areas and time that will influence employment and minimum wages.
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sample to cross-state contiguous counties and then estimating the traditional two-way
fixed effects specification with an additional fixed effect for each pair of cross-state
contiguous counties, which produces small and insignificant elasticity estimates. Two
separate, but related, critiques have been raised with respect to this approach. First,
as discussed in the introduction, [Neumark et al., 2014b, Neumark et al., 2014a]
have argued that this approach throws out too much valid identifying information,
with most of their argument based on the weight that a synthetic control approach
places on local areas. This critique is related to the primary drawback of the border
discontinuity approach, which is that it relies on the non-testable assumption that
confounding factors are removed when comparing contiguous areas. While it seems
likely that contiguous areas would be more similar in terms of their unobservable
characteristics than two random counties, there may be many cases in which they are
not. [Slichter, 2015] addresses this issue of imperfect neighbor matches by extending
the control group from only neighbors to include neighbors-of-neighbors, neighborsof-neighbors-of-neighbors, and so on. However, this approach is still based on the
imperfect assumption that similarity in observable characteristics implies similarity
in unobservable characteristics. The advantage of the factor model approach is that,
rather than assuming that unobserved confounders are removed by comparing local
areas, the factor model approach obtains estimates of the unobserved confounders
and controls for their presence directly.
The second critique of the border discontinuity approach is that it is not necessarily
obvious whether this approach improves or worsens policy endogeneity. In work that
uses the border discontinuity approach to study employment flows, [Dube et al.,
2014] conjecture that policy endogeneity is likely removed by the border discontinuity
approach because state-level minimum wage policy is likely to respond to state-wide
shocks, which may not be the same shocks that occur at the border. Alternatively,
[Neumark et al., 2014a] conjecture that this approach worsens policy endogeneity
because more of the policy variation comes from state-level hikes, which are more
likely to be endogenous to state-level employment than federal minimum wage hikes.
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The factor model approach provides a way to improve policy endogeneity that may be
better than the border discontinuity approach. The conjecture in [Allegretto et al.,
2015] that the state-level shocks that state minimum wages respond to are not the
same shocks that occur at the border is both untested and unlikely to always be
true. Therefore, the factor model approach of obtaining estimates of the unobserved
confounders directly may be a more robust approach. Furthermore, the factor model
approach is not subject to the critique from [Neumark et al., 2014a] that it may
worsen policy endogeneity by changing the identifying variation, because it uses the
same variation as the two-way fixed effects approach.
The factor model approach also has advantages over the synthetic control approach. The synthetic control approach discussed in [Abadie et al., 2010] is also
based on a factor model structure. They show that, under fairly standard conditions,
the ability to match covariates and a long period of pre-treatment outcomes using
synthetic controls implies that the factor structure is also matched. In this sense, the
linear factor model estimators described above and synthetic controls may be seen
as complimentary ways to estimate specifications that include time-varying heterogeneity. However, recent work by [Gobillon and Magnac, 2015] suggests that the IFE
estimator from [Bai, 2009] may be preferred to synthetic controls for the purpose
of regional policy evaluation: from a theoretical perspective, if the true model is a
linear factor model as in equations (1)-(2), then the synthetic control estimator from
[Abadie et al., 2010] is equivalent to interactive fixed effects only when the matching
variables observable covariates and unobservable factor loadings for the treated areas
belong to the support of observable covariates and unobservable factor loadings for
the untreated areas8 . Monte carlo simulations and an empirical application also seem
to support interactive fixed effects over synthetic controls.
Furthermore, there are drawbacks associated with the synthetic control approach
that are specific to the minimum wage setting. The synthetic control approach in
[Abadie et al., 2010] was designed for the setting in which there is a single area
8

[Dube and Zipperer, 2015] find evidence that this support requirement may not be satisfied for the
minimum wage application (p. 26).
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receiving a one-time policy treatment. Then, a policy effect is estimated by first
constructing a synthetic control that is a weighted combination of untreated areas,
or ”donor units,” which best matches the treated area in the pre-treatment period
and then simply taking the difference between the post-treatment outcome for the
treated area and the post-treatment outcome for the synthetic control. Two important requirements for this approach are long pre- and post-treatment windows and
many untreated areas. However, these two requirements are difficult to satisfy in the
minimum wage setting. Federal minimum wage hikes are difficult to analyze because
nearly every state is treated, leaving very few untreated areas with which to construct
a synthetic control. State minimum wage hikes are also difficult to analyze because
they occur so frequently across states and within states over time that it is difficult to
construct long pre- and post-treatment windows during which many other states are
untreated and no additional treatment occurs within the treated state. This difficulty
has led to two different synthetic control approaches in the minimum wage literature.
[Neumark et al., 2014b] construct a synthetic control for each instance of a minimum
wage increase and then pool all of the real and synthetic data together to perform
OLS with two-way fixed effects and an additional fixed effect for each pair of real and
synthetic data. They use 4-quarter windows and, in some cases, include other areas
that are being treated in the control group. [Allegretto et al., 2015] and [Dube and
Zipperer, 2015] apply an approach more closely assigned with [Abadie et al., 2010]
by analyzing individual minimum wage hikes separately, using longer windows, and
including only untreated areas in the control group. However, this leaves them with
only 29 usable instances of a minimum wage hike from 1979-2013 out of 215 total
instances. It is apparent that, in addition to the fact that synthetic controls have
produced conflicting results in the literature, synthetic controls are not very applicable to the minimum wage setting to begin with due to the common, recurring, and
continuous treatment. The linear factor model estimators described above, however,
are entirely amenable to this setting.
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The newest approach in the debate is the double-selection post-LASSO approach
used in [Allegretto et al., 2015], originally developed in [Belloni et al., 2014]. There
are similarities between this approach the factor model approach. Both LASSO regressions and factor models are commonly used for data reduction purposes. The
double-selection post-LASSO approach and the linear factor model estimators from
[Pesaran, 2006] and [Bai, 2009] use these data reduction abilities to apply a parsimonious structure to a traditional regression equation in settings that could contain many potential variables. The double-selection post-LASSO procedure first uses
LASSO regressions to select covariates that predict either the dependent variable or
the treatment variable of interest. Then, these covariates are included in a simple OLS
regression. Similar to how the linear factor model estimators can embed state-specific
time trends and Census division-by-period fixed effects, thus allowing the data to determine if they are appropriate, the double-selection post-LASSO approach applied
in [Allegretto et al., 2015] first uses the LASSO-driven procedure to determine which,
if any, state-specific time trends and Census division-by-period fixed effects should be
included in addition to the two-way fixed effects.
However, the double-section post-LASSO approach can only select from covariates that are specified by the researcher in the LASSO regressions, thus requiring
that the researcher is aware of and can account for all relevant covariates and forms
of unobserved heterogeneity. Endogeneity bias remains a threat in the form of unobservable or omitted variables not included in the LASSO regression and unobserved
heterogeneity structures that OLS cannot estimate, such as interactive fixed effects.
The factor model approach remains a more robust and flexible approach, as the
researcher does not have to specify variables or fixed effects for the factor model estimators to choose from and the factor model approach allows for unit fixed effects
to vary over time. Therefore, while both the double-selection post-LASSO and factor
model approaches allow the data determine if Census division-by-period fixed effects
and state-specific time trends are appropriate, the factor model approach can also
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account for variables that may be omitted from the LASSO regressions in [Allegretto
et al., 2015] and allow unit fixed effects to vary over time.
In addition to having advantages over each of the other approaches used in the recent literature, the factor model approach can satisfy the primary concerns from each
side of the debate. The primary concern in [Dube et al., 2010] and [Allegretto et al.,
2011] was that the traditional two-way fixed effects specification was not sufficient
to address unobserved confounders in the data, so they proposed new methods to
generate credible estimates of employment effects. [Neumark et al., 2014b, Neumark
et al., 2014a] have also proposed methods to generate more credible estimates than
those provided by the two-way fixed effects specification, but they caution that the
methods in [Dube et al., 2010] and [Allegretto et al., 2011] may discard too much
valid identifying information or, in the case of the border discontinuity approach,
discard too much data altogether. They have also argued that these methods may
worsen policy endogeneity by changing the identifying variation from both state and
federal minimum wage variation to only state minimum wage variation, which is more
likely to be endogenously determined. The factor model estimators provide a middle
ground: They are designed to facilitate the control of unobserved confounders for the
purpose of generating unbiased estimates of regression coefficients, and they do so
without discarding data, without changing the identifying variation to within Census
divisions or across state borders, and they use both state and federal minimum wage
variation.

1.2.4

Limitations of the factor model approach

The primary drawback of the factor model approach is that the estimators discussed above can only control for unobserved heterogeneity that fits into the interactive fixed effects form in equation (2). Most relevantly, this means that there cannot
be variation in the factor loadings over time. This could occur when some characteristics for a particular area change, such that the area experiences a different effect
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over time from a given common factor. For example, using the technological change
example from above, if a state’s industrial composition or education level changed
over time such that it had more high skill jobs to attract high skill workers or had
more high skill workers to attract high skill jobs, then that state’s true factor loading
for the technological change factor could change signs. As the model is written in
equation (2), the factor model estimators cannot address this type of identification
threat.
However, there is some evidence to suggest that the factors model estimators may
still perform well in this setting. [Bates et al., 2013] show that the principal components estimation of common factors still performs well even when there is time
variation in the factor loadings, including i.i.d. variation, random walk variation, and
structural breaks that affect all or some units. While this is a test of the estimation
of common factors rather than the estimation of regression coefficients in specifications that include estimated common factors, it does suggest that the interactive fixed
effects estimator, which is based on principal components estimation of common factors, may still perform well. Nonetheless, one way to deal with the possibility of time
variation in the factor loadings is to estimate the model for separately for different
period of time. If the estimates of the minimum wage-employment elasticity are similar across time periods, then the results are likely not being caused by inaccurate
estimation of factor loadings due to time instability. This strategy will be used below
as a robustness check.

1.3

Data

1.3.1

Data sources

Following the recent minimum wage-employment literature, two different low-skill
groups are analyzed in this study: restaurant workers and teenagers. Restaurant
workers and teenagers are the two most commonly studied populations in the minimum wage-employment literature [Baleman and Wolfson, 2014] and they have been
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the focus of the recent debate in the literature. Based on CPS Outgoing Rotation
Group calculations in [Allegretto et al., 2015], during the period 1979-2014, 40.2% of
working teenagers earned within 10% of the minimum wage and teenagers accounted
for 22.7% of all workers earning within 10% of the minimum wage (down from 32.2%
in 1979). During the time period 2000-2014, 28.3% of restaurant workers earned
within 10% of the minimum wage and restaurant workers accounted for 28.6% of all
workers earning within 10% of the minimum wage.
Analysis of restaurant employment is based on data from the Quarterly Census
of Employment of Wages (QCEW) as in [Dube et al., 2010], updated to include more
recent years (1990-2010)9 . The QCEW has also been used in the follow-up studies
[Neumark et al., 2014b, Neumark et al., 2014a, Allegretto et al., 2013, Allegretto et al.,
2015]. The QCEW provides quarterly county-level payroll data by industry based
on ES-202 filings that establishments submit for the purpose of calculating payroll
taxes related to unemployment insurance. The county-quarter restaurant employment
dependent variable is constructed from both Full Service Restaurants (NAICS 7221)
and Limited Service Restaurants (NAICS 7222) and measures the total number of full
service and limited service restaurant employees. The control variables are the countyquarter total private sector employment and the county population. The employment
variables are constructed from the QCEW and the county population comes from the
county-level Census Bureau population data which is produced annually. Data is
available for the entire time frame of analysis for 1,371 counties10 . Robustness checks
that analyze the effect of minimum wage hikes on restaurant worker earnings are
based on average weekly wages, which are constructed by dividing the county-quarter
total restaurant payroll by the county-quarter number of restaurant employees. A
minimum wage variable is merged to the dataset, which is always the higher of the
9

The time period of analysis stops in 2010 because there were classification changes to the four-digit
NAICS industry codes, which [Dube et al., 2010] use to identify restaurants, beginning in 2011.
Results that include more recent years are very similar to the results shown in this paper.
10
For consistency with [Dube et al., 2010], results are based on a balanced panel.
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state and federal minimum wage. Summary statistics for the dataset of analysis on
restaurant workers are shown in Table 3.1.
Analysis of teenage employment is based on data from the CPS Outgoing Rotation
Groups (CPS ORG) as in [Allegretto et al., 2011], updated to include more recent
years (1990-2013). CPS ORG data has been used in each of the follow-up studies
on teenage employment [Neumark et al., 2014b, Neumark et al., 2014a, Allegretto
et al., 2013, Allegretto et al., 2015]. State-quarter observations are constructed by
aggregating the CPS ORG individual-level data up to the state-quarter level. The
state-quarter teenage employment dependent variable is the fraction of teenagers,
ages 16-19, that are employed. The control variables are the state-quarter relative
size of the teenage population and state-quarter unemployment rate, also constructed
from the CPS-ORG. Robustness checks that analyze the effect of minimum wage hikes
on teenage earnings are based on average hourly earnings, which are based only on
those who were working and paid between $1 and $100 per hour in 2009 dollars and
are constructed by aggregating the CPS ORG individual hourly earnings data to the
state-quarter level. A minimum wage variable is merged to the dataset, which is
always the higher of the state and federal minimum wage. Summary statistics for the
dataset of analysis on teenagers are shown in Table 3.1.
As robustness checks, two other datasets are used to analyze teenage employment:
CPS basic monthly and Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI). These two datasets
have been used in more recent minimum wage-employment studies [Allegretto et al.,
2013, Allegretto et al., 2015]. The CPS basic monthly files do not have data on earnings, which is necessary for the crucial robustness check on the effect of minimum wage
hikes on earnings, but it has a much larger monthly sample of employment outcomes.
The QWI is a newer dataset which provides county-level teenage employment counts.
The data is a public-use aggregation of the matched employer-employee Longitudinal
Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) database, which is provided via a partnership between the Census Bureau and the Labor Market Information (LMI) offices.
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Both of these datasets are taken directly from the data associated with [Allegretto
et al., 2015]11 . Summary statistics for these datasets are also shown in Table 3.1.

1.3.2

Cross section dependence and data size

As discussed in the introduction and Section 2.1, the presence of unobserved common factors can cause outcomes or residuals to be correlated across areas, known as
cross section dependence, which can be problematic for inference and estimation. The
factor model approach is commonly used to model the presence of strong, as opposed
to weak, cross section dependence. Weak cross section dependence can be thought of
as arising from the fact that geographically proximate places will have similar characteristics, due to integrated geography and labor markets, which will cause correlation
in outcomes between neighboring areas. Strong cross section dependence, on the
other hand, is typically thought of as arising from unobserved forces (”factors”) that
influence outcomes in heterogeneous ways between areas. Spatial econometric methods, which deal with cross section dependence by assuming some specific geographic
structure for the correlation between areas ex ante, are an alternative way to address
issues related to cross section dependence. However, factor models have two important advantages over spatial econometric methods. The first is that factor models are
intended to capture the presence of strong cross section dependence, whereas spatial
econometric methods typically require that the cross section dependence is only weak.
The second is that the factor model approach assumes no geographic relationship for
the correlation between areas before estimation, thus allowing outcomes and residuals
to be correlated in ways that depart from geographic proximity.
To validate the use of factor model methods, Table 3.1 shows the results of a
test for strong cross section dependence in the data using the cross section dependence (CD) test from [Pesaran, 2015]. This test is based on the average of pair-wise
correlations in the data, with greater correlations indicating greater cross section de11

The data can be downloaded here: https://arindube.com/working-papers/
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pendence and thus producing a larger test statistic. The null hypothesis of the test,
which is distributed standard normal, is that there is only weak cross section dependence, while the alternative is that the cross section dependence is strong. The
null hypothesis of weak cross section dependence is rejected at the one-percent level
for each of the datasets for restaurant and teenage employment. This suggests the
presence of common factors influencing employment across areas and validates the
factor model approach. The fact that there is less strong cross section dependence in
the state-level CPS datasets is not surprising, given that the unit of analysis occurs
at a more aggregated level.
Because CPS data does not allow for reliable estimates at the county level, the
teenage dataset has a relatively small cross section dimension of 51, containing all
50 states and Washington D.C. As discussed in Section 2.2, one of the results from
[Westerlund and Urbain, 2015] is that both the IFE and CCE estimators perform
better when N > T , which is not the case for the CPS datasets. It is therefore
possible that the factor model estimators may not be able to capture the common
factors as reliably for the CPS datasets as they can for the QCEW and QWI and
therefore may not be able to fully remove any cross section dependence and bias that
is caused by common factors. Nonetheless, the IFE and CCE estimators still provide
significant improvements over traditional OLS methods when common factors exist
in the data and still perform well without the presence of common factors in the data
even when N < T , as shown in [Pesaran, 2006] and [Bai, 2009] and in the simulations
in Section 5.

1.4

Results

1.4.1

Minimum wage-employment elasticity

All OLS results are based on the traditional two-way fixed effects specification
in equation (1). Factor model results are based on the two-way fixed effects specification in equation (1) and the multi-factor error structure in equation (2). Results
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are reported separately for each of the datasets. The results tables first show the
OLS estimate of the two-way fixed effects specification, and then show results using
each of the factor model estimators described in Section 2. Confidence intervals and
significance reported in the tables are based on bootstrapped t-statistics using the
wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure from [Cameron et al., 2008], clustered at the state
level.
The effect of minimum wage hikes on restaurant employment is shown in Table
1.3. Column (1) shows that the OLS estimate of the traditional two-way fixed effects
specification is in line with other estimates from the literature, with a large elasticity
of -0.138 that is statistically significant. However, the factor model estimators in
columns (2)-(4) produce very different elasticity estimates. The CCEMG, CCEP, and
IFE estimators produce elasticity estimates of -0.013, -0.013, and -0.042, respectively.
None of the factor model estimates are statistically different from zero. In addition
to producing smaller elasticity estimates, the factor model estimators produce more
precise estimates: the confidence intervals are much tighter for the factor model
estimators than OLS. This is consistent with the presence of common factors that
the OLS estimator is not controlling for, which would cause bias and inefficiency in
the OLS estimator. Interestingly, the factor model estimates for the other covariates
are much more similar to OLS in terms of both the point estimate and the confidence
interval length; it appears that the unobserved common factors are correlated with
the minimum wage more so than total private sector employment or population.
Table 1.3 also shows residual diagnostics that test for the presence of strong cross
section dependence in the residuals. There is still strong cross section dependence
in the OLS residuals, which have a test statistic of 26.98, suggesting the presence
of unobserved common factors remaining in the OLS residuals. The factor model
estimators do a better job of controlling for common factors and removing cross
section dependence from the data, with test statistics of 8.46, 17.19, and -0.30 for the
CCEMG, CCEP, and IFE estimators, respectively.
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The effect of minimum wage hikes on teenage employment is shown in Table 1.4.
Column (1) shows that the OLS estimate of the minimum wage-employment elasticity
is once again in line with other estimates from the literature, with a large elasticity
of -0.178 that is statistically significant. Just as with the restaurant employment
dataset, the factor model estimators in columns (2)-(4) produce very different elasticity estimates than OLS: the CCEMG, CCEP, and IFE estimators produce elasticity
estimates of -0.040, -0.065, and -0.036, respectively, none of which are statistically
different from zero. Regarding the other covariates, the factor model estimators produce slightly smaller estimates than OLS for the effect of the unemployment rate and
produce estimates of the opposite sign for the effect of the teenage population share.
Although the factor model estimators produce significantly smaller elasticity estimates than OLS for teenage employment, they do not produce tighter confidence
intervals or further remove cross section dependence from the residuals. This may
be due to the relatively small size of the cross section dimension of the teenage employment dataset, an issue discussed in Section 3.2: it is possible that the relatively
small cross section dimension may lead to imprecise estimates of the common factors,
which could leave the residuals contaminated with cross section dependence while still
removing bias from the parameter estimates. This seems especially plausible for the
√
N T -consistent IFE estimator, whose estimates of the common factors via principal
√
components are only N -consistent. Nonetheless, the main concern in this paper
is removing bias from the minimum wage-employment elasticity, rather than cross
section dependence from the residuals. The factor model estimators do still appear
to be capturing the presence of common factors, because the factor model estimates
are very different from the OLS estimates. Section 5 will confirm that the factor
model estimators would produce elasticity estimates similar to OLS if there were no
common factors in the data, even for the teenage dataset.
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1.4.2

Alternative teenage employment data sources

As discussed in Section 3.1, CPS basic monthly files and the QWI have been used
to analyze teenage employment in more recent studies. The advantage of the CPS
basic monthly files is that they provide a much larger sample of monthly employment
outcomes than the CPS ORG. The advantage of the QWI data is that it provides
county-level teenage employment counts, which could address the cross section dimension issue associated with the CPS data for teenage employment.
Table 1.5 shows the results for these two datasets. Panel A is based on CPS
basic monthly files. Column (1) shows that the OLS estimate is once again consistent
with the literature, with a negative and statistically significant elasticity. Similar to
the CPS ORG results, the factor model estimators in columns (2)-(4) produce much
smaller elasticity estimates, but do not produce tighter confidence intervals or remove
more of the cross section dependence from the residuals.
Panel B is based on the QWI data. In this case, even the OLS estimator produces a
small elasticity that is not statistically different from zero. [Allegretto et al., 2015] find
significant negative effects when using this dataset and only two-way fixed effects, but
they analyze only contiguous counties for the border discontinuity approach, rather
than the entire sample. The factor model estimators also produce elasticity estimates
that are small and close to zero. The CCE estimates are statistically significant, but
they are still smaller in magnitude than the traditional OLS estimates, which are
in the range of -0.1 to -0.2. Unlike teenage results based on state-level CPS data,
the factor model estimators now produce much tighter confidence intervals than OLS
and remove more of the cross section dependence from the residuals than OLS. This
confirms that the lack of improvement in confidence interval length and cross section
dependence associated with the factor model results for the CPS data were likely due
to the relatively small cross section dimension.
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1.4.3

Number of common factors for IFE estimation

One important feature of the IFE procedure is the selection of the number of
common factors. As discussed in Section 2.2, one way to determine the number
of common factors is to use the information criteria from [Bai and Ng, 2002], which
estimates the number of strong common factors in the data. However, the information
criteria proved to be uninformative, as it picked the minimum number of factors
allowed in some cases and the maximum allowed in other cases. This has occurred in
other empirical papers using this method [Kim and Oka, 2014, Bailey et al., 2016].
Therefore, in the analysis above, the IFE results were based on the minimum number
of factors needed to explain approximately 90% of the variation in the residuals. This
meant 4 common factors for restaurant employment, 8 common factors for CPS ORG
and CPS basic monthly teenage employment, and 6 common factors for QWI teenage
employment. This can be seen in Table 1.6, which shows the relative importance of
each common factor, Rp2 . The relative importance of each common factor is calculated
as the fraction of the total variance in the residuals explained by factors 1 to p, given
as the sum of the first p largest eigenvalues of the second moment matrix of the OLS
residuals divided by the sum of all eigenvalues.
As a robustness check, Table 1.7 shows IFE results based on 2-8 common factors.
For restaurant employment, the IFE estimate of the minimum wage-employment elasticity is invariant to the number of factors, with elasticity estimates that remain small
and not statistically significant for different numbers of factors. The teenage minimum wage-employment elasticity is not entirely invariant to the number of common
factors for either CPS dataset: while the elasticity estimates are not statistically significant for any number of common factors, the IFE estimates are somewhat large
when only 2 or 3 common factors are included. Once 5 common factors are included,
the IFE estimates are much more similar to the CCE estimates reported in Table 1.4
and Table 1.5 and they remain relatively small for up to 8 common factors. The fact
that it takes a larger number of common factors for IFE elasticity estimates based
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on CPS data to become small is consistent with the results in Table 1.6 that it takes
a larger number of common factors to explain the variation in the CPS residuals.
Figure 1.2 plots the IFE elasticity estimate for 1-10 common factors for each dataset.
The fact that the IFE estimates are generally more stable for higher numbers of common factors is consistent with the result in [Moon and Weidner, 2015] that the IFE
estimator still performs well when the number of common factors is over-estimated,
but that the IFE estimator can be biased when the number of common factors is
under-estimated.

1.4.4

Accounting for the difference between OLS and factor model estimators

The previous results showed that the factor model estimators consistently produce elasticity estimates that are smaller than the traditional two-way fixed effects
OLS estimates. The goal of this section is to attempt to shed some light on what
the factor model estimators are capturing in the error term of equation (1) that OLS
cannot account for by analyzing the estimated factor structure from the IFE estimator. No direct economic interpretation can be given to the common factors, as
they are defined purely in a statistical sense: the factors are the eigenvectors that
correspond to the largest eigenvalues of the second moment matrix of the regression
residuals. Additionally, while the product λ0i ft is identifiable, the factors and factor
loadings themselves are identifiable only up to a sign change. Nonetheless, the factor
structure does have some interpretable patterns that are relevant to the recent debate
about the appropriateness of state-specific time trends and Census division-by-period
fixed effects.
Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5 show the first common factor from the IFE estimator
for restaurant employment and teenage employment from the QWI, respectively. The
common factor for restaurant employment looks similar to a linear time trend with
seasonality. The common factor for teenage employment from the QWI looks similar
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to a quadratic time trend with seasonality. This produces a structure very similar
to county-specific time trends when each factor is multiplied by its factor loadings.
This lends some support to the inclusion of time trends in the two-way fixed effects
specification, but only for restaurant employment and teenage employment from the
QWI. Additionally, these common factors that resemble unit-specific time trends
represent only a portion of what remains in the error term of the two-way fixed
effects specification; it takes several more factors to explain a large fraction of the
variance in the OLS residuals for these datasets and the QWI IFE estimates do not
become significantly different from OLS until additional factors are included, as seen
in Table 1.6 and Table 1.7. The other factors are not shown because they do not have
such interpretable or relevant patterns.
Figures 1.6-1.9 plot the combined effect of the unobserved common factors for a
given time period. This is constructed as the inner product of the (1 x r) vector of
factor loadings for each cross section unit, λ0i , and the (r x 1) vector of common factors
for a given time period, ft . Each of these figures shows time-varying regional clustering
in the effect of the unobserved common factors. In Figure 1.6, for example, much of
the West Coast, Midwest, and Northeast experience positive effects on employment
from the unobserved common factors in 1990q1. However, in 2010q1, the Southwest,
parts of the South and Southeast, and parts of the Northeast experience positive
employment effects from the unobserved common factors. Similar patterns of timevarying regional clustering appear in Figures 1.7-1.9.
Interestingly, this time-varying regional clustering could roughly be approximated
by a Census division-by-period fixed effect. For example, in Figure 1.6 for 1990q1, the
darker regions align fairly well with the Pacific, East North Central, Middle Atlantic,
and New England Census divisions. However, the figures also illustrate the flexibility
of the factor approach over a Census division-by-period fixed effect or the border
discontinuity approach: while regional clustering does occur, there are also many
cases in which same-division states or counties on opposite sides of a state border
experience very different effects from the common factors. For example, in Figure 1.6
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for 1990q1, Ohio clearly stands out on the map from the states around it; it appears
to experiencing a very different shock than other same-division states and counties
on the opposite side of the border from Ohio appear to be poor control groups for
counties in Ohio for a border discontinuity approach. Another interesting feature of
the figures is that in Figure 1.6 for 2010q1, the areas experiencing positive effects from
the common factors are primarily clustered around the major cities in the US. The is
a remarkable result given that the factor structure does not know where counties are
relative to each other on a map when it estimates their factor loadings.

1.4.5

Throwing out the baby with the bathwater?

The factor model results presented above are more similar to results from the
literature that include Census division-by-period fixed effects and state-specific time
trends than results based on only two-way fixed effects. Additionally, analysis of
the factor structure estimated from the IFE estimator revealed some similarities to
unit-specific time trends and Census division-by-period fixed effects. One of the main
critiques of Census division-by-period fixed effects and state-specific time trends has
been that they ”throw out the baby with the bathwater” [Neumark et al., 2014b].
That is, they potentially discard too much valid identifying variation in pursuit of
ideal counterfactuals. This critique is mostly driven by the fact that synthetic controls
sometimes place very little weight on same-division states, suggesting same-division
states may not provide a better counterfactual than a randomly selected state.
The same critique could potentially be applied to the factor model approach: the
factors from the IFE procedure and the cross section averages which proxy for factors
in the CCE estimator may explain a lot of the identifying variation themselves, leaving
a small amount variation in the data with which to estimate the minimum wageemployment elasticity. In order to address this critique, Table 1.8 shows the fraction
of the variation in both the dependent employment variables and the minimum wage
variable that is explained by each of Census division-by-period fixed effects and state-
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specific time trends, the common factors from the IFE estimator, and the cross section
averages from the CCE estimator. This is computed by regressing each variable on one
of the three sets of controls for unobserved heterogeneity and reporting the r-squared.
Census division-by-period fixed effects and state-specific time trends explain a lot
of the variation in the data. For the restaurant employment dataset, they explain
17.4% of the variation in log(employment) and 94.4% of the variation in log(minimum
wage). For the CPS ORG teenage employment dataset, they explain 62.9% of the
variation in log(employment/population) and 93.5% of the variation in log(minimum
wage). Results are very similar for the other data sources for teenage employment.
The common factors from the IFE estimator and the cross section averages from
the CCE estimator consistently explain a smaller fraction of the variance in the data
across datasets and for both the employment and minimum wage variables. The
difference between the fraction explain by Census division-by-period fixed effects and
state-specific time trends compared to the fraction explained by factor model controls
is largest for the employment variables, but there is also a significant reduction for
the minimum wage variable. It is not obvious how much variation being removed
by controls for unobserved heterogeneity would be too much, but the factor model
approach does at least do a better job of not removing too much variation than Census
division-by-period fixed effects and state-specific time trends.

1.4.6

Robustness checks

Earnings elasticity
One potential explanation for finding no significant effect of minimum wage hikes
on employment is that minimum wage hikes are not binding wage floors. The fact
that a significant portion of teenage and restaurant workers earn within 10% of the
minimum wage, as mentioned in Section 3, along with the fact that the average size of
a minimum wage hike since 1990 is approximately 10%, suggests that minimum wage
hikes likely are binding for a significant number of low-wage workers. To test this
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further, Table 1.9 shows the effect of minimum wage hikes of worker earnings. These
regressions are based on the same specifications as the employment results, except
with earnings as the dependent variable and with log(total private sector average
weekly wages) instead of log(total private sector employment) as a control variable
for restaurant earnings regressions.
OLS results in column (1) shows positive and statistically significant minimum
wage-earnings elasticity estimates for restaurant workers and teenage workers. The
elasticity estimates are in the range of 0.1 to 0.2, but they could be driven by unobserved common factors that were influencing the employment results. However, the
factor model estimates in columns (2)-(4) are also positive and statistically significant. The factor model estimates are very similar in magnitude to the OLS estimates,
except for the QWI teenage employment dataset, with which the factor model estimators produce even larger elasticity estimates than OLS12 .
These results suggest that minimum wage hikes are binding for restaurant workers
and teenager workers and that they receive a 1% to 3% increase in earnings from a 10%
increase in the minimum wage. The earnings results also confirm that the common
factors and cross section averages do not explain so much variation in the data that
there is too little left to be able to estimate large and statistically significant effects
from minimum wages.

State-specific time trends
Because one of the debates in the minimum wage-employment literature has been
about the lack of robustness to the presence and order of state-specific time trends,
Table 1.10 and Table 1.11 replicate these results and also show how sensitive the factor
model estimates are to time trends by adding state-specific time trends to equation
(1). In this setup, the factor model estimators are applied to a specification which
already models state-specific time trends in addition to unit and period fixed effects.
12

Robustness of the IFE results to the number of common factors is shown in Figure 1.3; the results
are almost entirely invariant to the number of common factors.
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As discussed previously, the factor model setup can capture deterministic trends as a
special case of the factor structure without suffering from any potential bias resulting
from specifying state-specific trends when they are not appropriate. Therefore, from
a theoretical standpoint, the inclusion of time trends is not necessary, although it
would me more efficient to include them if they are part of the true underling datagenerating process; the results from Table 1.4 remain the primary results, given that
they will capture time trends only if they show up in the data.
Table 1.10 shows that the OLS estimate of the restaurant minimum wage-employment
elasticity does vary across specifications. The large negative estimate from the twoway fixed effects specification disappears when a linear time trend is included, but
a smaller negative estimate that is statistically different than zero returns for higher
order state-specific trends. The factor model estimators, on the other hand, are much
more robust to the presence and order of state-specific time trends: only the CCEP
estimate with a 3rd order polynomial state-specific time trend shows any considerable change in magnitude or significance and all of the factor model estimates remain
smaller than the OLS estimate from the traditional two-way fixed effects specification
in Table 1.3.
Table 1.11 shows the results for teenage employment. The OLS estimate of the
teenage minimum wage-employment elasticity is even more sensitive to the presence
and order of state-specific time trends: the large negative estimate from the twoway fixed effects specification becomes much smaller when linear or quadratic statespecific time trends are included, but large negative estimates that are almost as
large as the two-way fixed effects estimate return for higher order trends. The factor
model estimates also show some variance across specifications, but not as much as
the OLS estimates. The factor model estimators remain smaller than OLS for each
specification and are always smaller than the traditional two-way fixed effects OLS
estimate in Table 1.4. The variance across specifications for the factor model estimates
of the teenage minimum wage-employment elasticity is likely another result of the
relatively small cross section dimension of the CPS data.
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Sub-samples of the data
Section 2.4 discussed the primary limitation of the factor model approach, which is
the assumption of time-invariant factor loadings. While there is some reason to believe
that at least the IFE estimator may still perform well in this setting, this nonetheless
posses the most obvious threat to identification of regression parameters, as incorrect
modeling of the error term could affect the estimation of regression parameters. One
robustness check is to estimate the model for sub-samples of the data: if the time
variation in the factor loadings was of the structural break variety and thus timeinvariant within sub-samples of the time dimension of the data, sub-sample analysis
could help address this issue. The trade off, however, is that sample size concerns
become a bigger issue.
Sub-sample results are shown in Tables 1.12 and 1.13 for restaurant and teenage
employment, respectively. Three sub-samples are considered for each dataset: (1)
the first half of the time dimension of the data, (2) the second and third quarters
of the time dimension of the data, and (3) the last half of the time dimension of
the data. Analysis is performed for restaurant employment and CPS ORG teenage
employment13 . For restaurant employment, OLS shows a large negative effect in
the 1995q2-2005q3 sub-sample. The factor model estimates do not show any large
negative effects. The CCEP estimate is negative and statistically significant in the
1990q1-2000q2 sub-sample, but the magnitude is -0.060, which is much smaller than
the traditional negative estimates found in the literature. For teenage employment,
OLS shows large negative effects in earlier sub-samples. The factor model estimators
find similar results, although the magnitude of the negative effect in the first half of
the sample is smaller. Overall, the factor model estimates remain both smaller than
OLS and below the traditional -0.1 to -0.3 range.
13

The dimension of the sub-samples are N = 1371, T = 42 for restaurant employment and N = 51,
T = 48 for teenage employment. Splitting the QWI sample is not feasible given the already short
time frame. CPS basic monthly results are very similar to the CPS ORG results.
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Falsification test
Table 1.14 shows the results of a falsification test based on the manufacturing
industry. Only 2.8% of manufacturing workers earn within 10% of the minimum
wage [Dube et al., 2010]. The manufacturing industry therefore should not experience
significant employment or earnings effects from minimum wages hikes. Reassuringly,
the factor model estimators find no statistically significant effect on employment. The
CCEP estimator does find a positive and statistically significant effect on earnings.
This could just be a statistical artifact, although if there was going to be any effect on
manufacturing workers, it would likely be a small increase in earnings, given evidence
that there can be spillovers to workers making more than the minimum wage [Lopresti
and Mumford, 2015].

Pre-existing trends
Support for the Census division-by-period fixed effects, state-specific trends, and
the border discontinuity approach in [Dube et al., 2010] and [Allegretto et al., 2011]
comes from evidence that these controls remove negative pre-existing trends in employment for states that raise their minimum wage relative to states that do not. The
way that the authors show this is to include leads of the minimum wage variable,
in which case the traditional two-way fixed effects approach produces large negative
leading effects that are removed when the additional controls are included. The authors argue that finding negative effects prior to the policy change reflects spurious
pre-trends due to minimum wage changes tending to occur at times and places with
unusually low employment growth. The leading effect results have been another topic
of debate in the follow up work.
Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11 show elasticity estimates for specifications that include
leads in the minimum wage variable. Results are based on the same model specified
in equation (1), except with 1-, 2-, and 3-year leads in the minimum wage variable
included. The elasticity reported at each point in time in the figures is the cumulative
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elasticity, which is the sum of the contemporaneous elasticity estimates for each year
until that point in time.
Figure 1.10 shows the results for restaurant employment. Similar to the results
reported in [Dube et al., 2010], OLS produces a negative trend in the leading effect of
the minimum wage: the elasticity one year before the minimum wage increase occurs
is -0.15, which is similar to the contemporaneous effect shown in Table 1.3. This
negative trend is removed by the factor model estimators, which produce flat leading
effects that are closer to zero. Figure 1.11 shows the results for teenage employment.
There is again a negative trend in the leading effect for OLS, with an elasticity of
nearly -0.2 three years before the minimum wage increase and -0.3 one year before
the increase. The factor model estimators do not fully remove the negative leading
effects for teenage employment, but they do decrease their magnitude.

Contiguous counties
For comparison with the border discontinuity approach in [Dube et al., 2010], Table 1.15 shows the OLS and factor model estimates based on the sample of contiguous
counties from [Dube et al., 2010]. Column (1) shows an OLS estimate of -0.106, which
is not statistically significant but is at the low end of the traditional -0.1 to -0.3 range
of estimates. This is consistent with the results from [Dube et al., 2010]; it is not
until they add county-pair-by-period fixed effects for each pair of contiguous counties
that they find very small elasticity estimates. However, each of the factor model
estimators produces small elasticity estimates in the range of -0.01 to -0.03 based on
only the two-way fixed effects specification. The factor model estimators also produce
much tighter confidence intervals and remove more cross section dependence from the
residuals than OLS.
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1.5

Simulation
This section assesses the relative ability of OLS and the factor model estimators

to estimate the minimum wage-employment elasticity under different assumptions
about the unobserved heterogeneity in the data. Specifically, the performance of
OLS, CCEMG, CCEP, and IFE are compared with and without the presence of
common factors in the data-generating process. The goals of these simulations are
(1) to confirm the precision of the factor model estimates of the minimum wageemployment elasticity when no common factors exist in the data and (2) to confirm
the direction of the bias in the OLS estimate of the minimum wage-employment
elasticity caused by the common factors. The simulations use the same data from
the results section in the DGP, but impose different assumptions on the unobserved
heterogeneity to simulate new employment observations.
The first simulation analyzes the performance of the OLS, CCEP, CCEMG, and
IFE estimators with only state/county and period fixed effects representing the unobserved heterogeneity in the DGP. This DGP uses the OLS results as the true value
of the coefficients in the DGP, with independent and identically distributed (IID)
normal errors. For the restaurant employment DGP, these coefficients come from
the OLS estimates in Table 1.3 and the error variance is computed using the residuals from this specification. For the teenage employment DGP, the true value of the
coefficients and the error variance come from the OLS estimates in Table 1.4. The
simulation is performed for 1,000 repetitions for each dataset14 .
The results from this simulation are shown in Table 1.16. Columns (1) and (4)
report the median of the estimates for each of the estimators for restaurant and
teenage employment, respectively, and columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) report the 95%
range of the estimates. All four estimators perform well without the presence of
∗
The DGP is yit
= β̂ln(M Wit ) + Xit Γ̂ + α̂i + δˆt + vit . The independent variables are the same
variables from the main results section, the parameters are from the OLS results reported in Tables
3 and 4, and vit is an idiosyncratic error term whose variance is determined by the variance of the
OLS residuals. State/county and period fixed effects are recovered from the data and included in
the DGP.
14
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factors in the DGP; the median estimate of the minimum wage-employment elasticity
is near the true value for each estimator. The factor model estimators also perform
well in terms of the 95% range of the estimates, with only slightly wider ranges than
OLS. There are two key takeaways from this simulation. The first key takeaway is that
the factor model estimators perform well without the presence of factors in the DGP,
even with the small cross section dimension of the teenage dataset. The second key
takeaway is that the pattern of results in this simulation does not match the pattern of
results in Section 4.1: the factor model results were very different from OLS in Section
4.1, but they are very similar here. Overall, these results show that the factor model
estimators would produce minimum wage-employment elasticity estimates similar to
OLS if the two-way fixed effects specification was correct.
The second simulation analyzes the performance of the OLS, CCEP, CCEMG, and
IFE estimators with state/county and period fixed effects and common factors representing the unobserved heterogeneity in the DGP. This DGP uses the coefficients,
common factors, and factor loadings from the IFE estimation, with independent and
identically distributed (IID) normal errors. For the restaurant employment DGP, the
true value of the coefficients and factor structure comes from the IFE estimates in Table 1.3 and the error variance is computed using the residuals from this specification.
For the teenage employment DGP, the true value of the coefficients, factor structure,
and the error variance come from the IFE estimates in Table 1.4. The simulation is
performed for 1,000 repetitions for each dataset15 .
The results from this simulation are shown in Table 1.17. For restaurant employment, the CCEP, CCEMG, and IFE estimators all perform well. The OLS estimator,
however, shows consistent and severe negative bias across repetitions: the true value
of the coefficient for the minimum wage-employment elasticity is not even in the 95%
range of the OLS estimates. For teenage employment, the OLS estimator once again
∗
The DGP is yit
= β̂ln(M Wit ) + Xit Γ̂ + α̂i + δˆt + λ̂0i fˆt + vit . The independent variables are the
same variables from the main results section, the parameters are from the IFE estimation reported
in Tables 3 and 4, and vit is an idiosyncratic error term whose variance is determined by the variance
of the IFE residuals. State/county and period fixed effects are recovered from the data and included
in the DGP.
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shows significant negative bias, with the 95% confidence range not containing the
true value of the minimum wage-employment elasticity coefficient. The CCEP and
CCEMG estimators also show some negative bias for the teenage dataset, although
not as much as OLS. This is consistent with the discussion in Section 3.2 that the
factor model estimators may not be able to remove all of the bias caused by common factors in the teenage employment data due to the relatively small cross section
dimension of the data. This simulation produces two key takeaways. The first key
takeaway is that the OLS estimate of the minimum wage-employment elasticity is
negatively biased when the common factors for restaurant and teenage employment
are included in the DGP. The second key takeaway is that the pattern of results
from this simulation matches the pattern of results seen in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4:
the OLS estimates of the minimum wage-employment elasticity are much larger in
magnitude than the factor model estimates both in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 and in
simulations with common factors included in the DGP.
In summary, the simulations show that the CCEP, CCEMG, and IFE estimators would produce minimum wage-employment elasticity estimates similar to OLS if
state/county and period fixed effects fully represented the unobserved heterogeneity
in the underlying data generating process. When common factors are included in the
DGP, the OLS estimate of the minimum wage-employment elasticity is negatively
biased, while the factor model estimators perform much better. These results suggest
that the presence of common factors in the true underlying DGP can cause the different estimates of the minimum wage-employment elasticity seen across approaches
in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4.

1.6

Discussion and conclusion
The recent minimum wage-employment debate in the literature has focused on

how to generate credible estimates of employment effects when using aggregated panel
data. Doing so is very difficult, as both outcomes and minimum wage policy are likely
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to be correlated across areas due to unobservable confounders. Many approaches
have been proposed in order to control for or remove these confounders, including
saturating the two-way fixed effects specification with additional controls, using a
border discontinuity approach to identify the effect based on policy discontinuity at
state borders, and using synthetic controls. Each approach has its drawbacks. More
importantly, the various approaches have produced inconsistent results, and it is not
obvious which approach is best or which set of results to believe.
The factor model estimators from [Pesaran, 2006] and [Bai, 2009] are very wellsuited to address the issues in the minimum wage-employment literature: they are
intended to control for unobservable factors in panel data in order to generate unbiased estimates of regression parameters for observed covariates. These estimators
have specific advantages over the other approaches that have recently been used in the
literature. They also satisfy the main concerns from each side of the recent debate,
which is that they facilitate the control of unobserved confounders without discarding
a significant amount of identifying variation, changing the identifying variation, or
discarding data altogether.
The factor model estimators produce minimum wage-employment elasticity estimates in the range of -0.01 to -0.05 for restaurant employment and -0.03 to -0.07
for teenage employment. These results are generally robust to a number of robustness checks, including alternative sources for teenage employment data and different
assumptions about the number of common factors in the data. Furthermore, the
pattern of relatively large negative OLS elasticity estimates and small factor model
estimates cannot be replicated in simulations which include only two-way fixed effects
as the true unobserved heterogeneity, suggesting that the traditional two-way fixed
effects specification is not correct. The simulations also confirm that common factors
from the minimum wage-employment data cause negative bias in the OLS estimate
of the minimum wage-employment elasticity.
Overall, the factor model results suggest that there has been little to no effect
of minimum wage hikes on restaurant or teenage employment over the last three
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decades. However, the size of the minimum wage hike is important. Most minimum
wage hikes in the U.S. during this time have been in the range of 5% to 15%. The
results in this study, or any other study based on data from past U.S. minimum wage
hikes, may not be informative about the effects of larger hikes.
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Fig. 1.1.: The top figure shows the average minimum wage in each state from 19802015. The bottom figure shows the total number of minimum wage hikes in each
state from 1980-2015.
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Fig. 1.2.: Each figure shows the interactive fixed effects (IFE) estimate of the minimum wage-employment elasticity for different numbers of common factors. Zero
common factors is equivalent to OLS. Corresponding confidence intervals are shown
in Table 1.7.

Fig. 1.3.: Each figure shows the interactive fixed effects (IFE) estimate of the minimum wage-employment elasticity for different numbers of common factors. Zero
common factors is equivalent to OLS.
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Fig. 1.4.: The figure shows the first common factor for restaurant employment. Common factors are estimated jointly with the regression coefficients in the interactive
fixed effects (IFE) procedure.
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Fig. 1.5.: The figure shows the first common factor for teenage employment (QWI).
Common factors are estimated jointly with the regression coefficients in the interactive
fixed effects (IFE) procedure.
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Fig. 1.6.: Each figure plots the combined effect of the common factors for the specified
0
time period on each county’s log employment (λ̂i fˆt , 5 factors). Common factors and
factor loadings are estimated jointly with the regression coefficients in the interactive
fixed effects (IFE) procedure. Counties without data in the figure had missing observations in the raw data and were therefore not included in the balanced sample used
for analysis.
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0
Fig. 1.7.: Figures plots λ̂i fˆt , 8 factors. See Figure 1.6 for details.
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0
Fig. 1.8.: Figure plots λ̂i fˆt , 8 factors. See Figure 1.6 for details.
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0
Fig. 1.9.: Figure plots λ̂i fˆt , 6 factors. See Figure 1.6 for details.
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Fig. 1.10.: This figure plots lead effects of minimum wage hikes. Results are based
on equation (1) with 1-, 2-, and 3-year leads in the minimum wage variable included.
The elasticity reported at each point in time is the cumulative elasticity, which is
the sum of the contemporaneous elasticity estimates for each year until that point in
time.
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Fig. 1.11.: See Figure 1.10 for details.
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Table 1.1.: Partial review of recent panel studies
Study

Population

Neumark and Wascher (1992) Teenagers
Neumark and Wascher (2007) Teenagers
DLR (2010)
Restaurants

ADR (2011)

NSW (2014a, 2014b)

ADRZ (2013, 2015)

Approach

Traditional
Traditional
Census division-by-period fixed effects
CDxP FE & state-specific linear trends
Contiguous county pairs
Teenagers
Census division-by-period fixed effects
State-specific linear trends
CDxP FE & state-specific linear trends
Restaurants Synthetic controls
Teenagers
State-specific 5th-order trend
Synthetic controls
Teenagers
Synthetic controls
Double-selection post-LASSO

Elasticity Effect
-0.140**
-0.136*
-0.023
0.054
0.016
-0.036
-0.034
0.047
-0.063***
-0.185**
-0.145**
-0.036
-0.012

Negative
Negative
None
None
None
None
None
None
Negative
Negative
Negative
None
None

The elasticity result is taken directly from the results reported in each study. For Neumark and Wascher
(2007), this elasticity is constructed using the employment-population ratio in Table 1 and the employment
coefficient in Table 2, specification 1. The ”traditional” approach refers to using two-way fixed effects for time
and location, with no additional controls for regional heterogeneity or selection of states experiencing minimum
wage hikes. DLR=[Dube et al., 2010], ADR=[Allegretto et al., 2011], NSW=Neumark, Salas, and Wascher,
ADRZ=Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer. The synthetic control approach in NSW pools all synthetic and
real data together and then estimates the two-way fixed effects specification with a fixed effect for each set of
synthetic and real observations. Significance levels are as follows: *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent.
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Table 1.2.: Data sources
(1)
Mean
Panel A: Restaurant employment (QCEW)
Restaurant employment
4,786
Restaurant average weekly wages
$170.77
Total private sector employment
68,289
Total private sector average wages
$481.37
Population
181,719
Minimum wage
$5.26
T (1990-2010)
84
N
1,371
Panel B: Teenage employment (CPS ORG)
Fraction of teenagers employed
0.41
Average hourly wage for teens
$8.26
Unemployment rate
5.68
Relative size of teenage population
0.09
Minimum wage
$5.58
T (1990-2013)
96
N
51
Panel C: Teenage employment (CPS basic monthly)
Fraction of teenagers employed
0.41
Unemployment rate
5.58
Relative size of teenage population
0.07
Minimum wage
$5.58
T (1990-2013)
96
N
51
Panel D: Teenage employment (QWI)
Teenage employment
Teenage average weekly wages
Total private sector employment
Population
Teenage population
Minimum wage
T (2000-2011)
N

1,299
$474.61
41,046
357,940
13,233
$5.98
48
2,189

(2)
Standard
deviation

(3)
CD test
statistic

11,168
$43.72
174,797
$136.80
423,564
$1.07

4992.8***
6939.0***

0.12
$0.86
2.14
0.01
$1.26

205.2***
88.82***

0.12
1.26
0.01
$1.26

253.9**

4,029
$868.95
153,885
1,237,330
44,986
$0.98

6856.8***
6485.5***

For the restaurant employment analysis, county-quarter employment and wage data
come from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) and population
data comes from the annual Census Bureau estimates. For teenage employment analysis using CPS ORG and CPS basic monthly files, all variables are constructed by
aggregating the individual-level CPS files to the state-quarter level. For teenage employment analysis using the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) dataset, countyquarter employment and wage data come from the QWI and population data comes
from the annual Census Bureau estimates. A minimum wage variable that is always
the higher of the state and federal minimum wage is added to each dataset. Tests for
cross section dependence are based on the test in [Pesaran, 2015].

Table 1.3.: Minimum wage-employment elasticity - restaurant employment
(1)
OLS

(2)
CCEMG

(3)
CCEP

(4)
IFE

Dependent variable: log(employment)
log(Minimum wage)
log(Total private sector emp.)
log(Population)

Period fixed effects
County fixed effects
CD test statistic
T xN

-0.138*
[-0.297,0.019]
0.512***
[0.430,0.595]
0.587***
[0.432,0.742]

-0.013
[-0.042,0.026]
0.704***
[0.667,0.742]
0.373***
[0.184,0.566]

-0.013
[-0.046,0.028]
0.585***
[0.515,0.653]
0.412***
[0.285,0.547]

-0.042
[-0.085,0.015]
0.519***
[0.424,0.601]
0.296***
[0.138,0.436]

Yes
Yes
26.98***
115,164

Yes
Yes
8.46***
115,164

Yes
Yes
17.19***
115,164

Yes
Yes
-0.30
115,164

Each column uses a different estimator applied to the traditional two-way fixed effects specification shown in equation
(1). IFE results are based on 4 common factors. OLS standard errors are clustered at the state level. Standard errors for
CCEMG, CCEP, and IFE are calculated according to [Bai, 2009] and [Pesaran, 2006] and are described in the appendix. The
confidence intervals and significance reported for CCEMG, CCEP, and IFE are based on bootstrapped t-statistics following
the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure in [Cameron et al., 2008], clustered at the state level. Significance levels are as follows:
*10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent. Residual diagnostics for strong cross section dependence are based on the test in
[Pesaran, 2015].
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Table 1.4.: Minimum wage-employment elasticity - teenage employment
(1)
OLS

(2)
CCEMG

(3)
CCEP

(4)
IFE

Dependent variable: log(employment/population)
log(Minimum wage)
Unemployment rate
Teen population share

Period fixed effects
State fixed effects
CD test statistic
T xN

-0.178**
[-0.323,-0.033]
-3.608***
[-4.243,-2.973]
-0.154
[-0.709,0.401]

-0.040
[-0.214,0.135]
-2.660***
[-3.162,-2.158]
0.482
[-0.104,1.068]

-0.065
[-0.191,0.061]
-2.805***
[-3.415,-2.195]
0.274
[-0.223,0.771]

-0.036
[-0.157,0.097]
-1.787***
[-2.457,-1.347]
0.249
[-0.233,0.773]

Yes
Yes
-5.96***
4,896

Yes
Yes
-6.01***
4,896

Yes
Yes
-6.03***
4,896

Yes
Yes
-6.69***
4,896

IFE results are based on 8 common factors. See Table 1.3 for additional details.
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Table 1.5.: Minimum wage-employment elasticity - teenage employment, other data sources
(1)
OLS

(2)
CCEMG

(3)
CCEP

(4)
IFE

-0.116*
[-0.245,0.014]
-6.06***
4,896

0.001
[-0.182,0.184]
-5.19***
4,896

-0.066
[-0.179,0.047]
-6.02***
4,896

0.053
[-0.017,0.159]
-6.78***
4,896

Panel B: Quarterly Workforce Indicators
log(Minimum wage)
-0.019
[-0.277,0.239]
CD test statistic
95.85***
T xN
105,072

-0.089**
[-0.164,-0.014]
51.81***
105,072

-0.039**
[-0.077,-0.001]
76.63***
105,072

-0.035
[-0.110,0.042]
20.93***
105,072

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Panel A: CPS basic monthly
log(Minimum wage)
CD test statistic
T xN

Period fixed effects
County/State fixed effects

Yes
Yes

IFE results are based on 8 common factors for the CPS basic monthly data and 6 common factors for the QWI data. Panel
A also controls for state-quarter unemployment rate, state-quarter relative size of the teenage population, and state-quarter
mean demographics for sex, age, race, Hispanic heritage, and marital status. Panel B controls for county-quarter total
population, teenage population, and total private sector employment. See Table 1.3 for additional details.
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Table 1.6.: Summary statistics for common factors

Panel A: Restaurant employment
AR1(fˆpt )
Rp2
Panel B: Teen employment (CPS ORG)
AR1(fˆpt )
Rp2
Panel C: Teen employment (CPS basic monthly)
AR1(fˆpt )
Rp2
Panel D: Teen employment (QWI)
AR1(fˆpt )
Rp2

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1

2

3
0.527
0.785

0.990 0.975
0.538 0.707

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

4

(5)
(6)
Factor #p
5
6

7

8

9

10

0.447
0.857

0.988 0.969
0.899 0.928

0.954
0.951

0.884 0.882 0.867
0.971 0.987 1.000

0.496 0.295 -0.014
0.195 0.374 0.470

-0.009 0.021 0.031 -0.015 0.008 0.122 0.028
0.561 0.648 0.730 0.806 0.879 0.944 1.000

0.825 0.086
0.274 0.477

0.440
0.563

0.281
0.640

0.430 0.363
0.713 0.775

0.827 0.032
0.377 0.586

0.917
0.734

0.941
0.809

0.901 0.876 -0.059 0.844 0.622 0.523
0.861 0.899 0.932 0.960 0.982 1.000

0.382
0.836

0.263 0.337 0.140
0.899 0.950 1.000

The first 10 common factors for each data source come from the interactive fixed effects (IFE) results with 10 pre-specified
common factors. Rp2 shows the relative importance of each factor, calculated as the fraction of the total variance of the residuals
explained by factors 1 to p. This is given as the sum of the first p largest eigenvalues of the sample second moment matrix of the
OLS residuals divided by the sum of all eigenvalues. AR1(fˆpt ) is the first order autocorrelation coefficient for the given factor.
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Table 1.7.: IFE estimates for different numbers of common factors
(1)

(2)

2

3

(3)
(4)
(5)
Number of common factors
4
5
6

(6)

(7)

7

8

Panel A: Restaurant employment
log(Minimum wage)
-0.016
-0.035
-0.042
-0.023
-0.035
-0.008
-0.007
[-0.056,0.029] [-0.072,0.019] [-0.085,0.015] [-0.068,0.028] [-0.049,0.029] [-0.044,0.030] [-0.052,0.023]
CD test statistic
29.02***
29.39***
-0.30
-0.22
0.40
0.61
0.74
Panel B: Teen employment (CPS ORG)
log(Minimum wage)
-0.104
-0.093
-0.069
-0.064
-0.061
-0.018
-0.036
[-0.233,0.038] [-0.224,0.045] [-0.196,0.076] [-0.179,0.072] [-0.157,0.097] [-0.121,0.147] [-0.161,0.094]
CD test statistic
-6.45***
-6.45***
-6.48***
-6.52***
-6.64***
-6.66***
-6.72***
Panel C: Teen employment (CPS basic monthly)
log(Minimum wage)
-0.072
-0.069
-0.078
0.013
0.031
0.045
0.053
[-0.143,0.039] [-0.139,0.035] [-0.140,0.029] [-0.052,0.118] [-0.040,0.133] [-0.028,0.146] [-0.017,0.159]
CD test statistic
-6.29***
-6.53***
-6.71***
-6.74***
-6.77***
-6.77***
-6.78***
Panel D: Teen employment (QWI)
log(Minimum wage)
-0.098**
-0.071*
-0.009
-0.031
-0.035
0.042
0.008
[-0.170,-0.023] [-0.146,0.002] [-0.076,0.073] [-0.108,0.044] [-0.110,0.042] [-0.037,0.077] [-0.074,0.075]
CD test statistic
20.17***
17.00***
21.42***
18.75***
20.93***
13.25***
12.49***
Each column is a separate interactive fixed effects (IFE) estimate of the minimum wage-employment elasticity based on the traditional two-way fixed effects specification shown in equation (1). Each columns assumes a different number of pre-specified common
factors for the IFE procedure. See Table 1.3 for additional details about standard errors, inference, and CD test statistics.
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Table 1.8.: Proportion of variance (R2 ) explained by controls for unobserved heterogeneity
(1)

(2)
Controls

(3)

CDxP
fixed
effects and
statespecific
time
trends

Common
factors
estimated
from IFE
procedure

cross
section
averages
from CCE
procedure

Panel A: Restaurant employment
log(Employment)
log(Minimum wage)

0.174
0.944

0.013
0.837

0.014
0.874

Panel B: Teenage employment (CPS ORG)
log(Employment/population)
log(Minimum wage)

0.629
0.935

0.186
0.643

0.336
0.882

Panel C: Teenage employment (CPS ORG)
log(Employment/population)
log(Minimum wage)

0.693
0.935

0.258
0.715

0.372
0.880

Panel D: Teenage employment (QWI)
log(Employment)
log(Minimum wage)

0.189
0.885

0.015
0.753

0.015
0.766

Dependent variable

Each columns shows the proportion of the variance in the data for the given dependent variable that is explained by the controls for unobserved heterogeneity. This
is computed by regressing the dependent variable on Census division-by-period fixed
effects and state-specific time trends for column (1), regressing the dependent variable
on the common factors estimated from the interactive fixed effects (IFE) procedure
for column (2), and regressing the dependent variable on the cross section averages
used in the common correlated effects (CCE) procedure for column (3).

Table 1.9.: Minimum wage-earnings elasticity estimates

Panel A: Restaurant average weekly wages
log(Minimum wage)

Panel B: Teenage hourly earnings (CPS)
log(Minimum wage)

Panel C: Teenage average weekly wages (QWI)
log(Minimum wage)

Period fixed effects
State fixed effects

(1)
OLS

(2)
CCEMG

(3)
CCEP

(4)
IFE

0.209***
[0.160,0.257]
5.12***

0.231***
[0.175,0.264]
6.00***

0.222***
[0.199,0.251]
2.88***

0.145***
[0.091,0.210]
0.21

0.104***
[0.041,0.167]
-6.18***

0.097**
[0.010,0.188]
-6.10***

0.110***
[0.034,0.184]
-6.20***

0.158***
[0.083,0.232]
-6.77***

0.193***
[0.143,0.243]
108.05***

0.307***
[0.235,0.383]
101.32***

0.294***
[0.244,0.331]
74.31***

0.308***
[0.253,0.354]
18.18***

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Each column uses a different estimator applied to the traditional two-way fixed effects specification to estimate the minimum
wage-earnings elasticity. The dependent variable is county-quarter average weekly wages for restaurant workers in Panel A,
individual hourly earnings for teenage workers in the CPS aggregated to the state-quarter level in Panel B, and county-quarter
average weekly wages for teenagers in the QWI in Panel C. Independent variables are the same as those for employment
regressions, except log(Total private sector employment) is replaced with log(Total private sector average weekly wages) for
restaurant earnings regressions.
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Table 1.10.: State-specific trend robustness checks - restaurant employment

OLS
CCEMG
CCEP
IFE

(1)

(2)

None

1st

-0.138*
[-0.297,0.019]
-0.013
[-0.042,0.026]
-0.013
[-0.046,0.028]
-0.042
[-0.085,0.015]

-0.041**
[-0.075,-0.008]
-0.003
[-0.039,0.022]
-0.003
[-0.036,0.025]
-0.048
[-0.087,0.014]

(3)
(4)
Polynomial order for state-specific trend
2nd
3rd
-0.024
[-0.058,0.009]
-0.012
[-0.044,0.019]
-0.018
[-0.049,0.014]
-0.041
[-0.084,0.015]

-0.052***
[-0.085,-0.020]
-0.013
[-0.045,0.018]
-0.041***
[-0.073,-0.021]
-0.044
[-0.085,0.013]

(5)

(6)

4th

5th

-0.040**
[-0.071,-0.009]
0.001
[-0.032,0.029]
-0.013
[-0.038,0.022]
-0.033
[-0.080,0.019]

-0.031*
[-0.067,0.003]
-0.007
[-0.035,0.022]
-0.007
[-0.034,0.024]
-0.025
[-0.078,0.023]

Each column shows the OLS, common correlated effects (CCE), and interactive fixed effects (IFE) estimates for different
specifications. Column (1) is the traditional two-way fixed effects result without state-specific time trends shown in Table
1.3. Columns (2)-(6) add flexible state-specific time trends, beginning with linear state-specific time trends and extending
to 5th-order polynomial state-specific time trends. IFE results are based on 4 common factors. See Table 1.3 for additional
details about standard errors and inference.
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Table 1.11.: State-specific trend robustness checks - teenage employment

OLS
CCEMG
CCEP
IFE

(1)

(2)

None

1st

-0.178**
[-0.323,-0.033]
-0.040
[-0.214,0.135]
-0.065
[-0.191,0.061]
-0.036
[-0.157,0.097]

-0.074
[-0.194,0.045]
-0.025
[-0.198,0.147]
-0.043
[-0.173,0.088]
0.041
[-0.053,0.137]

(3)
(4)
Polynomial order for state-specific trend
2nd
3rd
-0.045
[-0.167,0.077]
0.029
[-0.119,0.193]
0.009
[-0.106,0.125]
0.028
[-0.074,0.128]

-0.142**
[-0.303,-0.019]
-0.129
[-0.321,0.075]
-0.090
[-0.260,0.080]
-0.079
[-0.220,0.054]

(5)

(6)

4th

5th

-0.108
[-0.275,0.059]
-0.088
[-0.293,0.129]
-0.018
[-0.192,0.155]
-0.064
[-0.174,0.062]

-0.125*
[0.270,-0.020]
-0.106
[0.310,0.089]
-0.065
[-0.221,0.091]
-0.094
[-0.208,0.098]

IFE results are based on 8 common factors. See Table 1.10 for additional details.
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Table 1.12.: Sub-sample robustness checks - restaurant employment

OLS
CCEMG
CCEP
IFE

(1)
1990q1-2000q2

(2)
1995q2-2005q3

(3)
2000q3-2010q4

-0.018
[-0.177,0.141]
0.120
[-0.335,0.095]
-0.060**
[-0.004,-0.118]
-0.052
[0.015,-0.013]

-0.137**
[-0.264,-0.010]
0.088
[-0.219,0.042]
-0.003
[0.039,-0.043]
-0.015
[0.056,-0.055]

-0.021
[-0.095,0.019]
-0.014
[0.013,-0.049]
-0.020
[0.015,-0.059]
0.002
[0.063,-0.053]

Each column shows the OLS, common correlated effects (CCE), and interactive effects (IFE) estimates for sub-samples of the data. The dimensions of the data in the
sub-samples are N = 1371 and T = 42. IFE results are based on 4 common factors.
See Table 1.3 for additional details about standard errors and inference.
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Table 1.13.: Sub-sample robustness checks - teenage employment

OLS
CCEMG
CCEP
IFE

(1)
1990q1-2001q4

(2)
1996q1-2007q4

(3)
2002q1-2013q4

-0.205**
[-0.409,-0.001]
-0.020
[-0.519,0.485]
-0.156
[-0.376,0.073]
-0.142
[-0.416,0.186]

-0.102
[-0.249,0.045]
-0.113
[-0.364,0.145]
-0.107
[-0.310,0.112]
-0.102
[-0.303,0.109]

-0.069
[-0.261,0.131]
-0.045
[-0.349,0.258]
-0.066
[-0.282,0.159]
-0.069
[-0.268,0.143]

Each column shows the OLS, common correlated effects (CCE), and interactive effects (IFE) estimates for sub-samples of the data. The dimensions of the data in the
sub-samples are N = 51 and T = 48. IFE results are based on 8 common factors.
See Table 1.3 for additional details about standard errors and inference.

Table 1.14.: Falsification test: employment and earnings minimum wage elasticity estimates for the manufacturing industry
Dependent variable
Employment
Earnings

Period fixed effects
State fixed effects

(1)
OLS

(2)
CCEMG

(3)
CCEP

(4)
IFE

-0.013
[-0.176,0.149]
-0.096
[-0.314,0.121]

0.015
[-0.028,0.051]
0.086
[-0.078,0.235]

0.026
[-0.021,0.063]
0.085**
[0.013,0.161]

0.007
[-0.038,0.041]
-0.045
[-0.139,0.063]

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Each column uses a different estimator applied to the traditional two-way fixed effects specification shown in equation (1)
for the given dependent variable. The employment dependent variable is county-quarter manufacturing employment. The
earnings dependent variable is county-quarter average weekly wages for manufacturing workers. Data on county-quarter
employment and earnings for manufacturing workers comes from the QCEW. Employment regressions control for total
private sector employment and county population. Earnings regressions control for total private sector average weekly wages
and county population. IFE results are based on 4 common factors. See Table 1.3 for additional details about standard
errors and inference.
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Table 1.15.: Minimum wage-employment elasticity - restaurant employment, contiguous counties sample
(1)
OLS

(2)
CCEMG

(3)
CCEP

(4)
IFE

Dependent variable: log(restaurant emp.)
log(Minimum wage)
log(Total private sector emp.)
log(Population)

Period fixed effects
County fixed effects
CD test statistic
T xN

-0.106
[-0.236,0.024]
0.288***
[0.198,0.379]
0.778***
[0.612,0.944]

-0.025
[-0.088,0.038]
0.600***
[0.533,0.667]
0.224
[-0.084,0.568]

-0.011
[-0.056,0.034]
0.468***
[0.370,0.566]
0.476***
[0.239,0.713]

-0.034
[-0.090,0.024]
0.425***
[0.292,0.548]
0.181
[-0.117,0.442]

Yes
Yes
7.15***
42,000

Yes
Yes
1.15
42,000

Yes
Yes
2.22**
42,000

Yes
Yes
-1.25
42,000

Results correspond to the results in Table 1.3, except based on the contiguous county sample from [Dube et al., 2010].
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Table 1.16.: Minimum wage-employment elasticity simulation results - no factors in
DGP

True value
OLS
CCEMG
CCEP
IFE

(1)
(2)
(3)
Restaurant Employment
Median
2.5%
97.5%

(4)
(5)
(6)
Teenage Employment
Median
2.5%
97.5%

-0.138
-0.139
-0.139
-0.138
-0.138

-0.178
-0.177
-0.179
-0.177
-0.177

-0.152
-0.167
-0.159
-0.153

-0.128
-0.111
-0.120
-0.124

-0.223
-0.248
-0.234
-0.225

-0.134
-0.107
-0.124
-0.131

This table reports simulation results for the case without common factors in the data
generating process. The DGP is yit = β̂ln(M Wit ) + Xit Γ̂ + α̂i + δˆt + vit , where the
independent variables are the same variables used in the results section, the parameters are from the OLS results for the traditional two-way period and location fixed
effects specification reported in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4, and vit is an idiosyncratic
error term whose variance is equal to the variance of the OLS residuals. The number
of repetitions is 1,000.
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Table 1.17.: Minimum wage-employment elasticity simulation results - factors in DGP

True value
OLS
CCEMG
CCEP
IFE

(1)
(2)
(3)
Restaurant Employment
Median
2.5%
97.5%

(4)
(5)
(6)
Teenage Employment
Median
2.5%
97.5%

-0.042
-0.175
-0.045
-0.041
-0.043

-0.036
-0.175
-0.134
-0.101
-0.038

-0.203
-0.092
-0.087
-0.072

-0.135
0.007
-0.002
-0.011

-0.222
-0.198
-0.158
-0.088

-0.129
-0.058
-0.047
0.026

This table reports simulation results for the case with common factors in the data
generating process. The DGP is yit = β̂ln(M Wit )+Xit Γ̂+ α̂i + δˆt + λ̂0i fˆt +vit , where the
independent variables are the same variables used in the results section, the parameters are from the IFE results for the traditional two-way period and location fixed
effects specification reported in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4, and vit is an idiosyncratic
error term whose variance is equal to the variance of the IFE residuals. The number
of repetitions is 1,000.
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CHAPTER 2. THE LASTING IMPACT OF HIGH SCHOOL VALUE-ADDED
2.1

Introduction
Many states and school districts have recently begun using value-added models to

evaluate teachers and schools1 . These models are intended to estimate the impact that
teachers and schools have on student test scores. This typically involves estimating
the gains or losses in terms of normalized test scores that students experience while
under the instruction of a particular teacher or while in enrolled in a particular school.
Some states and school districts have tied raises, tenure, and school funding to valueadded scores. Some also release these value-added scores to the public2 .
The use of value-added models to evaluate teachers and schools has caused two
debates. The first is whether value-added models provide unbiased estimates of the
impact that teachers and schools have on student test scores. The second is a public
policy debate of whether these value-added models should actually be a part of the
evaluation process for teachers and schools. Much work has been done on the first
debate. A number of papers have raised concerns that value-added models may be
biased by an inability to capture the sorting of students into classrooms and schools
based on unobservable characteristics that are correlated with test scores [Baker et al.,
2010, Rothstein, 2010, Paufler and Amrein-Beardsley, 2014]. However, there is lots
of evidence and a growing consensus that modern value-added models do a good job
of capturing these unobservable characteristics and providing unbiased value-added
estimates [Kane and Staiger, 2008, Kane et al., 2013, Deming, 2014, Chetty et al.,
014a, Koedel et al., 2015].
1

See [Hershberg, 2015] for an overview of which states rely on some form of value-added models for
teacher and school evaluation and how this assessment is implemented.
2
In Tennessee, for example: http://www.tn.gov/education/topic/report-card.
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The second debate has not approached a consensus and is still a very divisive
topic. One critique against the use of value-added models to evaluate schools and
teachers is that value-added estimates may be too unstable to be used for high-stakes
personnel decisions [Baker et al., 2010, Newton et al., 2010]. Another important
question related to the public policy debate is whether value-added estimates capture
lasting impacts that teachers and schools are having on students. Are teachers and
schools that have high value-added estimates actually improving the cognitive ability
of their students, or are they simply better at teaching to the test? The former would
be a valuable argument for public policy use of value-added estimates. Alternatively,
if higher value-added teachers and schools are simply better at teaching to the test
and have no lasting impact on student outcomes, then their appropriateness as a way
of evaluating teachers and schools should become even more heavily scrutinized.
I address this second debate by first using K-12 test score data for students in
Florida and North Carolina to estimate value-added scores for high schools in these
two states. I use value-added models that have been shown to provide unbiased estimates of value-added scores in prior work. I confirm the performance of these models
by including tests which suggest that the value-added models appear to sufficiently
capture the sorting of students into high schools based on unobservable characteristics
that are correlated with test scores. I then link these value-added scores for Florida
and North Carolina high schools to a second dataset on college performance. This
dataset includes detailed college transcript data as well as some background data on
the student, including their high school. This allows me to determine the impact of
attending a higher value-added high school on college performance.
The only other paper that analyzes the lasting impact of value-added on adult
outcomes is [Chetty et al., 014b]. They study the lasting impact of value-added
measured at the teacher level in grades 4-8 and find statistically significant positive
effects of having a higher value-added teacher on college attendance, college quality,
and early adulthood earnings. This study is the most similar to mine because it
analyzes the lasting impact of value-added on adult outcomes, but there are also
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several differences. First, their study analyzed the lasting impact of value-added
during grades 4-8, whereas I am studying the lasting impact of value-added that
occurs during high school. Studies have found that the earliest years of a student’s
schooling are the most influential [Cuncha and Heckman, 2010]. This suggests that
value-added that occurs during high school may have less impact on a student’s
adult outcomes. The results from [Chetty et al., 014b] therefore do not answer the
question of how value-added that occurs during high school affects adult outcomes.
A second difference is that their study analyzed the lasting impact of being in a
high value-added teacher’s classroom, whereas this study analyzes the lasting impact
of attending a high value-added school. This difference is an important distinction
between their study and mine and, more generally, an important addition to the valueadded literature. Several states and school districts evaluate schools using value-added
methods, just as they do for teachers, and attach school-level funding to value-added
scores. Additionally, teachers without test score data, such as preschool and special
education teachers, in some cases have their school’s value-added score substituted
into their evaluation. Yet, the value-added literature focuses primarily on teacher
value-added. Finally, my paper uses adult outcome variables that were not studied
in [Chetty et al., 014b]: college GPA and graduation.
I find that higher value-added high schools have positive and statistically significant impacts on the future college GPA of their students. The effect is largest
in earlier semesters. A one standard deviation increase in high school value-added
increases first-semester GPA by 0.022 points. The impact becomes smaller and eventually insignificant for later semesters, which is consistent with the value-added model
framework. Ultimately, a one standard deviation increase in high school value-added
increases final GPA by 0.017 points, which is approximately a one letter grade increase
over the course of a college career. The impact on graduation is not statistically significant. While these results are somewhat small in magnitude, one of the identifying
assumptions is that higher value-added high schools do not cause selection into or out
of the universities in the sample. In reality, higher value-added high schools do likely
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push lower-ability students into the sample of universities and push higher-ability
students out of the sample and into better universities. In fact, as mentioned above,
[Chetty et al., 014b] find evidence that higher value-added teachers do in fact increase
both college attendance and university quality. This would cause negative bias in the
results in this paper. Therefore, these estimates likely provide a lower-bound on the
impact of attending a higher value-added high school on college performance. I also
find that these results are generally consistent across race and gender, although the
impact is somewhat larger for White students. Additionally, quantile regressions suggest that the lasting impact on GPA is larger for students on the lower-end of the
ability distribution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the conceptual framework that modern value-added models are based on. Section 3 describes
how the value-added scores are estimated and how I estimate the impact of attending
a higher value-added high school on college performance. Section 4 describes the
datasets used. Section 5 tests some of the assumptions of the models. Section 6
presents and discusses the results. Section 7 concludes.

2.2

Model background
Value-added modeling typically involves linear regression analysis which predicts

student test score performance based on a combination on prior achievement and
demographics. The details for the specification and estimation of value-added scores
and their impact on college outcomes will be discussed in Section 3. First, I discuss a
statistical framework for student achievement adopted from [Todd and Wolpin, 2003].
Under some conditions discussed below, the linear regression value-added models can
be derived from this framework.
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Student achievement in a given year is a function of school inputs and other
factors:

Ait = A[Si (t), Fi (t), αi0 , εit ].

(2.1)

Ait is a measure of achievement for student i at time t, which is a function of the
history of family inputs (Fi (t)), school inputs (Si (t)), ability (αi0 ), and an idiosyncratic error term (εit ), where Si /Fi (t) represents a detailed history from each year
until time t. The intuition behind the common value-added models is that lagged
achievement measures can be a sufficient statistic for detailed input histories and
ability. In this setting, the achievement production function can be rewritten as a
function of contemporaneous inputs and a baseline test score:

Aijt = At [sj(i,t) , fit , Ai,t−1 [Si (t − 1), Fi (t − 1), αi0 ], εijt ].

(2.2)

which models current academic achievement as a function of current school inputs
(sj(i,t) , which is a measure of school quality for school j that student i attends in year
t), current family inputs (fit ), lagged achievement (Ai,t−1 ), and an idiosyncratic error
term3 .
Applied value-added work traditionally assumes that the arguments in (2) are
additively separable, which leads to the equation:

Aijt = sj(i,t) + αfit + γAi,t−1 + εijt .

(2.3)

Difficult to measure prior input histories and unobservable individual ability are not in
(3) because they are, in principle, captured in the lagged achievement score. Applied
value-added models typically make one additional assumption, which is that current
3

Here, school quality is indexed by (i, t) to indicate that it is the school that student i attended in
year t. Below, when I estimate the impact of high school quality on college performance, I use the
average value-added score for each school during the entire time frame; I do not use within-school
variation in value-added scores. Thus, in these regressions, I index school quality only by (i) to
indicate which high school the college student attended.
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family inputs such as parental effort do not respond to contemporaneous school inputs,
in which case the model of student achievement is further simplified to:

Aijt = sj(i,t) + γAi,t−1 + εijt

(2.4)

which is the basis for applied value-added work. There are a variety of estimation
methods that are often used to recover the school inputs from this model. These
methods will be discussed in the next section.
Several conditions are required in order to link the value-added model in equation
(4) to the underlying structural cumulative achievement model in (1). Among them
are grade invariance in the education production function, geometric decay in the
impact of prior inputs, and geometric decay in the impact of unobservable individual
ability that is equal to the rate of geometric decay for prior inputs. A detailed
discussion of these assumptions can be found in [Todd and Wolpin, 2003] and [Sass
et al., 2014]. [Sass et al., 2014] show that these conditions are usually not met.
However, as they point out, the failure of typical value-added models to link to
a structural interpretation says little about the informational value of the valueadded measures. Ultimately, the extent to which value-added measures capture useful
information about school inputs is an empirical question. Another assumption of this
model that is standard in applied value-added work is that school quality is timeinvariant, conditional on the roster and experience of the teachers and administrators
in the school. This rules out the possibility that school value-added fluctuates from
year-to-year for reasons unrelated to school faculty composition effects or that it
depends on characteristics of the students.
Before moving to the college achievement function, it should be mentioned that
much of the applied work on value-added is concerned with value-added from teachers,
rather than entire schools. Thus, in equation (4), ’school inputs’ becomes a measure
of teachers’ impacts on test scores. However, the focus in this paper is on measuring
school-level value-added and the ’school inputs’ will be a measure of the school’s
impact on test scores. The use of school-level value-added is a necessity, given that
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the college outcome data only allows me to link students to high schools, rather than
teachers. But it is not a concern; the use of school value-added, rather than teacher
value-added, is likely most appropriate at the high school level. Within any school,
there will be variation in teacher quality. For earlier grades, where students often only
have instruction from a single teacher, the entire school’s value-added score would be
a very noisy measure of the value-added that each individual student receives. In high
school, however, students take courses with many different instructors; over the course
of their high school career, students will likely receive instruction from a large fraction
of the school’s teachers. This makes the use of teacher value-added less appropriate,
as a student will often take only one course from a specific teacher in their entire
high school career. When only school effects are included without teacher effects, the
school effect is likely made up of an accumulation of teacher effects, but they also
likely capture the effects of the administration, leadership, and polices associated
with the school itself. In this sense, the interpretation for a school value-added score
can be seen as the accumulated value-added that the student receives from all of the
various teachers, administrators, and policies associated with the school.
The model for college achievement is analogous to the model for academic achievement shown in equation (1). College achievement is a function of school inputs, family
inputs, ability, and an idiosyncratic error term:

C
C
C
AC
it = A [Si (t), Fi (t), αi0 , νit ].

(2.5)

The significant difference between this equation and that in (1) is that there is a new
C
, that is specific to college outcomes. The two models are allowed
ability term, αi0

to have different abilities because of the difference in outcome measures between the
high school value-added achievement models and the college achievement outcomes
I will be using. As is the tradition in the high school value-added literature, I will
be estimating the high school value-added model by using data on standardized test
scores as outcome variables. The college outcome variables will be GPA and graduation. Some of the unobserved ability that impacts standardized test scores, such as
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cognitive ability, will also impact college GPA and graduation; both involve cogniC
tive skills. Therefore, αi0 and αi0
may be correlated. However, GPA and graduation

likely require other types of ability as well, such as non-cognitive skills like motivation,
adaptability, self-restraint, and persistence, which are less important in determining
standardized test scores.
I rely on the same assumptions discussed above for the high school value-added
model to rewrite (5) as a linear function of high school quality and a proxy that is a
sufficient statistic for detailed school and family histories and ability:

C
C
AC
ijt = βsj(i) + λAi,t−1 + νijt .

(2.6)

Details on the proxy and the interpretation of β will be discussed in section 3.2.

2.3

Methodology

2.3.1

Estimating the impact of high schools on test scores

I first focus on estimating the impact of high schools on test scores. The specification used to estimate the impact of high schools corresponds to equation (4) from
the previous section. Relying on the assumptions described in the previous section
that family inputs are not endogenously determined and that the lagged test score
is a sufficient statistic for input histories and unobserved ability, I can estimate the
impact of high schools on test scores. To do this, I begin by estimating the following
equation:

Aijt = γf (Ai,t−1 ) + φXijt + ijt

(2.7)

ijt = sj(i,t) + uit ,

(2.8)
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where f (Ai,t−1 ) is a control function of lagged test scores that includes a cubic in
both 8th grade reading and math scores and Xit is a vector of controls for the student’s gender, ethnicity, free/reduced lunch status, disability status, and the grade
in which the student took the high school exam4 . The error term is decomposed into
a measure of school quality (sj(i,t) ) and an idiosyncratic error term (uit ). This equation is directly comparable to the one presented in equation (4), but with student
characteristics included to help capture the unobserved student ability, αi0 , from the
structural model. Together with the lagged test scores, these controls should capture
most the individual student’s ability and history of school and family inputs. The idiosyncratic error term captures heterogeneity that is orthogonal to lagged test scores
and individual characteristics.
The identification assumption of the model is that students are not sorted into
schools based on unobservables determinants of test scores. If this assumption fails,
then the estimate of school quality will capture both school quality and the correlation
between school quality and unobserved determinants of test scores. Note, of course,
that this assumption allows for sorting of students into schools. Sorting into high
schools based on characteristics such as ability and family characteristics definitely
happens. The identification assumption just requires that the lagged test scores and
observable characteristics as sufficient to capture the unobserved characteristics on
which the sorting occurs. Section 5.1 will discuss a test of this assumption.
Many different methods have been used to estimate value-added models like the
one presented in (7)-(8) [Koedel et al., 2015]. One methodology selection decision is
the use of gain-score versus lagged-score models. The model presented in (7)-(8) is
a lagged-score model, while a gain-score model would be one where the the laggedscore was moved to the left-hand side of the equation such that the dependent variable
becomes (Ait − Ai,t−1 ). Thus, the gains-score model imposes the restriction that the
parameter on the lagged-score in equation (7) is equal to one. A benefit of the gains4

I control for the grade in which the high school exam occurred because not all high school students
take high school end-of-course exams in the same grade and the timing of the high school exam
could impact test scores [Clotfelter et al., 2012].
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score model is that it avoids the complication of having an independent variable that
is measured with error. However, the current consensus is that lagged-score models
outperform the gain-score specification [Koedel et al., 2015]. Another methodological
issue is the use of one-step versus two-step models. The model presented above, which
includes the school effects in the residual, is a two-step model, while a model with fixed
effects for each school would be a one-step model. There is not a preferred specification
between these two options in the literature. Reported correlations between the two
have been shown to be as high as 0.98 [Chetty et al., 014a].
I use a two-step lagged-score value-added approach that averages school valueadded scores across years with a shrinkage step. This is the most commonly used
value-added approach and has been shown to produce unbiased estimates of valueadded scores [Chetty et al., 014a, Deming, 2014]5 . The mechanics of estimating the
value-added scores for schools is as follows:
Step 1: Estimate equation (7), recover the residuals, ˆijt , and calculate the average
residual for each school, ¯jt . This step is performed separately for each subject and
year of high school test scores, such that each school has an average residual for each
subject and each year in the data, ¯jkt , where k is the subject.
Step 2: Shrink the school-subject-year effect estimates. It is common in applied
value-added work to apply a Bayesian shrinkage factor, which shrinks the estimates
of teacher/school value-added towards zero based on how noisy the value-added score
is for a given teacher/school [Kane and Staiger, 2008, Chetty et al., 014a]. Following
this tradition, I apply a shrinkage estimator, but I apply a more general version
that also incorporates information across subjects for a given school. As discussed in
[Lefgren and Sims, 2012], in a setting where one has value-added scores across multiple
subjects for a given school, the best guess of a school’s ability to increase Algebra
1 scores should incorporate information regarding the school’s ability to increase
5

The consensus of averaging value-added scores across years is based on the finding from many studies
that value-added estimates are less biased when they are averaged over many years [McCaffrey
et al., 2009, McCaffrey et al., 2010, Koedel and Betts, 2011, Deming, 2014]; much of the withinschool/teacher variation over time is noise [Kane and Staiger, 2002]. Average value-added scores
therefore leverage a larger degree of true variation in school quality.
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Biology scores. This shrinkage can be performed by ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions of a school’s value-added score for one subject-year on it’s value-added
scores for all other subject-year value-added scores:

¯jkt = π0 + π1 ¯j,1,−t + π2 ¯j,2,−t + ... + πK ¯j,K,−t + µjkt
The coefficients in the regression represent the weights from the theoretical shrinkage
function from equation (7) in [Lefgren and Sims, 2012]. The intuition for this procedure is as follows. If the value-added scores for a particular school are imprecisely
measured and noisy, then there will be less correlation over time and subjects. This
will cause estimates of πkp that are close to zero and will therefore shrink the estimated
value-added score for that school toward zero. Including separate regressors for each
subject and for each distance from the current year’s value-added score allows for a
flexible shrinkage function in which some subjects and some years can have larger
weight than others. The predicted value for each school-subject-year serves as the
post-shrinkage estimate of the school-subject-year value-added scores.
Step 3: Calculate the average school effects. This is done by averaging the postshrinkage residuals across subjects and years for each school. Letting ˜jkt be the
post-shrinkage predicted school-subject-year estimate for school j in subject k and
year t, the average school value-added is:
T
K
1X 1 X
ŝj =
˜jkt .
T t=1 K k=1

The test scores for each subject are normalized by state and year to mean 0 and
standard deviation 1 before being used in the value-added models. Therefore, the
value-added estimates, ŝj , are scaled in units of student test score standard deviations.
For example, if a high school had an average value-added estimate of 0.20, that
would mean that the high school increases it’s students test scores by 0.20 standard
deviations, on average.
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2.3.2

Estimating the impact of high schools on college performance

The primary purpose of this paper is to better understand whether value-added
scores that are commonly used to evaluate schools and teachers are capturing a lasting
impact that schools and teachers have on students. In order to answer this question,
I include the value-added score for each student’s high school as an independent
variable in regressions for college performance:

AC
ijt = βŝj(i) + λAi,t−1 + φ1 Xit + φ2 X̄j(it) + vijt ,

(2.9)

where AC
ijt is the college outcome variable (either GPA or graduation), ŝj(i) is the
value-added score for the high school that student i attended, Ai,t−1 is the lagged
score that proxies for the history of school and family inputs and unobserved ability,
Xit is a vector of controls for the student’s race, gender and age, and X̄j(it) is a vector
of controls for the student’s high school’s mean fraction male, fraction Black, fraction
Asian, fraction other race, fraction on free-or-reduced lunch, and mean incoming test
scores. This equation is directly comparable to equation (6), but with controls for
student characteristics and mean characteristics for the student’s high school added to
help capture unobserved student ability from the college achievement model presented
in section 2. The analysis in section 4 will also include major and university fixed
effects in order to control for differences in difficulty across majors and universities.
The coefficient β in this regression captures the correlation between high school valueadded and college performance.
I use high school GPA as the lagged score that is meant to proxy for historical
school and family inputs and unobserved ability. The unobserved ability that influences high school GPA is likely correlated with the unobserved ability that influences
college GPA. The ideal lagged variable would be a measure of GPA before entering
high school. However, I cannot link the students in the college achievement dataset
to the K-12 dataset. For each student in the college outcome dataset, the only precollege information I have are the high school that the student attended, ACT and
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SAT scores, and high school GPA and rank. The inclusion of high school GPA would
be problematic if high schools that raise their students’ test scores also systematically
raise their students’ GPA. Then, the impact of value-added in equation (9) could get
absorbed into the high school GPA variable. However, this is not a significant concern
because, while standardized test scores are intended to measure a student’s cognitive
skills, high school GPA may be largely determined by non-cognitive skills like motivation, adaptability, self-restraint, and persistence. If I had GPA data in addition to
the test score data for K-12 students, then it would be possible to test whether high
schools that are good at raising test scores also raise GPAs, but I do not have this
data. However, [Jackson, 2012] has shown that the ability of a teacher to raise test
scores shows little correlation with their ability to raise non-cognitive skills. Section
4.3 will provide some evidence that high school GPA is not impacted by a school’s
ability to raise test scores.
There are two important assumptions for identification of equation (9). The first
is the usual assumption that there is no correlation between student unobservables
and the school value-added scores. This allows for there to be sorting of students into
schools based on ability, but high schools with better students cannot have higher
value-added scores, conditional on student and high school characteristics concluded
in the regressions. Section 5.1 will show evidence that value-added scores are in fact
uncorrelated with unobservable determinants of test scores. The second important
assumption is that there is no sorting into or out of the universities in the college
achievement dataset based on value-added scores. If high value-added schools changed
the ability distribution of students in the sample by pushing students that would
typically attend the universities in the sample to better universities and pushing
worse ability students into the sample of universities, then that would cause negative
bias in the estimated impact of attending a higher value-added high school on college
performance. This assumption will be tested in section 5.2
An alternative approach to the one discussed above would be to estimate an
equation analogous to (7)-(8), where I estimate the impact of high schools on college
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performance directly. This would produce a college performance value-added score
for each high school, rather than estimating the lasting impact of attending a higher
test score value-added school. I choose not to take this approach for two reasons.
First, estimating the lasting impact of attending a high school that is good at raising
test scores more closely relates to the public policy question of whether high school
value-added scores are capturing anything that has a lasting impact on students. The
second reason is that estimating the impact of high schools on college performance
directly requires a stronger assumption; it requires that there is no correlation between unobservable determinants of college performance and the high school that the
student attended, conditional on high school GPA and other covariates, while estimating the impact of high school value-added on college performance only requires
that there is no correlation between unobservables and the high school value-added
scores.

2.4

Data
I study the lasting impact of attending a higher value-added high school by linking

two K-12 student-level datasets with a dataset on college performance at several
universities in the United States. The datasets cannot be linked at the student-level;
they can only be linked at the high school-level. Therefore, I use the two K-12 studentlevel datasets to estimate value-added scores for all high schools in the datasets. Then,
I match these value-added scores to the dataset on college performance by matching
the high school that each college student attended to the estimated value-added score
for that high school.

2.4.1

K-12 test score data

The two K-12 student-level datasets that I use to measure high school valueadded scores come from the North Carolina Education Research Data Center at Duke
University and the PK20 Education Data Warehouse at the Florida Department of
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Education. North Carolina students in grades 3-8 take annual math and reading
standardized tests. High school students have end-of-course exams in Algebra 1,
Algebra 2, English 1, Biology, Chemistry, and History. The dataset also contains
information on ethnicity, gender, date of birth, receipt of special education services,
limited English proficiency, and receipt of free or reduced lunch. The dataset contains
information on 3.1 million students over grades 3-12 from 1997-2012. Florida students
in grades 8 and 10 take end-of-course exams in Math, Reading, Writing, and Science.
The dataset also contains information on ethnicity, gender, date of birth, receipt of
special education services, limited English proficiency, and receipt of free or reduced
lunch. This dataset contains information on students from 1997-2010.
As described in the previous section, I use this data to estimate high school valueadded scores for each high school6 . The value-added models are estimated separately
for each state. The student demographic covariates included in the value-added model
are the ones listed in the previous paragraph. I also include a control variable for the
grade in which the student took the high school exam. All test scores are normalized
by subject, grade, and year before estimation. After estimating the value-added
scores, I match these value-added scores, as well as other high school-level variables,
to the dataset on college performance by matching on high school.

2.4.2

College performance data

The dataset on college performance comes from the Multiple-Institution Database
for Investigating Engineering Longitudinal Development (MIDFIELD). MIDFIELD
contains information on 1,248,363 college students at 11 different universities in the
United States from 1987-2005. Of the 11 universities in the dataset, 6 are from either
Florida or North Carolina. This dataset includes detailed student-level information
including start date, final date, graduation, GPA by semester, final GPA, majors,
transfers, ACT scores, SAT scores, high school GPA, high school class rank, high
6

Chemistry and History in North Carolina and Science in Florida are not included in the value-added
estimates because these exams are only in the data for a small fraction of the years.
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school ID, ethnicity, gender, and age7 . I use the high school IDs to match valueadded scores to the high schools in the data. I also match other high school-level
variables such as percent of students on free or reduced lunch, gender and ethnic
characteristics, and mean incoming 8th grade normalized test scores. The percent of
students receiving free or reduced lunches and the racial composition of the school
serve as measures of the school’s social and economic setting. The mean incoming test scores help capture sorting of students into schools based on unobservable
characteristics that are correlated with test scores.

2.4.3

Dataset of analysis

Summary statistics for the linked dataset of analysis are shown in table 3.1. Of
the 1,248,363 students in the MIDFIELD dataset, 103,250 are from high schools in
Florida or North Carolina that could be matched to a value-added score. Table
3.1 shows summary statistics for the primary outcome variables, college GPA and
graduation, as well as gender, ethnicity, high school GPA, SAT and ACT scores, and
the value-added score and mean characteristics of the student’s high school. The
summary statistics are shown for all students in the data and separately according
to whether the student is from a high school that has a value-added score above the
median value or below the median value.
The average final cumulative GPA for students in the linked dataset of analysis
is 2.34 and 42 percent graduated8 . Students in the linked sample were 53% female,
27% Black, 6% Hispanic, and 4% Asian. The average starting age was 18.508 years9 .
7

Despite the use of the word engineering in the title, MIDFIELD collects data on students from all
majors.
8
The sample size for the graduated variable is smaller than the sample size for college GPA because
the sample for graduation is limited to students that enrolled at least 5 years before MIDFIELD
stopped tracking students in 2006. This gives all students in the regressions for graduation time to
graduate. A similar issue arises when looking at final cumulative GPA. Therefore, in GPA regressions
later in the paper, I restrict the sample based on how many years the student is in the data.
9
In the analysis below, I limit the sample to traditional college students than enroll as freshmen
in the fall. This removes transfer students and early enrollees. Excluding these students does not
significantly change the results.
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The mean high school value-added score is 0.003 for all observations with a standard
deviation of 0.07110 . The majority of students in the sample come from one of six
different universities in the MIDFIELD dataset that are located in either Florida or
North Carolina: the University of Florida, North Carolina State University, Florida
State University, the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, North Carolina A&T
University, and Florida A&M University. Other universities in the sample include
Georgia Tech, Virginia Tech, the University of Colorado, Purdue University, and
Clemson University. In the analysis below, I pool students from North Carolina
and Florida high school students together. Results are similar if I run the analysis
separately for students from each state or control for which state the student is from.
One other variable worth discussing is the high school GPA variable. As discussed
in section 3.2, I use high school GPA as a proxy for unobserved ability and detailed
input histories in the main analysis below. This is potentially problematic if high
schools that are good at raising test scores also tend to have students with higher
GPAs. However, looking in table 3.1, we see that students from higher value-added
high schools have almost exactly the same average high school GPA as students from
lower value-added high schools; the average GPA is 3.55 for higher value-added high
schools and 3.54 for lower value-added high schools. This is very different than what
we see for ACT and SAT scores, which is strictly a measure of cognitive skills; students
from high value-added high schools have higher ACT and SAT scores. This supports
the use of high school GPA as a proxy for student ability in the analysis below because
high school GPA appears to be a measure of non-cognitive skills, rather than cognitive
skills, so that it is not an outcome variable of attending a higher value-added high
school.
10

These means and standard deviations are based on the full dataset of analysis, in which most
high schools are linked to many students and thus contribute to the mean and standard deviation
multiple times. The actual mean and standard deviation of the value-added scores for high schools
linked to students in the MIDFIELD data are -0.02 and 0.077.
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2.5

Testing the assumptions for the analysis

2.5.1

Correlation between high school value-added and unobservables

As discussed in section 3, the identification assumption of the value-added model is
that high school value-added scores are uncorrelated with unobservable determinants
of test scores. I test this assumption by estimating the correlation between the high
school value-added scores and a variable that is typically left out of value-added
models: prior test scores.
The value-added models control for once-lagged test scores, Ai,t−1 , so they cannot
be used to test for selection. But twice-lagged scores, Ai,t−2 , can be used. As explained
in section 3, the value-added model allows for there to be sorting into schools based
on unobservable determinants of test scores, such as family inputs and ability, but the
value-added model requires that lagged test scores and other observable characteristics
sufficiently capture the unobservable characteristics on which sorting occurs. If this
holds, then high school value-added scores should be uncorrelated with 7th grade test
scores. Similarly, adding 7th grade test scores to the value-added model should not
significantly change the value-added scores.
To test this assumption, I regress 7th grade test scores in reading and math on
the average value-added score of the high school that the 7th grader would eventually
attend. I include student-level controls for gender, race, free or reduced lunch, and a
cubic in 8th grade math and reading scores and include high school controls for mean
demographics, mean free or reduced lunch receipt, and a cubic in mean 8th grade
math and reading scores. Year fixed effects are also included11 . If 7th grade test
scores appear to be impacted by the value-added of their future high school, then this
would be strong evidence that the value-added model is not sufficiently capturing
the unobservable characteristics on which students sort into high schools. Indeed,
the tendency for teacher/school value-added scores to significantly impact lagged test
scores has been one of the main critiques of value-added models [Rothstein, 2010].
11

This test is similar to the one used in [Chetty et al., 014a].
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Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the results of this test for the application of the valueadded model to the North Carolina and Florida test score data, respectively. For each
table, the first several columns show the impact of attending a higher value-added
high school on each of the high school-level test scores used to estimate the valueadded scores. The tables then show the impact of attending a higher value-added
high school on 7th grade reading and math scores. Finally, the last columns show
the impact of value-added on high school test scores with the 7th grade reading and
math scores added as additional controls.
In both table 2.2 and table 2.3, attending a higher value-added high school has a
positive and statistically significant impact on high school exam scores. As described
in section 3, the value-added scores are scaled in units of student test score standard
deviations. Thus, the interpretation for the coefficient of 1.47 for the effect of valueadded on Algebra 1 scores in table 2.2 is that high schools that increase student test
scores by an average of 1 standard deviation increase their students’ Algebra 1 scores,
specifically, by 1.47 standard deviations.
Table 2.2 and table 2.3 both show that attending a higher value-added high school
has no significant impact on 7th grade reading and math scores. For North Carolina,
the coefficients are very close to zero and not statistically significant. For Florida, the
coefficients on value-added are statistically significant, but they are still very small
and they are actually negative. This suggests that higher value-added high schools
might have slightly lower ability students. Thus suggests that there may be negative
bias when estimating the effect of attending a higher value-added high school on
college outcomes. Nonetheless, the results support the assumption that once-lagged
test scores and other covariates are good proxies for unobservable characteristics that
are correlated with test scores and the sorting of students into high schools.
The last columns of table 2.2 and table 2.3 show how the estimated effect of
attending a higher value-added high school on high school test scores changes when
7th grade test scores are added to the regression as independent variables. The results
show that, despite the fact that 7th grade test scores are strong predictors of high
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school test scores, the coefficient for the high school’s value-added score is essentially
unchanged. This again suggests that the once-lagged test scores and other covariates
sufficiently capture unobservable student characteristics that are correlated with test
scores and the sorting of students into high schools.

2.5.2

Selection into or out of universities in the sample

An important assumption required in order to identify the impact of attending a
higher value-added high school on college performance is that there is no change in
the underlying distribution of student ability in the dataset of analysis as a result of
attending a higher value-added high school. I only observe students that select into
the schools in the dataset. Therefore, if higher value-added high schools have positive
transcript effects for students, then there could be negative selection bias caused
by higher value-added high schools pushing low ability students into the schools in
the sample and pushing high ability students out of the schools in the sample and
into better schools. This is a difficult assumption to test, but I am able to provide
some indirect evidence on the assumption by testing for selection across universities
within the sample (rather than selection into or out of the sample) and by testing the
correlation between the number of students in the sample from each school and the
school’s value-added score.
Results for these selection tests are shown in table 2.4. Column (2) tests the effect
of value-added on selection into or out of Historically Black Colleges and Universities
(HBCUs) for Black students in the dataset. Florida A&M and North Carolina A&T
are HBCUs. I look at the effect first by pooling all observations and then by separating
the effect by high school type, according to their mean incoming 8th grade test scores.
This is done in an attempt to separate the effect of value-added on attending an HBCU
by student ability, as students from high schools with higher mean incoming 8th grade
test scores should, on average, be of higher ability. The numbers in the table represent
marginal effects from a probit model with student controls for age, gender, and race,
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mean high school demographics and incoming test scores, and year fixed effects. The
results show some evidence of an impact of value-added on the sorting of students
into or out of HBCUs. Overall, students from higher value-added schools are less
likely to attend HBCUs, although the effect is only marginally significant. This effect
appears to be primarily occurring for the sample of schools with lower incoming test
scores.
Column (3) looks at the effect of value-added on selection across universities in
the sample from North Carolina. One could argue that there is a somewhat natural
ranking of the North Carolina schools in the dataset in terms of quality: (1) North
Carolina State University (2) UNC Charlotte and (3) North Carolina A&T. I therefore estimate an ordered logit of this quality ranking on value-added scores, including
student controls for age, gender, and race, mean high school demographics and incoming test scores, and year fixed effects. There is again some evidence of selection
occurring here, as the coefficient for value-added is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that students from higher value-added high schools attend better
schools in the sample. This effect is primarily occurring within the sample of high
schools with higher incoming test scores.
Column (4) looks at the effect of a school’s value-added score on the number of
students in the sample from that high school. This specification attempts to actually
test selection into and out of the sample of universities in the dataset by exploiting
the idea that students from high schools with low mean incoming 8th grade test scores
will, on average, be of relatively low ability, while students from high schools with high
mean incoming 8th grade test scores will, on average, be of relatively high ability. If
there is selection bias into and out of the sample, it would be caused by higher
value-added schools pushing low ability students into the sample of schools in the
dataset and pushing high ability students out of the sample of schools. One therefore
might expect to find positive effects of a high school’s value-added on the number of
students from that high school in the dataset for high schools with low mean incoming
8th grade test scores and negative effects of value-added on the number of students
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in the sample from that high school for high schools with high mean incoming 8th
grade scores. To test this, I regress the number of students from each high school
on it’s value-added score with controls for age, gender, and race, mean high school
demographics and incoming test scores, and year fixed effects. The results of this test
do not shown any evidence of selection effects. A one standard deviation increase
in value-added changes the number of students in the sample from each school in
a given year by no more than 2.5 students. The sign of the effect changes across
the distribution of incoming test score percentiles with no pattern and none of the
estimates are statistically significant. The lack of any significant patterns could just
mean that the selection of high ability students out of the sample for each school
offsets the selection of low ability students into the sample.
Overall, the results in table 2.4 show some evidence of selection, although the
evidence is for selection across different universities within the sample rather than
selection into or out of the sample. To the extent that selection exists, driving low
ability students into the sample and high ability students out of the sample, it will
cause negative bias in the estimate of the effect of attending a higher value-added
high school on college performance.

2.6

Results
This section shows the results for the analysis of the lasting impact of attending

a higher value-added high school on college GPA and graduation. All of the analysis
is restricted to students that originally enrolled as freshmen, thus excluding transfer
students12 . The sample of students for the graduation regressions is restricted to
students that enrolled at least 5 years before MIDFIELD stopped tracking students
in 2006. The lasting impact of attending a higher value-added high school on GPA
is shown separately for each of the first 6 semesters and then for the final cumulative
12

This is because I look at the lasting impact of attending a higher value-added high school by
semester. Students that transfer into the schools in the sample do not have GPA information for
previous semesters at other schools.
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GPA. The sample for GPA regressions is restricted to students that were enrolled for
6-12 semesters and do not have any missing GPA information in the first 6 semesters.
The purpose of requiring at least 6 semesters is so that there is a consistent sample
of students across regressions for GPAs from different semesters. Students enrolled
for more than 12 semesters are dropped in order to limit the sample to students with
a traditional college graduation time-line13 .
I first present results for all students. I then separate the results for GPA according
to whether the student graduated. For those that graduated, the sample is again
restricted to those that were enrolled for 6-12 semesters. For those that did not
graduate, the sample is not restricted by the total number of semesters attended.
Therefore, the number of observations in regressions by semester decreases for later
semesters for the non-graduation sample. Regressions that condition on graduation
status restrict the sample to students enrolled at least 5 years before MIDFIELD
stopped tracking students in 2006.
The coefficient for the value-added variable shown in the results tables represents
the impact of increasing the value-added score for the student’s high school by 1
unit. A more intuitive interpretation is the impact of increasing the value-added
score for the student’s high school by one standard deviation. This can be found
by multiplying the coefficients reported in the tables by the standard deviation of
the high school value-added scores, which is 0.077, as discussed in section 4. The
high school value-added scores are scaled in units of student test score standard
deviations. Thus, increasing a high school’s value-added score by one is associated
with increasing student test scores by a full standard deviation, while increasing a
high school’s value-added score by 0.077 is associated with increasing student test
scores by 0.077 standard deviations.
All of the analysis presented below includes student controls for age, gender, ethnicity, and high school GPA. High school controls matched from the K-12 datasets
include the fraction of the enrollment that is male, Black, Asian, Hispanic, and on free
13

Only 4% of students in the sample have a total semester count larger than 12.
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or reduced lunch as well as the mean 8th grade math and reading scores for incoming
students. University, major, and year fixed effects are also included. Standard errors
are clustered by high school.

2.6.1

GPA and Graduation

Column (1) of table 2.5 shows the lasting impact of attending a higher valueadded high school on the probability of graduating from college. The coefficient is
0.009, meaning that a one standard deviation increase in high school value-added
scores increases the probability of graduating from college by 0.0007, or less than one
one-thousandth of a percentage point. The effect is not statistically significant.
The results for GPA tell a different story. Columns (2)-(7) of table 2.5 show
the impact of attending a higher value-added high school on GPA in semesters 1-6,
respectively. Here, we see that attending a higher value-added high school does have
a lasting impact, although the impact becomes smaller as the time since high school
increases. The coefficient for value-added in semester 1 is 0.29, statistically significant
at the one-percent level. This corresponds to an increase in GPA of 0.022 points from
a one standard deviation increase in high school value-added.
The effect remains stable throughout the first three semesters. The coefficient in
semester 2 is again 0.29, statistically significant at the one-percent level. In semester
3, the coefficient actually increases slightly to 0.32, again statistically significant at the
one-percent level. However, the impact begins to decrease after semester 3. The coefficient is 0.23 and significant at the five-percent level in semester 4. The coefficients
for semesters 5 and 6 are 0.11 and 0.04, repetitively, neither of which are statistically
significant. Column (8) shows the impact of attending a higher value-added high
school on the student’s final cumulative GPA. The coefficient is 0.22, statistically
significant at the one-percent level. This represents an increase in final GPA by 0.017
points from a one standard deviation increase in high school value-added.
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Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show the impact of attending a higher value-added high school
on college GPA separately for students that did and did not graduate from college.
The purpose of separating the effect according to whether the student graduated is
to begin to see if there is a different impact for different types of students14 . However, the results for both students that graduated and those that did not are very
similar to the results that pool all students together in table 2.5; there is a positive
and statistically significant impact of attending a higher value-added high school on
GPA. The effect is largest in semesters 1-4 and then begins to fade out and is no
longer statistically significant. The impact on final cumulative GPA is positive and
statistically significant at the one-percent level for both students that did and did not
graduate, with coefficients of 0.31 and 0.41, respectively.
Overall, the results in table 2.5, table 2.6, and table 2.7 show that there is a positive
and statistically significant impact of attending a higher value-added high school on
college GPA. The effect is largest in earlier semesters. This result is consistent with an
implied, although not discussed, feature of the value-added models discussed earlier,
which is that the impact of school inputs can vary with the temporal distance between
the time the inputs were applied and the time of the outcome measure [Todd and
Wolpin, 2003]. This result is also consistent with studies which find that the lasting
impact of teacher value-added on achievement in later K-12 grades fades out with the
temporal distance since the student was exposed to the teacher [Carrell and West,
2010, Brian A. Jacob and Sims, 2010, Rothstein, 2010, Chetty et al., 014a].
Although the impact on GPA is positive and statistically significant, the impact
is small. The impact of increasing high school value-added by one standard deviation
is associated with an increase in first semester GPA by 0.022 points and final GPA by
0.017 points. This is approximately equivalent to a one letter grade increase in exactly
one course during a student’s entire time in college. When put in that context, it is
14

Conditioning on graduation could cause negative bias in the estimated impact of attending a higher
value-added high school on college GPA if graduation is impacted by value-added. This would push
low ability students from higher value-added high schools into the graduated sample. However, given
the previous results for graduation, this is likely a very small concern.
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not surprising that there is no significant impact of attending a higher value-added
high school on the probability of graduating from college.

2.6.2

Gender and racial heterogeneity

Table 2.8 shows the impact of attending a higher value-added high school on the
probability of graduation and GPA separately for males, females, White students, and
Black students. Each row-column entry is a separate regression and shows only the
coefficient and standard error for the value-added variable. Each regression includes
the same control variables as in the previous analysis.
These results are very similar to the results shown in table 2.5, which showed the
results for all students. There is no significant impact of attending a higher valueadded high school on the probability of finishing college for any gender or race, but
there is a positive impact of attending a higher value-added high school on college
GPA. The impact on GPA is largest in early semesters for each race and gender and
then becomes smaller and statistically insignificant in later semesters.
There is not much difference in the results for males and females. The magnitude
of the impact of value-added is very similar for the two groups and very similar to the
overall results shown in table 2.5. A one standard deviation increase in high school
value-added increases final cumulative GPA by 0.017 and 0.015 points for males and
females, respectively, each statistically significant at the five-percent level. Most of
this impact occurs during the first four semesters.
There are significant differences for White and Black students. The results for
White students are larger in magnitude than for Black students and than the overall
results in table 2.5. A one standard deviation increase in high school value-added
increases final cumulative GPA by 0.022 points for White students. Most of the
impact comes in the first five semesters. For Black students, the results also show a
positive impact on final GPA that mostly occurs in the first few semesters, but the
impacts are small; the impact of a one standard deviation increase in high school
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value-added on final GPA is 0.010 and not statistically significant. It appears that
the reason for the smaller and insignificant impact of final cumulative GPA for Black
students is due to a quicker fade out of the impact of high school value-added for Black
students. Black and White students experience similar impacts of a one standard
deviation increase in high school value-added in semester 1: an increase of 0.022
points for Black students and 0.025 for White students. But the impact fades out
much more quickly after semester 1 for Black students than for White students; the
impact of a one standard deviation increase in high school value-added in semester 2
and semester 3 is 0.013 and 0.007 points, respectively, for Black students and 0.026
and 0.033 for White students.

2.6.3

Quantile regressions

I use quantile regressions to determine if value-added has different impacts for
students of different ability levels. The first set of results are shown in table 2.9. This
table shows the results of quantile regressions for the effect of attending a higher valueadded high school on college GPA by semester. It appears that the largest impact of
attending a higher value-added high school is for lower ability students; for each of
the first three semesters, the coefficient on the value-added variable is generally larger
for lower quantiles, although it is statistically significant for every quantile. This is a
fairly intuitive result, as one could imagine that low ability students would have more
to gain from attending a higher value-added high school than high ability students
who are already great students.
However, this pattern ceases beginning in semester 4. The coefficient on the
value-added variable for the 10th quantile becomes smaller than the other low quantiles beginning in the 4th semester. The coefficient for the 20th quantile does the
same beginning in semester 5. Similarly, the quantile regression results for final GPA
show that value-added appears to have larger impacts for lower ability students except for the very lowest quantiles. One possible explanation is that the very lowest
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quantile includes students that eventually drop out of college. These students are
likely different not only in terms of their GPA quantile, but also in terms of other
unobservable characteristics that make them more likely to struggle through college
and eventually drop out.
Table 2.10 shows quantile regression results for students that graduated. Here,
there is a more consistent pattern that attending a higher value-added high school
has larger impacts for lower-ability students, particularly when looking at final GPA
in column (7). However, this pattern does not hold for every individual semester. For
the first three semesters, the impact is similar across quantiles, with slightly larger
coefficients for both the low and high quantiles. After the first three semesters, the
impact fades out quickly for the higher ability students, but remains large and often
statistically significant for lower quantiles.
Overall, these results provide some evidence that the lasting impact of attending
a higher value-added high school is larger for low ability students. However, it should
be remembered that the low ability students enrolled in state universities in Florida
and North Carolina on average likely come from near the top of the distribution of
student ability in their own high school.

2.7

Conclusion
This paper addresses the question of whether attending a higher value-added high

school has lasting impacts on students later in life. This is a policy-relevant question,
as many states and school districts have begun using value-added scores to evaluate
teachers and schools. The use of these value-added models has sparked debate about
whether they provide unbiased estimates of the impact that teachers have on test
scores and debate about whether they are appropriate metrics for evaluating teachers
even if they are unbiased. While the growing consensus is that modern value-added
models can provide unbiased estimates of teacher impacts, their value as a public
policy tool is still heavily debated.
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One important piece for understanding whether value-added models are an appropriate way to evaluate teachers and schools is to test whether having better valueadded teachers or schools is correlated with better outcomes in adulthood. If they are
correlated, this suggests that the test score gains associated with higher value-added
teachers and schools represent gains in cognitive ability that have a lasting impact
on the student. Alternatively, if they are not correlated, higher value-added teachers
and schools may simply be those that are better at teaching to the test, rather than
having any impact on the ability of the student.
I address this public policy question by estimating value-added scores for high
schools in Florida and North Carolina and then linking these value-added scores to a
second dataset that includes detailed college transcript data, including high school.
I find that attending a higher value-added high school has lasting impacts on college
GPA, which primarily occur during early semesters. A one standard deviation increase
in high school value-added increases first semester GPA by 0.022 points and final GPA
by 0.017 points. This is approximately equal to one letter grade increase in one course
over a college career. These results are generally consistent across race and gender,
although the impact is slightly larger for White students.
While the results are small in magnitude, this is not entirely surprising given what
we know about early educational inputs mattering more than later inputs [Cuncha and
Heckman, 2010]. Additionally, much of the impact of attending a higher value-added
high school may result from boosting college attendance and getting students into
better universities, in addition to improving their performance in college. [Chetty
et al., 014b] find evidence of exactly that, which would cause negative bias in my
estimates of the impact of attending a higher value-added high school on college performance by changing the underlying distribution of student ability in my sample of
universities. Therefore, the estimates that I find may be interpreted as a lower-bound
on the impact of attending a higher value-added high school on college performance.
Finding positive and statistically significant effects of attending a higher value-added
high school despite this possible negative selection bias provides more strong support
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for the idea that high value-added teachers and schools can have significant lasting
impacts on their students.

Table 2.1.: Summary statistics for the dataset of analysis
(1)
(2)
Less than median VA

Female
Black
Hispanic
Asian
other race
start age
HS GPA
SAT
ACT
final GPA
graduated
VA
HS-% male
HS-% Black
HS-% Asian
HS-% Hispanic
HS-% free/reduced lunch
HS-mean 8th grade reading scores
HS-mean 8th grade math scores

(3)
(4)
Greater than median VA

(5)

(6)
All Students

(7)

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

N

0.54
0.29
0.05
0.04
0.02
18.53
3.54
1091.18
23.63
2.32
0.42
-0.05
0.47
0.30
0.02
0.13
0.27
0.04
0.03

0.499
0.452
0.225
0.191
0.136
2.877
0.638
184.814
4.215
0.966
0.493
0.041
0.035
0.243
0.023
0.145
0.119
0.299
0.301

0.53
0.25
0.06
0.04
0.02
18.49
3.55
1123.36
24.20
2.36
0.43
0.05
0.47
0.27
0.03
0.13
0.22
0.17
0.16

0.499
0.431
0.239
0.204
0.144
2.701
0.615
176.501
4.337
0.917
0.495
0.054
0.040
0.210
0.026
0.165
0.128
0.329
0.327

0.53
0.27
0.06
0.04
0.02
18.51
3.54
1107.77
23.91
2.34
0.42
0.00
0.47
0.29
0.03
0.13
0.25
0.11
0.09

0.499
0.442
0.232
0.198
0.140
2.788
0.627
181.289
4.286
0.942
0.494
0.071
0.038
0.228
0.025
0.155
0.126
0.321
0.322

103250
103250
103250
103250
103250
81076
92386
70955
88844
103250
29779
103228
103250
103250
103250
103250
103250
103250
103250
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Summary statistics are shown for all students in the data and according to whether the student is from a high school
with a value-added score above or below the median value-added score. Value-added is scaled in units of student test score
standard deviations. Demographics, high school GPA, SAT and ACT scores, college GPA, and graduation status come
from the MIDFIELD dataset. High school value-added scores and high school characteristics for the high school that the
student attended are matched from the data on test scores from Florida and North Carolina. The method for estimating
value-added scores are described in section 3.1.

Table 2.2.: Test for correlation between value-added scores and unobservables - North Carolina

VA

(1)
Algebra 1

(2)
Algebra 2

(3)
English 1

(4)
Biology

(5)
7th
Reading

(6)
7th
Math

(7)
Algebra 1

(8)
Algebra 2

(9)
English 1

(10)
Biology

1.47***
(0.062)

2.21***
(0.078)

0.24***
(0.045)

0.84***
(0.078)

0.03
(0.021)

-0.02
(0.026)

1.46***
(0.063)
-0.03***
(0.0044)
0.15***
(0.0054)

2.21***
(0.085)
0.01
(0.0054)
0.27***
(0.0072)

0.24***
(0.044)
0.29***
(0.0040)
0.07***
(0.0045)

0.84***
(0.076)
0.22***
(0.0042)
0.13***
(0.0048)

1845488
0.443

877846
0.394

2130103
0.577

1579277
0.499

3504036
0.692

3507403
0.727

1607523
0.446

762399
0.406

1856951
0.609

1349098
0.520

7th reading
7th math

Observations
R-squared

Each column reports the coefficients from an OLS regression, with standard errors clustered by high school. The regressions
are estimated using the K-12 test score data from North Carolina. Each column is a regression of the test score shown in the
column heading on the average value-added score for the student’s high school, along with several covariates. Value-added is
scaled in units of student test score standard deviations. Columns (1)-(4) show the effect of value-added on the different high
school test scores used to estimate school value-added scores. Columns (5)-(6) show the effect of high school value-added
on 7th grade test scores. Columns (7)-(10) show the effect of high school value-added on the high school test scores with
additional controls for 7th grade test scores. The covariates include student controls for gender, race, free or reduced lunch,
and a cubic in 8th grade math and reading scores and include high school controls for mean demographics, mean free or
reduced lunch receipt, and a cubic in mean 8th grade math and reading scores. Year fixed effects are also included.
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Table 2.3.: Test for correlation between value-added scores and unobservables - Florida

VA

(1)
Math

(2)
Reading

(3)
Writing

(4)
7th reading

(5)
7th math

(6)
Math

(7)
Reading

(8)
Writing

0.70***
(0.054)

0.78***
(0.055)

0.86***
(0.070)

-0.12***
(0.033)

-0.06*
(0.033)

0.68***
(0.060)
0.03***
(0.0012)
0.26***
(0.0015)

0.79***
(0.060)
0.28***
(0.0021)
0.07***
(0.0012)

0.66***
(0.061)
0.08***
(0.0011)
0.06***
(0.0012)

3141458
0.678

3539915
0.629

2279756
0.140

6604671
0.669

6603112
0.721

2241308
0.707

2595526
0.663

1751434
0.113

7th reading
7th math

Observations
R-squared

Each column reports the coefficients from an OLS regression, with standard errors clustered by high school. The regressions
are estimated using the K-12 test score data from Florida. See table 2.2 for more details.
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Table 2.4.: Selection across universities within sample and selection out of sample
(1)
Mean
Students
Per School

(2)
Attends
HBCU

(3)
NC
University
Quality

(4)
Students
in Sample
from each
HS

28.54
23.72
20.16
22.32
37.89
48.83
50.73

-0.22*
-1.52**
-0.21
-0.45**
-0.02
0.69*
1.29***

2.43***
-36.39***
0.94
1.58
2.74**
5.78***
9.96***

-0.03
1.51
-2.29
-2.15
1.77
2.39
-0.12

Incoming Test Score Percentile
All Schools
≤5th Percentile
5th-10th
10th-25th
75th-90th
90th-95th
≥95th

Column (1) shows the average number of students from each school in a given year
for all schools and separately according to the school’s average 8th grade scores for
incoming students. Column (2) shows the probit model results for the effect of high
school value-added on attending one of the two HBCUs in the dataset. Column (3)
shows the ordered logit results for university quality in North Carolina. The three
schools in the sample from North Carolina were given the following quality ranking:
(1) North Carolina State University (2) UNC Charlotte (3) North Carolina A&T.
Column (4) shows the regression results for the effect of high school value-added
on the number of students in the sample from each high school. All specifications
include student controls for age, gender, and race, mean high school demographics and
incoming test scores, and year fixed effects. Column (2) includes only Black students.
Results in column (4) represent the effect of increasing high school value-added by
one standard deviation. Standard errors are clustered by high school.

Table 2.5.: The impact of attending a higher value-added high school on graduation and GPA

VA
age
female
Black
Hispanic
Asian
other race
HS GPA

Observations
R-squared

(1)
Graduated

(2)
Semester 1

(3)
Semester 2

(4)
Semester 3

(5)
Semester 4

(6)
Semester 5

(7)
Semester 6

(8)
Final GPA

0.009
(0.044)
0.02***
(0.005)
0.06***
(0.008)
-0.01
(0.013)
-0.08***
(0.024)
-0.01
(0.021)
0.02
(0.020)
0.17***
(0.0084)

0.29***
(0.110)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.10***
(0.012)
-0.02
(0.020)
-0.01
(0.024)
-0.10***
(0.027)
-0.01
(0.035)
0.35***
(0.019)

0.29***
(0.092)
0.04***
(0.008)
0.07***
(0.012)
-0.06***
(0.019)
-0.02
(0.025)
-0.07***
(0.024)
0.05
(0.034)
0.63***
(0.015)

0.32***
(0.120)
0.04***
(0.006)
0.06***
(0.014)
-0.16***
(0.022)
-0.07**
(0.027)
-0.05
(0.031)
0.05
(0.038)
0.59***
(0.016)

0.23**
(0.101)
0.03***
(0.006)
0.08***
(0.014)
-0.14***
(0.021)
-0.12***
(0.029)
-0.06**
(0.028)
0.02
(0.044)
0.58***
(0.014)

0.11
(0.110)
0.03***
(0.007)
0.10***
(0.013)
-0.21***
(0.022)
-0.06**
(0.029)
-0.13***
(0.031)
-0.01
(0.045)
0.55***
(0.015)

0.04
(0.110)
0.03***
(0.008)
0.09***
(0.014)
-0.17***
(0.022)
-0.02
(0.032)
-0.09***
(0.035)
0.07
(0.042)
0.52***
(0.016)

0.22***
(0.073)
0.03***
(0.004)
0.11***
(0.008)
-0.14***
(0.013)
-0.05***
(0.017)
-0.10***
(0.018)
0.01
(0.025)
0.48***
(0.012)

12501
0.318

23608
0.271

23608
0.211

23608
0.189

23608
0.177

23608
0.168

23608
0.149

23608
0.370
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Each column is a separate regression of value-added scores on different outcome variables, as indicated in the column
headings. In addition to the control variables shown in the table, each column also controls for high school characteristics
including the mean fraction of the enrollment that is male, Black, Asian, Hispanic, and on free or reduced lunch as well as
the mean incoming 8th grade math and reading scores. Each column also includes university, major, and year fixed effects.
All results are based on students that originally enrolled as freshman, thus excluding transfer students. The sample for
graduation results is further limited to students that enrolled at least five year before MIDFIELD stopped tracking students
in 2006. The sample for GPA regressions is limited to students who were enrolled for 6-12 semesters and did not have
missing GPA observations for any semesters. Graduation results are based on a probit model and show marginal effects.
Value-added is scaled in units of student test score standard deviations. Standard errors are clustered by high school.

Table 2.6.: The impact of attending a higher value-added high school on graduation and GPA: students that graduated

VA
age
female
Black
Hispanic
Asian
other race
HS GPA

Observations
R-squared

(1)
Semester 1

(2)
Semester 2

(3)
Semester 3

(4)
Semester 4

(5)
Semester 5

(6)
Semester 6

(7)
Final GPA

0.44***
(0.130)
0.02*
(0.012)
0.10***
(0.024)
0.07*
(0.043)
-0.19**
(0.095)
0.10
(0.069)
-0.03
(0.065)
0.061
(0.044)

0.40***
(0.130)
0.04**
(0.016)
-0.01
(0.025)
0.01
(0.045)
0.06
(0.110)
-0.08
(0.064)
0.01
(0.056)
0.38***
(0.031)

0.33**
(0.140)
-0.01
(0.022)
-0.04
(0.031)
-0.08
(0.048)
-0.25*
(0.130)
0.06
(0.062)
0.11
(0.074)
0.44***
(0.039)

0.42***
(0.140)
0.012
(0.022)
-0.03
(0.026)
-0.10**
(0.048)
-0.09
(0.097)
-0.01
(0.065)
0.08
(0.072)
0.40***
(0.031)

0.21
(0.160)
-0.01
(0.017)
0.02
(0.028)
-0.11**
(0.047)
-0.17
(0.110)
0.03
(0.067)
0.05
(0.075)
0.39***
(0.034)

0.16
(0.140)
0.01
(0.031)
-0.01
(0.030)
-0.11**
(0.044)
-0.21*
(0.110)
-0.09
(0.081)
0.12*
(0.064)
0.42***
(0.033)

0.31***
(0.074)
0.01
(0.017)
0.05***
(0.015)
-0.08***
(0.025)
-0.11**
(0.057)
-0.03
(0.035)
0.03
(0.042)
0.25***
(0.024)

3656
0.200

3656
0.129

3656
0.131

3656
0.116

3656
0.094

3656
0.097

3656
0.189

This tables limits the analysis to students that graduated. See the footnotes in table 2.5 for further details.
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Table 2.7.: The impact of attending a higher value-added high school on graduation and GPA: students that did not graduate

VA
age
female
Black
Hispanic
Asian
other race
HS GPA

Observations
R-squared

(1)
Semester 1

(2)
Semester 2

(3)
Semester 3

(4)
Semester 4

(5)
Semester 5

(6)
Semester 6

(7)
Final GPA

0.31*
(0.17)
0.01
(0.016)
0.10***
(0.021)
0.01
(0.033)
0.01
(0.041)
-0.06
(0.051)
-0.10
(0.065)
0.47***
(0.028)

0.54***
(0.18)
0.03
(0.018)
0.10***
(0.022)
0.04
(0.034)
-0.07
(0.049)
-0.08
(0.058)
0.04
(0.071)
0.74***
(0.028)

0.40*
(0.21)
0.03**
(0.012)
0.06**
(0.025)
-0.06
(0.040)
-0.07
(0.056)
-0.04
(0.057)
0.04
(0.082)
0.64***
(0.030)

0.53**
(0.27)
0.03
(0.015)
0.05*
(0.025)
-0.09**
(0.042)
-0.06
(0.058)
-0.01
(0.062)
0.01
(0.086)
0.57***
(0.034)

0.04
(0.20)
0.01
(0.022)
0.10***
(0.026)
-0.24***
(0.041)
-0.8
(0.066)
-0.19**
(0.076)
-0.06
(0.083)
0.52***
(0.032)

0.19
(0.22)
-0.01
(0.024)
0.04
(0.030)
-0.13***
(0.044)
-0.04
(0.060)
-0.09
(0.073)
0.02
(0.089)
0.44***
(0.035)

0.41**
(0.17)
0.02*
(0.0096)
0.10***
(0.017)
-0.08***
(0.026)
-0.04
(0.036)
-0.06
(0.043)
-0.05
(0.054)
0.54***
(0.022)

8785
0.397

8281
0.289

7139
0.235

6526
0.195

5910
0.191

5465
0.143

8813
0.422

This tables limits the analysis to students that did not graduate. See the footnotes in table 2.5 for further details.
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Table 2.8.: The impact of attending a higher value-added high school on graduation and GPA: gender and racial heterogeneity

Male
Female
White
Black

(1)
Graduated

(2)
Semester 1

(3)
Semester 2

(4)
Semester 3

(5)
Semester 4

(6)
Semester 5

(7)
Semester 6

(8)
Final GPA

-0.05
(0.066)
0.06
(0.057)
0.03
(0.057)
0.09
(0.092)

0.25*
(0.140)
0.31**
(0.131)
0.33***
(0.122)
0.29
(0.190)

0.32***
(0.110)
0.25**
(0.134)
0.34***
(0.113)
0.17
(0.150)

0.36**
(0.150)
0.27*
(0.162)
0.43***
(0.132)
0.09
(0.211)

0.22
(0.140)
0.23*
(0.141)
0.22*
(0.132)
0.26
(0.172)

0.12
(0.141)
0.09
(0.130)
0.22*
(0.124)
-0.05
(0.191)

0.14
(0.152)
-0.07
(0.130)
0.07
(0.120)
0.06
(0.230)

0.22**
(0.086)
0.20**
(0.088)
0.29***
(0.084)
0.13
(0.120)

This table shows the impact of attending a higher value-added high school on GPA and graduation separately separately
by gender and race. Each row-column entry is a separate regression and shows only the coefficient and standard error (in
parentheses) for the value-added variable. Each regression includes the same control variables as the previous analysis. See
the footnotes in table 2.5 for further details.
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Table 2.9.: Quantile regression impact of attending a higher value-added high school
on GPA by semester
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Semester Semester Semester Semester Semester Semester
1
2
3
4
5
6
q10
q20
q30
q40
q50
q60
q70
q80
q90

Observations

(7)
Final
GPA

0.49***
(0.13)
0.35***
(0.078)
0.39***
(0.097)
0.24***
(0.084)
0.23***
(0.078)
0.18**
(0.083)
0.22**
(0.089)
0.25***
(0.081)
0.21***
(0.082)

0.48***
(0.15)
0.32***
(0.12)
0.33***
(0.071)
0.26***
(0.095)
0.19**
(0.089)
0.27***
(0.071)
0.24***
(0.083)
0.26***
(0.078)
0.36***
(0.13)

0.72***
(0.20)
0.57***
(0.12)
0.43***
(0.077)
0.27***
(0.098)
0.19**
(0.083)
0.25***
(0.088)
0.18*
(0.095)
0.089
(0.11)
0.19**
(0.083)

0.07
(0.16)
0.34***
(0.089)
0.33***
(0.085)
0.33***
(0.076)
0.35***
(0.11)
0.27**
(0.12)
0.19*
(0.11)
0.15
(0.11)
0.16
(0.11)

-0.01
(0.25)
0.13
(0.17)
0.29**
(0.15)
0.21
(0.13)
0.20
(0.13)
0.22*
(0.12)
0.20*
(0.11)
0.06
(0.092)
-0.04
(0.073)

-0.14
(0.22)
0.11
(0.12)
0.16
(0.13)
0.13
(0.12)
0.07
(0.10)
0.07
(0.11)
0.03
(0.12)
-0.01
(0.088)
0.02
(0.057)

0.15
(0.096)
0.26***
(0.082)
0.26***
(0.071)
0.29***
(0.064)
0.26***
(0.056)
0.28***
(0.056)
0.22***
(0.045)
0.16***
(0.059)
0.09
(0.065)

23608

23608

23608

23608

23608

23608

23608

This table shows quantile regressions for the impact of attending a higher value-added
high school on GPA. See table 2.5 for further details about covariates and standard
errors.
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Table 2.10.: Quantile regression impact of attending a higher value-added high school
on GPA by semester, students that graduated
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Semester Semester Semester Semester Semester Semester
1
2
3
4
5
6
q10
q20
q30
q40
q50
q60
q70
q80
q90
Observations

0.52**
(0.21)
0.60***
(0.21)
0.58***
(0.22)
0.44**
(0.17)
0.32**
(0.14)
0.37***
(0.14)
0.37**
(0.19)
0.42**
(0.20)
0.49**
(0.25)
3656

0.61***
(0.14)
0.37**
(0.18)
0.44**
(0.17)
0.48***
(0.15)
0.30**
(0.13)
0.35**
(0.17)
0.28
(0.19)
0.37*
(0.22)
0.51**
(0.24)
3656

0.28
(0.26)
0.40**
(0.20)
0.18
(0.22)
0.13
(0.22)
0.17
(0.20)
0.30
(0.23)
0.54**
(0.26)
0.43*
(0.24)
0.45**
(0.22)
3656

0.73**
(0.33)
0.78***
(0.24)
0.57***
(0.21)
0.57***
(0.15)
0.47***
(0.15)
0.32*
(0.16)
0.25
(0.18)
0.28
(0.21)
0.26
(0.19)
3656

0.24
(0.44)
0.61**
(0.25)
0.37*
(0.22)
0.39***
(0.15)
0.39**
(0.18)
0.46**
(0.20)
0.21
(0.18)
0.16
(0.12)
0.07
(0.090)
3656

0.18
(0.18)
0.43**
(0.20)
0.60***
(0.20)
0.35*
(0.19)
0.24
(0.19)
0.22
(0.19)
0.07
(0.14)
0.25*
(0.15)
0.07
(0.19)
3656

(7)
Final
GPA
0.56***
(0.14)
0.44***
(0.13)
0.34***
(0.092)
0.27**
(0.12)
0.25*
(0.14)
0.22**
(0.092)
0.25**
(0.13)
0.28**
(0.11)
0.26
(0.16)
3656

This table shows quantile regressions for the impact of attending a higher valueadded high school on GPA for students that graduated. See table 2.5 for further
details about covariates and standard errors.
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CHAPTER 3. THE IMPACT OF STUTTERING ON ADULT LABOR MARKET
OUTCOMES
3.1

Introduction
The economics literature has long been interested in quantifying the impact of

various disabilities and chronic health conditions on adult labor market outcomes.
This includes Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder [Fletcher, 2014], depression [Ettner et al., 1997, Fletcher, 2013], migraine headaches [Rees and Sabia, 2015], psychiatric disorders [Chatterji et al., 2011], cancer [Heinesen and Kolodziejczyk, 2013],
general health [Smith, 2009], obesity [Norton and Han, 2008], physical disabilities
that onset during adulthood [Haveman and Wolfe, 1990, Bound and Waidmann,
2002, Charles, 2003, Meyer and Mok, 2013], and chronic disabilities [Baldwin and
Johnson, 1994, Baldwin and Johnson, 1995, Kidd et al., 2000]. Our study adds to
this literature by using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to
Adult Health to quantify the impact of stuttering on adult labor market outcomes.
This dataset includes detailed background and labor market information for respondents, as well as information on whether the respondent is a person who stutters.
Presently, it is estimated that 70 million people stutter worldwide and 3 million in
the United States. Stuttering is a complex and heterogeneous disorder that extends
beyond the speech disfluencies produced by both children and adults diagnosed with
the disorder. Research has shown that chronic, persistent stuttering leads to the
development of negative thoughts, attitudes, and emotions about speaking and one’s
sense of efficacy as a communicator [Guitar, 2014]. Considering the ubiquitous nature
of communication, it is likely that communication differences and difficulties would
affect labor market outcomes for people who stutter (PWS) through various channels.
However, no study has adequately quantified the impact of stuttering on adult labor
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market outcomes or attempted to account for how various channels influence outcome
differences between PWS and people who do not stutter (PWNS).
Although no study has adequately quantified the impact of stuttering on labor
market outcomes, there is an abundance of evidence that PWS face difficulties in the
labor market [Rice and Kroll, 1994, Rice and Kroll, 1997, Crichton-Smith, 2002, Hayhow et al., 2002, Klein and Hood, 2004, Palasik et al., 2012, Bricker-Katz et al.,
2013]. These studies include self-reports of reduced earnings as a result of stuttering, reports of PWNS believing negative stereotypes about PWS, and reports of
reduced occupational opportunities for PWS. These hardships could arise from many
sources, including differences in background characteristics, differences in education
levels, self-selection out of specific occupations, differences in personality characteristics such as self-esteem or self-efficacy, differences in job performance, and employer
discrimination in the form of barriers to entry into specific occupations or decreased
promotion possibilities within occupations1 .
After controlling for detailed personal and family background characteristics, we
find that stuttering has significant impacts on labor market outcomes and that stuttering has heterogeneous effects for males and females; for males, stuttering is associated
with a significant decrease in the probability of being employed, decrease in the probability of being in the labor force, and increase in the probability of receiving pubic
assistance such as welfare, but no impact on the probability of being underemployed
conditional on employment. For females, the opposite is true; stuttering has no effect
on the probability of being employed or in the labor force, but females who stutter
are significantly more likely to be underemployed. Both males and females who stutter experience a reduction in hourly earnings of approximately 14%. Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition shows that much of the difference in hourly earnings can be explained
by differences in education, occupation, and self-stigma, which is a variable that we
construct to capture differences in self-esteem and self-efficacy that may develop as a
1

The United Kingdom has advocacy groups that support PWS in the workforce, such as the British
Stammering Association and the Defence Stammering Network, but no such organizations currently
exist in the United States.
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person stutters throughout his or her lifetime. However, there remains an unexplained
difference, which is often attributed to discrimination in decomposition studies.
Estimating the causal impact of stuttering may be difficult if stuttering is correlated with unobserved confounders at the individual or family level. Previous research
on stuttering in the economics literature has shown that while stuttering appears to be
associated with a decrease in human capital acquisition, these effects disappear when
approaches intended to address difficult-to-measure heterogeneity are added [Rees and
Sabia, 2014]2 . We use similar approaches, which include adding controls for ADHD
and other co-occurring learning disabilities or using propensity score matching. Unlike in [Rees and Sabia, 2014], we find that the effect of stuttering on labor market
outcomes is robust to these approaches. The heterogeneous effect of stuttering by
gender, which was not found in [Rees and Sabia, 2014], may also be interpreted as
evidence that the effect of stuttering on labor market outcomes is causal; if the results
were spurious and related to unobserved individual or family confounders, then the
spurious relationship may be expected to occur for all labor market outcome variables
or at least in the same outcome variables for males and females. Furthermore, the
result that stuttering impacts more labor market outcome variables for males than
females is consistent with evidence that females view stuttering as less of a handicap
in the labor market than males [Klein and Hood, 2004].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background
information on stuttering and the existing knowledge about employment experiences
of PWS. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the methodology used in
the analysis. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2

[Rees and Sabia, 2014] use ordinary least squares and find that stuttering is associated with a significant decrease in high school GPA, high school graduation, and college attendance. However, they
find that the effects become small and insignificant when any of the following three approaches are
added: (1) adding controls for ADHD and learning disabilities, (2) using propensity score matching,
or (3) adding family fixed effects. These three approaches all produce similar results that are much
smaller than initial OLS results.
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3.2

Background

3.2.1

What is stuttering and who stutters?

Stuttering is a neurodevelopmental disorder involving many different brain systems active for speech - including language, motor, and emotional networks [National
Stuttering Asso Meeting, 2015]. Given that stuttering is an intricate human behavior,
the cause of stuttering is both dynamic and multifactorial in nature [Smith, 1999].
Several factors have been implicated as potential contributors to stuttering etiology,
including genetics and heritability, sex, and co-occurrence of additional speech and
language difficulties in childhood. PWS are more likely than typical speakers to have
a relative who stutters [Ambrose et al., 1993]. Additionally, stuttering across the
lifespan is more common in males than females [Ambrose et al., 1997].
All speakers produce disfluencies, or breaks in the smooth transitions within and
between words, during speech production. Typical speech disfluencies produced by
both people who do and do not stutter include interjections (e.g. He wants theumball),
phrase repetitions (I want I want the car) and revisions (Where did I put Oh, there
it is). On the other hand, so-called ”stuttering-like” disfluencies (SLDs) are seen
with greater frequency in PWS. Stuttering-like disfluencies include sound and syllable
repetitions (e.g. b-b-boy), sound prolongations (e.g. hhhhhhhhhello), and blocks,
which are characterized by cessation in voicing and articulator movement (e.g.
no), [Guitar, 2014]. An important feature of stuttering is that it is highly variable
within and between PWS. In general, PWS produce fluent speech more often than
disfluent speech.
The lifetime incidence of stuttering, or the number of people who report experiencing stuttering at some point in their life, is estimated to be between 5% and 9%
[Mnsson, 2000, Felsenfeld et al., 1997, Dworzynski et al., 2007]. The prevalence, or
the number of people who report experiencing stuttering at a given time, typically
hovers around just less than 1% [Craig et al., 2002], but has been reported to be as
high as 2.12% [Gillespie and Cooper, 1973]. The incidence of stuttering is relatively
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high because stuttering emerges and is fairly common in the preschool years, with
one study suggesting that 17.7% of preschoolers experience stuttering [Mnsson, 2000].
However, approximately three out of four preschoolers who experience stuttering exhibit so-called unassisted or ”spontaneous” recovery. Unassisted recovery refers to a
natural cessation of stuttering-like behaviors without therapeutic intervention, and
typically occurs within one to two-years post-onset. The preschoolers who do not
recover (approximately one out of four) will persist in stuttering across the lifespan
[Yairi and Ambrose, 1992].
As a person stutters throughout his or her lifetime, the disorder and it’s behavioral manifestations evolves into a more complex problem that may include cognitive
(negative thoughts) and affective (negative emotions) components. Holistically, stuttering frequently affects social interactions and can negatively impact how people
view themselves as communicators and general members of society. For some PWS,
these can interfere more with communicating than the behavior itself.

3.2.2

Stuttering, employment, and stigma

Employment experiences of PWS
Several studies have explored occupational experiences of PWS [Rice and Kroll,
1994, Rice and Kroll, 1997, Crichton-Smith, 2002, Hayhow et al., 2002, Klein and
Hood, 2004, Palasik et al., 2012, McAllister et al., 2012, Bricker-Katz et al., 2013].
In a survey study with 282 PWS, over half of participants agreed that employers had
misjudged their skillsets because of their stuttering. Sixteen percent of participants
indicated that a potential employer directly told them that they were not hired for
a job because of stuttering [Rice and Kroll, 1994]. In a similar survey, over 40%
of the 232 PWS polled agreed that their job choice and earnings had been affected
by stuttering. Specifically, 50% indicated that they sought out employment that
required little speaking, 41% agreed that they would have a different job if they did
not stutter, and 38% believed they were earning less money than they would if they
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did not stutter. In terms of getting hired and promoted, 70% of participants believed
that their chances were decreased, and 20% had declined a job or promotion because
of their stuttering [Klein and Hood, 2004]. [Palasik et al., 2012]s survey findings also
demonstrate that at least some PWS experience work related difficulties and 43% of
the 184 PWS polled reported experiencing occupational discrimination.
These studies yield mixed findings as to whether specific groups of people are more
adversely affected in the workplace by their stuttering. The majority of studies indicate that males, non-Caucasians, and people without prior speech-therapy experience
are more likely to believe that stuttering negatively impacted their employability and
job performance [Klein and Hood, 2004]. However, one study did not find differences
between these groups and their counterparts [Palasik et al., 2012].
To date, only one group of authors has attempted to conduct a quantitative comparison of labor market outcomes between PWS and PWNS. [McAllister et al., 2012]
used a longitudinal British cohort dataset that is similar to ours in an attempt to
study the impact of stuttering on labor market outcomes. However, they recode the
earnings variable into a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent earns
more or less than the average level of earnings in the dataset, which provides an incomplete analysis of the impact of stuttering on earnings. Additionally, they have no
measure of employment status, labor force participation, or underemployment, which
is where much of the impact of stuttering on labor market outcomes may occur. Given
the discrepancy between reports of negative occupational experiences from PWS and
the null findings in their large-scale study, it is clear that more research is needed to
capture the nuanced difficulties reported by PWS.

Public-stigma
One of the best constructs for framing the factors that contribute to differences
in labor market outcomes between PWS and PWNS is stigma and how it impacts
PWS. Current models of stigma have broken the phenomenon down into two forms,
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public-stigma and self-stigma [Corrigan et al., 2009]. Stigma refers to a personal
mark or characteristic that devalues or discredits an individual in society [Goffman,
1963, Jones et al., 1984]. In the workplace, PWS not only have to manage their
stuttering, but they also have to manage the stigma associated with stuttering.
Stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination comprise public-stigma [Corrigan et al.,
2011, Boyle and Blood, 2015]. Stereotypes about PWS have been studied extensively in the speech-language pathology literature [Kalinowski et al., 1996]. Research
has shown that teachers, college students, speech-language pathologists, and general
members of the public hold negative stereotypes about PWS [Cooper and Cooper,
1996, Dorsey and Guenther, 2000, Craig et al., 2003, Boyle et al., 2009], including
that they are afraid, nervous, anxious, passive, avoidant, guarded, tense, introverted,
shy, embarrassed, frustrated, insecure, timid, self-derogatory, reticent, or sensitive
[Kalinowski et al., 1996, MacKinnon et al., 2007].
Employer-held stereotypes of PWS have also been specifically explored [Hurst
and Cooper, 1983]. In this study, 644 employers were surveyed about their attitudes
toward employees who stutter. Eighty-four percent of employers indicated that they
believed stuttering decreases a persons employability at least somewhat, with 10% of
total respondents indicating that employability is decreased a great deal. Additionally,
29% of employers indicated that stuttering interferes with job performance, and 40%
reported that stuttering interferes with promotion opportunities. When asked who
should be hired if two equally qualified applicants applied for employment, one being
a PWS and one being a PWNS, 61.9% indicated that the PWNS should be hired
[Hurst and Cooper, 1983].
One way in which stereotypes and prejudices can lead to discrimination is through
role entrapment of the stigmatized group. Role entrapment occurs when members
of the majority group (e.g. PWNS) define roles that are appropriate for members of
the minority group (e.g. PWS) [Smart, 2001, Gabel et al., 2004]. Occupational role
entrapment results in limited career choices for PWS. For example, 43.6% of employers
agreed that PWS should seek employment where little speaking is required [Hurst
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and Cooper, 1983]. In another study, 385 college students were asked to indicate
appropriate careers for PWS. Of the 43 total career choices, 20 choices (including
attorney, judge, speech-language pathologist, and minister) were rated as significantly
less appropriate for PWS than PWNS [Gabel et al., 2004].

Self-stigma
Self-stigma is another form of stigma. Self-stigma occurs when a person who possesses a marked characteristic or trait internalizes and embeds an associated publicstigma into his or her self-concept, and often results in reduced self-esteem and selfefficacy [Smart, 2001, Corrigan and Watson, 2002]. The phenomenon of self-stigma
is not inherent to the individual, but develops through sociocultural interaction [Barreto and Ellemers, 2010, Boyle and Blood, 2015]. Additionally, self-stigma is not a
phenomenon specific to PWS. Drawing from the broader disability literature, many
people with a variety of disabilities have received and accepted societys message that
they are inferior [Smart, 2001]. This phenomenon is more likely to occur in people with uncommon disabilities, as they may have fewer opportunities to disprove
the stereotypes and may be isolated from positive models of others with the same
disability [Smart, 2001].
In the qualitative research literature, some PWS report awareness of stereotypes
related to stuttering. PWS have said that they sometimes believe others view them as
mentally defective, stupid, introverted, not very bright, weird, incompetent, a failure,
socially crippled, inferior, not normal, or having something major wrong with [them]
[Corcoran and Stewart, 1998, Klompas and Ross, 2004, Plexico et al., 2009, Boyle,
2013, Bricker-Katz et al., 2013]. Some people applied these stereotypes to themselves
and reported feeling hopeless or suffering from reduced self-worth, self-esteem or selfidentity [Klompas and Ross, 2004, Plexico et al., 2009].
[Boyle, 2013] developed the Self-Stigma of Stuttering Scale (4S), a psychometrically sound assessment tool that was normed from responses from 291 PWS. In this
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sample, 86% of participants demonstrated high levels of awareness of stigma associated with stuttering, 19% agreed that stigma associated with stuttering may apply
to other PWS, and 39% indicated that the stigma applied to themselves. In this
sample, stigma at all levels (awareness, agreement, and application) was associated
with increased levels of anxiety and depression, as well as decreased feelings of hope,
empowerment, quality of life, and social support [Boyle, 2015]. No research has ever
been conducted that attempts to capture how self-stigma may affect occupational
outcomes in PWS.

3.3

Data
Data for the study comes from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent

to Adult Health (Add Health). Add Health is a longitudinal study of a nationally
representative sample of adolescents in grades 7-12 in the United States during the
1994-95 school year, which was conducted by the Carolina Population Center at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The Add Health cohort has been followed
into young adulthood with four in-home interviews, the most recent of which occurred
in 2008, when the respondents were aged 24-32. Add Health combines longitudinal
survey data on respondents social, economic, psychological, and physical well-being
with contextual data on the family, neighborhood, community, school, friendships,
peer groups, and romantic relationships3 . Add Health data has been used to study
the effect of a variety of worker characteristics on labor market outcomes, such as
obesity [Norton and Han, 2008], attractiveness [Fletcher, 2009], adolescent depression
[Fletcher, 2013], ADHD [Fletcher, 2014], and migraine headaches [Rees and Sabia,
2015].
3

Eighty high schools from the US were selected using sampling and stratification methods to ensure that the selected schools were representative of US schools with respect to region of country,
urbanicity, size, type, and ethnicity. Selected schools that did not enroll 7th graders helped to identify feeder schools that contribute students to the high school. Fifty-two such schools were added,
bringing the total number of schools in the study to 132, covering 80 communities in the US. See
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/design for additional information on the Add Health
sampling process.
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During Wave I of the in-home interviews, a core sample of 12,105 students were
selected at random from the 132 schools. Supplemental samples of students were
selected with a special emphasis on collecting information from ethnic minorities,
students with physical disabilities involving the use of their limbs, and siblings. Additionally, the survey was given to every student enrolled at 16 of the 132 schools.
The total number of respondents was 20,745. Three waves of follow-up in-home interviews have been conducted since the initial wave. Wave II was conducted one year
after the first wave, during the 1995-96 school year. Wave III occurred in 2001-02,
when respondents were between 18 and 26 years old. The most recent wave, Wave
IV, occurred during 2007-08 when respondents were 24-32 and includes detailed labor
market information.

3.3.1

The measure of stuttering

Wave III and Wave IV ask respondents, ”Do you have a problem with stuttering
or stammering?” Approximately 4% of the sample (208 out of the 5,114 respondents
in the public-use data) answered yes to this question4 . As discussed in Section 2, the
consensus is that around 1% of the adult population stutters, although some studies
have reported higher estimates. Most likely, there are people in the sample who
answered yes to the question about stuttering that would not be clinically diagnosed
as a PWS. This could occur because the respondent stuttered as a child and has
since spontaneously recovered, but still identified as a PWS in the survey due to
misunderstanding the longitudinal nature of stuttering. It could also occur because
some people confuse ”normal” disfluencies (e.g., interjections, phrase repetitions, and
revisions that occasionally occur during normal speech) with stuttering.
We made some attempts to separately identify people who actually stutter from
those who used to stutter and those who confuse normal disfluencies with stuttering.
Wave IV asks respondents if they would describe their stuttering as mild, moderate,
4

Our analysis is based on the public-use Add Health data which includes only a subset of the full
sample. The respondents in the public-use data are selected randomly from the full dataset.
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or severe. Keeping only those who reported their stuttering as moderate or severe
greatly reduces the estimated prevalence of stuttering. Only including this group in
the analysis, or showing how the effect of stuttering differs according to stuttering
severity, was considered. However, this was unfeasible given that only 28 people
in the public-use dataset reported moderate or severe stuttering. Additionally, selfassessment of stuttering severity may be correlated with factors such as self-esteem,
which would also influence labor market outcomes and thus introduce endogeneity
into the measure of stuttering. We also attempted to address this issue by limiting the
sample of PWS to those who reported that they stutter in both Wave III and Wave
IV. Given that both the onset of and spontaneous recovery from stuttering typically
occur during childhood, a respondent who reports that they stutter in one wave but
not the other is more likely to be a person who is confusing normal disfluencies with
stuttering. This slightly decreases the estimated prevalence, but the results using this
sample are nearly identical to those reported later in the paper and are therefore not
shown.
Including PWNS in the sample of PWS would result in attenuation bias in the
estimated effect of stuttering on labor market outcomes toward zero. Given that
4% is much higher than the general consensus on the prevalence of stuttering into
adulthood, a large fraction of our sample of PWS may be PWNS. If this is the
case, then the results presented later in the paper may underestimate the impact of
stuttering on labor market outcomes.

3.3.2

Outcome variables

The labor market outcome variables are log hourly earnings and indicator variables
for whether the respondent is employed, in the labor force (employed or unemployed
but looking for a job), underemployed, and on public assistance. Each of these outcome variables comes from Wave IV. The earnings data come from the following
question: ”Now think about your personal earnings. In [previous year] how much
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income did you receive from personal earnings before taxes, that is, wages or salaries,
including tips, bonuses, and overtime pay, and income from self-employment?” This
was converted into an hourly earnings variable using the next question, asked in reference to their current job: ”How many hours per week do you usually work at this
job?” We then multiplied this number by 52 to get annual hours and then divided
annual earnings by annual hours5 .
The outcome variable for whether the respondent is employed is taken from a
question that asked respondents if they are currently working for pay at least 10
hours per week. The employed variable is equal to 1 if the respondent answered
yes to this question and 0 otherwise. The labor force variable is equal to 1 if the
respondent is working for pay at least 10 hours per week or if they reported that they
are unemployed but looking for a job and 0 if the respondent neither is working at least
10 hours per week nor is looking for a job. The underemployed variable was created by
matching the SOC occupation codes in the Add Health data to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ data on the typical level of education for each occupation. If a respondent
had a higher level of education than the typical worker in that occupation, then the
respondent was coded as being underemployed. The public assistance variable is
equal to 1 if the respondent indicated that they have ever been enrolled in a public
assistance program such as welfare and 0 otherwise.
Summary statistics in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 show the mean and standard deviation for each of these labor market outcomes and are shown separately according to
whether the respondent is a PWS.

3.3.3

Labor market characteristics, individual characteristics, and family
characteristics

Stuttering may impact labor market outcomes through many channels, including
through labor market characteristics such as education level, occupation, and per5

Results based on annual earnings are very similar to the results shown later for hourly earnings.
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sonality characteristics like self-esteem and self-efficacy. Data on these characteristics
will be useful when attempting to account for the cause of differences in labor market
outcomes between PWS and PWNS. Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for education levels, average hourly earnings in the respondent’s occupation, and a variable
that measures self-stigma, which we construct to account for personality differences
between PWS and PWNS6 .
As described in Section 2, some PWS have been shown to exhibit self-stigma,
which occurs when a person who possesses a marked characteristic or trait (in this
case, stuttering) internalizes and embeds an associated public-stigma into his or her
self-concept, and often results in reduced self-esteem and self-efficacy. In this sense,
accounting for self-stigma is similar to other studies that have accounted for selfesteem, which has been shown to have significant impacts on labor market outcomes
[Heckman et al., 2006, Fortin, 2008]. Our measure of self-stigma is constructed using
answers to a subset of six questions asked in Wave IV of the Add Health data7 .
These questions were chosen because they align closely with common stereotypes
about PWS. The exact questions and the stereotype that they align with are shown
in the appendix. The response to each of these questions was re-coded into a binary
variable (1 or 0), with a 1 indicating that the respondent gave an answer that aligns
with the stereotype. This was done for both PWS and PWNS. Each of these six
indicator variables were then summed together and re-scaled into a composite variable
6

We calculate mean occupation earnings by taking the average hourly earnings for each occupation
in the Add Health data and then matching this variable to each respondent’s occupation. In the
analysis below, occupation differences will be accounted for by using occupation fixed effects.
7
We measure self-stigma in Wave IV because self-stigma occurs over time as a stigmatized group is
exposed to and then internalizes the public-stigma into his or her self-concept. Much of this exposure
to public stigma may occur when PWS enter the labor force, so we choose to measure self-stigma
in Wave IV. However, reverse causality is a potential concern; people may be more likely to answer
survey questions in a way that suggests that they are quiet, nervous, lacking assertion, etc. (some of
the common stereotypes of PWS, as shown in the appendix) because of struggles in the labor market
that are unrelated to any discrimination or stereotyping that they have experienced. Therefore, we
also used a measure of self-stigma constructed from Wave I. Results using this measure are similar to
those shown in the paper, although self-stigma appears to play a somewhat smaller role in explaining
the difference in labor market outcomes between PWS and PWNS when measured using Wave I.

123
ranging from 0 to 18 . PWS, on average, have statistically significant higher levels of
this self-stigma index, which suggests that we are capturing differences in self-esteem
and self-efficacy that are correlated with stuttering. Additionally, the difference in the
response to each of the individual questions between PWS and PWNS was statistically
significant at the one-percent level, with PWS responding in ways that aligned with
the internalization of public stigmas.
Summary statistics for individual and family characteristics are shown in Table
3.2. These include the respondent’s age, gender, race, ethnicity, attractiveness, height,
and weight at Wave IV and information on their parent’s income, education, and
marital status at Wave I. We also use the school that the respondent was enrolled in
during Wave I to capture difficult-to-measure differences in school and neighborhood
quality. Table 3.1 also shows summary statistics for tenure (years at current job) and
weekly hours.

3.4

Methodology

3.4.1

Regression analysis and propensity score matching

The first method that we use to quantify the impact of stuttering on labor market
outcomes is regression analysis using ordinary least squares (OLS) for hourly earnings
regressions and probit estimation for binary outcome variables. We first estimate:

Yi = α + βP W Si + εi ,

(3.1)

where Yi is one of the outcome variables discussed in the previous section and P W Si
is an indicator for whether the respondent is a PWS. In this equation, the estimate
of β captures the total difference in outcomes between PWS and PWNS without
8

The Cronbach’s alpha, a measure of reliability that indicates whether the responses to each question
comprising the composite index are highly correlated, is 0.43. This is very similar to that of scales
used in economics to measure self-esteem and locus of control [Waddell, 2006, Fortin, 2008].
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controlling for any characteristics of the respondent, α is a constant, and εi is an
individual-specific error term.
Next, we add covariates to the equation to control for individual and family background characteristics:

Yis = α + βP W Si + φ0 Xi + zs + εis ,

(3.2)

where Xi is a vector of individual and family background characteristics (age, gender,
race, ethnicity, attractiveness, height, weight, parent’s income, parent’s education,
and parent’s marital status) and zs is a fixed effect for each of the 132 schools in
Wave I. The covariates control for differences in observable background characteristics and the school fixed effects capture unobservable differences related to school or
neighborhood factors. The estimate of β in this equation captures the difference in
outcomes between PWS and PWNS that is due to reasons other than differences in
these background characteristics.
If stuttering is uncorrelated with any remaining individual or family heterogeneity
left over in the error term εis from equation (2), then the estimate of β will capture
the total causal effect of stuttering on the given labor market outcome; after controlling for individual, family, and school/neighborhood background characteristics, any
remaining difference in labor market outcomes between PWS and PWNS is likely an
effect of stuttering itself. However, it is possible that there are unobservable differences in background characteristics remaining in the error term that are correlated
with stuttering and could cause bias in our estimate of the effect of stuttering on
labor market outcomes.
One potential confounder not included in equation (2) is ADHD and learning disabilities. Stuttering has been shown to be correlated with both ADHD and some
other learning disabilities9 . [Rees and Sabia, 2014] showed that controls for ADHD
9

Estimates of the prevalence of concomitant ADHD in children who stutter have ranged from 4%
to 26% [Riley and Riley, 2000, Conture, 2001, Arndt and Healey, 2001]. This may be similar to or
higher than the national prevalence of ADHD in children in the United States, which ranges from
5% to 11% [Association, 2013, Visser et al., 2014]. Phonological and/or language disorders have
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and learning disabilities significantly reduce the estimated effect of stuttering on human capital accumulation. Table 3.2 confirms that stuttering is highly correlated
with both ADHD and learning disabilities. Therefore, we also estimate the following
specification, which adds controls for ADHD and learning disabilities:

Yis = α + βP W Si + φ0 Xi + δADHDi + γLDi + zs + εis ,

(3.3)

where ADHDi and LDi are binary variables indicating ADHD and learning disabilities, respectively. The variable for ADHD comes from a question in Wave IV that
asks, ”Has a doctor, nurse or other health care provider ever told you that you have
or had: attention problems or ADD or ADHD?” The variable for learning disabilities
comes from a question in Wave I that asks, ”Does (he/she) have a specific learning
disability, such as difficulties with attention, dyslexia, or some other reading, spelling,
writing, or math disability?”
Another way to address differences between PWS and PWNS in terms of observable characteristics is the use of propensity score matching. This approach will
produce more reliable estimates than regression analysis if the two groups lack common support. [Rees and Sabia, 2014] found that using propensity score matching
also significantly reduces the estimated effect of stuttering on human capital accumulation. Therefore, we perform nearest neighbor matching, which first estimates the
propensity of each respondent to be a PWS based on the covariates described above:

P r(P W Si = 1) = 1 − Φ(−α − φ0 Xi − δADHDi − γLDi − zs ).
Then, we use nearest neighbor matching with replacement to match each PWS to
three PWNS with a similar estimated propensity. The propensity score matching
estimates for the effect of stuttering on labor market outcomes are calculated by
also been shown to be more prevalent in children who stutter than in the general population, with
estimates of comorbidity with stuttering as high as 42% [Arndt and Healey, 2001]. Comorbidity
of stuttering and learning disabilities or literacy disorders is also estimated to be higher than in
the general population, with estimated comorbidities of 15.2% and 8.2%, respectively [Blood et al.,
2003]
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comparing the outcomes of PWS to the outcomes of their match. Specifically, the
estimate is the mean difference in outcomes between PWS and their match. We limit
the sample to matches whose estimated propensity scores were within 0.004. We also
dropped the 2% of PWS whose propensity score was furthest from the propensity
score of their nearest match10 .
These methods will estimate the total causal impact of stuttering on labor market
outcomes, conditional on individual and family background characteristics and cooccurring disabilities, assuming that there are no remaining unobserved confounders11 .

3.4.2

Labor market characteristics and Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition

We are also interested in understanding the causes of the remaining difference in
labor market outcomes between PWS and PWNS after controlling for individual and
family background characteristics and co-occurring disabilities. There are several
channels through which stuttering could impact labor market outcomes, including
differences in education levels, personality characteristics such as self-esteem and selfefficacy, occupations, job performance, and employer discrimination. We therefore
add several additional covariates to equation (3) in order to control for differences in
observable labor market characteristics:

Yis = α + βP W Si + φ0 Xi + δADHDi + γLDi + σ 0 LMi + zs + εis ,
10

(3.4)

We chose to match with replacement and to match to multiple neighbors (”oversampling”) because
this approach did the best job of matching covariate means between PWS and PWNS. Results are
very similar if we match without replacement, match to a different number of neighbors, or match
to a single neighbor. Results are also very similar for different caliper widths and different trimming
percentages.
11
[Rees and Sabia, 2014] also use family fixed effects to address potential unobserved differences in
family characteristics that may be correlated with stuttering and human capital accumulation. The
public-use version of the data does not provide sibling identifiers and therefore does not allow for
family fixed effects. However, as discussed in the introduction, [Rees and Sabia, 2014] find that
family fixed effects, propensity score matching, and controls for ADHD and learning disabilities all
produce very similar results that are significantly different from baseline OLS results. Therefore,
the propensity score matching and specifications with controls for ADHD and learning disabilities
should be sufficient to indicate whether baseline OLS results are entirely spurious or if there is an
effect of stuttering on labor market outcomes.
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where LMi is a vector of controls for education level and self-stigma. For earnings
regressions, it also includes occupation fixed effects, job tenure, average weekly hours
worked, and limits the sample to full-time workers (at least 35 hours per week).
Results from this equation will show how much of the remaining difference in
labor market outcomes between PWS and PWNS after controlling for individual and
family characteristics and co-occurring disabilities can be explained by differences in
observable labor market characteristics. If a large fraction of the difference can be
explained by these labor market characteristics, that does not mean that there is no
effect of stuttering on labor market outcomes. Rather, it would indicate that the
effect of stuttering on labor market outcomes occurs through these observable labor
market characteristics.
The estimate of β from equation (4) will show the total difference in labor market
outcomes that remains between PWS and PWNS after controlling for all background
characteristics and labor market characteristics. But we are not just interested in
quantifying the unexplained difference. We are also interested in accounting for the
relative importance of each of the background and labor market characteristics in explaining the total difference in earnings12 . Understanding the most important factors
that account for earnings differences between PWS and PWNS is especially important given that this is a policy relevant question; the relative importance of immutable
individual and family background characteristics, labor market characteristics, and
unexplained factors informs the relative importance of access to speech therapy, the
focus of speech therapy (self-stigma versus fluency), and anti-discrimination policies
that support PWS in the workforce. The desire to account for the causes of earnings
differences between groups is also relevant in the literature on gender and racial earn12

As explained in [Gelbach, 2014], accounting for the relative importance of different covariates
in explaining a difference in outcomes across groups cannot be done by simply observing how the
coefficient of a group dummy variable in a linear regression changes as covariates are added. This
issue is known as sequencing sensitivity or path dependence. Rather, decomposition methods are
required.
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ings differences. This is commonly done by using Blinder-Oaxaca (BO) decomposition
[Blinder, 1973, Oaxaca, 1973], which we adopt for the same purpose

13

.

Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is straightforward. Let XiBO be a vector that
contains some combination of the covariates described above.

That is, XiBO =

[Xi0 , ADHDi , LDi , LMi0 , zs ], or any subset of those covariates. For simplicity in exposition below, assume that XiBO contains K of these covariates. Assuming a linear
regression approach as above, we can write hourly earnings as a function of these
covariates separately for PWS and PWNS:

Ygi = αg +

K
X

BO
Xik
βgk + εgi ,

g = P W S, P W N S.

(3.5)

k=1

Then, the overall difference in earnings between PWS and PWNS,
ˆ = ȲP W N S − ȲP W S ,
∆
can be rewritten as:

ˆ =
∆

K
X

BO
(X̄PBO
W N S,k − X̄P W S,k )β̂P W S,k

(3.6)

k=1

+

K
X

X̄PBO
W N S,k (β̂P W N S,k − β̂P W S,k ) + (α̂P W N S − α̂P W S ).

k=1

where α̂g and β̂gk are the estimated intercept and slope coefficients from the model
in (5) for g = P W S, P W N S and X̄gk is the average value of variable k for group g.
The first term on the right-hand side of (6) is usually called the ”explained” effect
or ”characteristics” effect in Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, because it represents the
fraction of the difference in outcomes that is due to differences in observable characteristics. The next two terms on the right-hand side of (5) are usually called the
”unexplained” effect. They are also often referred to as the ”coefficients effect” or
”wage effect”, because they represent the fraction of the earnings difference that is
13

See [O’Neill and O’Neill, 2006] for an example of decomposition methods applied to gender and
racial discrimination and [Fortin and Firpo, 2011] for a detailed overview of decomposition methods.
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due to differences in the return to characteristics, captured by differences in the coefficients. This unexplained effect can also be interpreted as a treatment effect [Fortin
and Firpo, 2011]. In earnings studies, it is commonly assumed to capture employer
discrimination, although it also captures the effect of any unobserved differences between groups.
Thus, in this application, we can decompose the total hourly earnings difference
between PWS and PWNS into the explained difference due to various background and
labor market characteristics and the unexplained difference due to employer discrimination or other unobserved differences between PWS and PWNS14 . More importantly,
we can further breakdown the explained fraction of the earnings difference into the
fraction that is explained by each background and labor market characteristic. This
provides a detailed accounting for the relative influence of each of the background and
labor market characteristics on the total hourly earnings difference between PWS and
PWNS.

3.5

Results
The main results are reported in Tables 2-7. Each table reports pooled results for

males and females and also reports results separately by gender. Standard errors are
clustered by school of residence in Wave I in all tables.

3.5.1

Regression analysis

Table 3.3 shows the baseline regression results. The table shows the impact of
stuttering on each of hourly earnings, employment, labor force participation, under14

One of the primary drawbacks of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition - that it inherently follows a
partial equilibrium approach - is less of a concern in this application than applications to gender and
racial differences. The male (White) wage structure does not provide a proper counterfactual for
female (Black) workers in the absence of discrimination, due to general equilibrium wage effects that
would occur; changing the female (Black) wage structure would also affect the male (White) wage
structure. However, due to the relatively small size of the stuttering population, general equilibrium
effects would likely be very small in this setting.
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employment, and receipt of public assistance separately by panel. Pooled results are
reported in columns (1)-(2) and results for males and females are reported in columns
(3)-(4) and (5)-(6), respectively. The first column for each group shows the total unconditional difference, corresponding to the specification in equation (1). The next
column adds controls for background characteristics and corresponds to equation (2).
Each panel-by-column result is based on a separate regression. We only report the
coefficient on the stuttering variable for the purpose of brevity in the table.
Pooled results in column (1) show that stuttering appears to have a significant
impact on hourly earnings, employment status, labor force participation, and receipt
of public assistance. The estimated effect of stuttering on each of these outcomes is
statistically significant at at least the 5% level. When controls for detailed individual
and family background characteristics are added in column (2), the estimated effect
of stuttering on labor market outcomes decreases in magnitude by approximately
25% - 40% depending on the outcome variable, but statistically significant differences
remain, except for employment status.
However, the pooled results mask significant gender heterogeneity. For males,
stuttering is associated with a 19% reduction in hourly earnings, a 12% reduction
in the probability of being employed, a 14% reduction in the probability of being
in the labor force, and a 12% increase in the probability of having ever received
public assistance. Each of these estimates are statistically significant at at least the
5% level. Conditional on being employed, stuttering has no impact, statistically or
economically, on the probability of being underemployed.
For females, the results are nearly the opposite; stuttering is associated with a
significant effect on hourly earnings and underemployment, but no effect on the probability of being employed, being in the labor force, or having ever received public
assistance. The coefficient for the stuttering indicator variable suggests a 16% reduction in hourly earnings and a 10% increase in the probability of being underemployed.
Each of these estimates are statistically significant at the 10% level. Stuttering has no
impact, statistically or economically, on the other labor market outcomes for females.
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3.5.2

Controls for individual heterogeneity

We address concerns about individual-level heterogeneity that may be correlated
with stuttering and labor market outcomes by adding controls for ADHD and learning
disabilities in Table 3.4. The first column for each group (all, males, females) is based
on equation (2), which controls for individual and family background characteristics.
The next column adds controls for ADHD and learning disabilities, corresponding to
equation (3). Because of missing observations for ADHD and learning disabilities,
the sample size decreases compared to Table 3.3.
The magnitude of the effect of stuttering on labor market outcomes decreases
by approximately 10% to 30%, depending on the outcome variable and group, when
controls for ADHD and learning disabilities are added. Given that stuttering does
have a high co-occurrence with ADHD and other learning disabilities, a decrease in
magnitude is expected. However, the estimates reported in Table 3.3 do not appear
to be entirely caused by other co-occurring disabilities.
For males, stuttering is associated with a statistically significant impact on the
same outcome variables as before: hourly earnings, employment, labor force participation, and receipt of public assistance. The effect is also still economically significant;
stuttering is associated with a 14% reduction in hourly earnings, a 12% decrease in the
probability of being employed, a 14% increase in the probability of being in the labor
force, and a 13% increase in the probability of having ever received pubic assistance.
For females, the results are also very similar to Table 3.3; stuttering is associated
with an economically large reduction in hourly earnings of 14% and an increase in
the probability of being underemployed of 8%. However, the estimate for the effect
of stuttering on these two outcomes is no longer statistically significant. Nonetheless,
stuttering does appear to impact these two outcomes for females, even if the estimates
are not measured precisely enough to be statistically significant.
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3.5.3

Propensity score matching

Table B.2 and B.3 in the appendix shows the means of the covariates before and
after matching. In the unmatched sample, PWS are significantly more likely to be
male, Black, and Native American. PWS are also less attractive, taller, weigh more,
and are more likely to have ADHD or other learning disabilities. In the matched
sample, no statistically significant differences between PWS and PWNS remain.
The propensity score matching results are shown in Table 3.5. The first column
for each group (all, males, females) shows the mean difference in each labor market
outcome variable for the unmatched sample. The next column shows the mean difference for the matched sample. Results based on the unmatched sample are very
similar to the results reported in previous tables. Propensity score matching results
based on the matched sample are very similar to results reported in Table 3.4.
For males, stuttering is associated with a significant reduction in hourly earnings,
a decrease in the probability of being employed, a decrease in the probability of
being in the labor force, and an increase in the probability of having ever received
public assistance. For females, stuttering is again associated with an economically
large reduction in hourly earnings of 9.3% and increase in the probability of being
underemployed of 12.2%, although neither is statistically significant, as in Table 3.4.

3.5.4

Labor market characteristics and Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition

The previous results suggest that stuttering is associated with a significant impact
on several labor market outcomes. This impact could occur through many possible
channels, including differences in education levels, personality characteristics such as
self-esteem and self-efficacy, occupations, job performance, and employer discrimination. Therefore, Table 3.6 adds controls for several labor market characteristics in
order to better understand the role of these channels. These characteristics include
education level and self-stigma. Results for log hourly earnings also include occupation fixed effects, controls for tenure and hours, and are based on full-time workers.
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The first column for each group (all, males, females) controls for background characteristics, ADHD, and learning disabilities. The next column adds controls for these
labor market characteristics, which corresponds to equation (4).
In almost all cases, the magnitude of the estimated effect of stuttering is reduced
when controls for labor market characteristics are included. In several cases, statistical
significance is either removed or reduced by the inclusion of these controls. This
confirms that a portion of the difference in labor market outcomes between PWS and
PWNS can be explained by differences in these labor market characteristics. However,
the differences are not entirely removed.
For males, there is still a statistically significant effect of stuttering on the probability of being employed, the probability of being in the labor force, and the probability
of having ever received public assistance. Much of the difference in hourly earnings
associated with stuttering for males is removed when labor market characteristics are
included. For females, there are no statistically significant estimates, but stuttering does seem to still have an economically significant effect on hourly earnings and
underemployment; the estimates for these outcomes are large, just imprecisely measured. Unlike for males, much of the effect of stuttering on hourly earnings remains
for females after adding controls for labor market characteristics
Table 3.7 shows Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the effect of stuttering on log
hourly earnings. The results are based on the same specifications from Table 3.6; the
first column for each group (all, males, females) controls for background characteristics, ADHD, and learning disabilities and the next column adds controls for labor
market characteristics. Visual summary of the Blinder-Oaxaca results is shown in
Figure 3.1.
Panel I of Table 3.7 shows the total unconditional difference in hourly earnings
between PWS and PWNS. This corresponds to the results in Table 3.3 without background characteristics, although the estimates are slightly different due to missing
observations for ADHD, learning disability, or labor market characteristics. The next
two rows show the portion of the total difference that is due to differences in ob-
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servable characteristics and the difference that is due to differences in coefficients,
respectively. The difference due to coefficients is equivalent to the estimates for the
impact of stuttering on hourly earnings in Table 3.6.
The purpose of the Blinder-Oaxaca results is to account for the relative importance of various background and labor market characteristics in explaining the hourly
earnings difference between PWS and PWNS. This is shown in Panel II, which shows
the contribution of each covariate to the explained difference. For brevity in the table
we group each of the background controls, ADHD, and learning disability together.
The table then shows the fraction of the difference that is explained by differences in
occupation, education level, self-stigma, tenure, and hours.
For males, column (4) in Panel I shows that 15.2 of the 21.3 percentage point reduction in hourly earnings can be explained by observable differences in background
characteristics, ADHD and learning disabilities, and labor market characteristics.
Panel II shows that much of that explained difference comes from differences in occupation; there is an 11.1 percentage point reduction in hourly earnings associated
with stuttering for males that is attributable to differences in occupation. Education
level and self-stigma also play a significant role; differences in education contribute a
3.9 percentage point reduction and differences in self-stigma contribute a 3.7 percentage point reduction. Each of these three covariates explain a statistically significant
portion of the difference in earnings between males who stutter and males who do
not stutter. The other covariates contribute negatively, meaning that conditional
on equivalent occupations, education, and self-stigma, males who stutter have, on
average, better background characteristics, more job tenure, and work more hours.
For females, column (6) in Panel I shows that only 8.2 percentage points of the
21.4 percentage point reduction in hourly earnings can be explained by differences
in background characteristics, ADHD and learning disabilities, and labor market
characteristics. Panel II shows that this explained portion is almost entire due to
differences in education, which contributes a 7.4 percentage point reduction in hourly
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earnings. None of the other covariates contribute significantly to the hourly earnings
difference.
Table 3.8 shows how the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results change when selfstigma is removed from the specification. Differences in self-esteem and self-efficacy
captured in the self-stigma variable could impact labor market outcomes in two ways:
(1) by causing PWS to avoid education levels or occupations that require lots of speaking or (2) negatively impacting job performance and interactions with coworkers. For
example, PWS may be reticent to speak up when they have knowledge to contribute
to a discussion, less willing to seek assistance when needed, or less willing to accept
promotions that involve increased speaking demands [Klein and Hood, 2004]. Seeing
how the decomposition results change when self-stigma is removed should shed light
on what our measure of self-stigma is capturing and how it impacts labor market
outcomes; if our measure of self-stigma is impacting hourly earnings through differences in education levels and occupations, then the contribution of education and
occupation to the hourly earnings difference should become larger when self-stigma is
excluded. Alternatively, if self-stigma is mostly capturing difficult-to-measure impacts
of stuttering on job performance and interactions, then the occupation and years of
school components should remain mostly unchanged and the component previously
explained by self-stigma should become unexplained.
Results in Table 3.8 show that the contribution of education and occupation to the
hourly earnings difference are almost entirely unchanged when self-stigma is removed;
much of what was previous explained by self-stigma becomes unexplained. For males,
2.3 of the 3.7 percentage points attributed to self-stigma in column (3) become unexplained in column (4). Much of the remainder becomes attributed to background
characteristics. Self-stigma explained very little for females, but most of what it did
explain in column (5) becomes unexplained in column (6). These results suggest
that our measure of self-stigma captures difficult-to-measure impacts of stuttering
on job performance and interactions that are mostly orthogonal to other observable
characteristics, but are partially correlated with background characteristics.
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3.6

Conclusion
Despite an abundance of research suggesting that stuttering is associated with

significant hardships in the labor market [Rice and Kroll, 1994, Rice and Kroll, 1997,
Crichton-Smith, 2002, Hayhow et al., 2002, Klein and Hood, 2004, Palasik et al., 2012,
Bricker-Katz et al., 2013], no study has adequately quantified the impact of stuttering
on labor market outcomes. We address this issue by using the National Longitudinal
Study of Adolescent to Adult Health, which tracked adolescents into adulthood and
collected labor market information and detailed background characteristics, including
whether the respondent is a person who stutters.
We find that stuttering does have a significant impact on labor market outcomes
and that the impact is different for males and females; for males, stuttering is associated with a decrease in the probability of being employed, a decrease in the
probability of being in the labor force (employed or unemployed but looking for a
job), and an increase in the probability of having ever received public assistance such
as welfare. For females, we find no effect of stuttering on employment, labor force participation, or receipt of public assistance, but we do find that stuttering is associated
with a significant increase in the probability of being underemployed (over-educated
for their current job). Both males and females experience a significant reduction in
hourly earnings associated with stuttering. For males, most of this difference can be
explained by differences in occupations, education levels, and self-stigma. A much
larger fraction remains unexplained for females.
The primary difficulty in quantifying the impact of stuttering on labor market
outcomes is unobserved individual or family heterogeneity; if stuttering is correlated
with unobserved confounders that also influence labor market outcomes, then results
will be biased. [Rees and Sabia, 2014] showed that although stuttering appeared
to be associated with a reduction in high school GPA, high school graduation, and
college attendance, the effect of stuttering on these outcomes was removed when the
authors controlled for co-occurring disabilities or used propensity score matching.
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However, we find that the effect of stuttering on labor market outcomes is robust to
these approaches. This result can be reconciled with the null findings in [Rees and
Sabia, 2014] under the assumption that differences and difficulties in communication
are more of a hardship in the labor market than in the classroom; employer decisions
about hires and promotions likely provide more opportunities for discrimination than
teacher or school decisions about grades and graduation.
To put the magnitude of these results in perspective, it is useful to compare them
to those from studies on other health conditions and labor market outcomes. In specifications that control for ADHD and other co-occurring learning disabilities, we find
that stuttering decreases hourly earnings by approximately 14% for both males and
females; [Fletcher, 2014] found that ADHD reduces earnings by 33%; [Rees and Sabia,
2015] found that migraine headaches reduce earnings by 30% in specifications that
use instrumental variables, but smaller effects using OLS; [Kidd et al., 2000] found
that a broad definition of disability - including mobility, manual dexterity, physical
co-ordination, continence, ability to lift/carry/move everyday objects, speech, hearing or eyesight, memory/ability to concentrate/learn/understand, or the perception
of the risk of physical danger - reduces earnings by 14%; [Fletcher, 2013] found that
adolescent depression reduces earnings by 15%. Therefore, the effect of stuttering on
labor market outcomes may not be as great as some other health conditions, but the
results are consistent with a growing literature that health conditions have significant
effects on labor market outcomes.
While difficulties in the labor market are not unique to stuttering compared to
other disabilities or minority statuses such as gender and race, the experience of PWS
is unique in another sense: PWS may have less support than some people with other
types of disabilities or minority statuses. Despite the prevalence of stuttering discussed above and the clear impact that stuttering can have on a person’s life, speech
therapy for PWS is typically not covered by federal or private insurance companies
[Reeves et al., 2006]. Additionally, while there are organizations that fight for disability rights for people with many other types of disabilities, no such organization
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exists in the United States for PWS. In our current society, most PWS are neither
protected from discrimination by employers nor are they afforded easy access to resources such as speech therapy, which can help PWS manage their stuttering and
self-stigma in preparation for job interviews and occupations that require speaking.
Given the prevalence of stuttering, the decrease in earnings associated with stuttering may represent significant lost revenue to the government in the form of taxable
income. A policy that provided publicly-funded speech therapy for PWS could potentially be a net benefit to the government; increased access to speech therapy could
both increase tax revenue and decrease PWS’s receipt of public assistance by helping
PWS increase their fluency and reduce self-stigma. These financial benefits may offset
the cost of providing publicly-funded speech therapy for PWS.
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Table 3.1.: Summary statistics
PWNS

Labor market outcomes
Employed
Hourly earnings
In labor force
Underemployed
Ever received public assistance
Labor market characteristics
Less than high school education
High school
Some college
College
More than college
Mean occupation earnings
Self-stigma
Tenure
Weekly hours

PWS

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

0.79
16.48
0.87
0.50
0.24

0.408
23.409
0.336
0.500
0.426

0.71
12.13
0.81
0.51
0.38

0.457
11.850
0.393
0.501
0.487

0.07
0.16
0.43
0.20
0.13
16.34
0.17
4.26
41.21

0.262
0.367
0.496
0.400
0.338
9.737
0.187
2.974
11.367

0.16
0.22
0.42
0.14
0.05
14.69
0.29
4.30
40.53

0.371
0.416
0.494
0.352
0.224
8.743
0.236
3.540
12.340

”PWS” = people who stutter. ”PWNS” = people who do not stutter. Summary
statistics are based on the public-use version of the Add Health data, which consists
of 5,114 people in Wave IV. Of those 5,114 respondents, 208 said that they stutter.
Each of the labor market outcomes and labor market characteristics are measured in
Wave IV of the data, when respondents were 24-32 years old. Individual and family
characteristics come from Wave I of the survey when respondents were in grades 7-12.
All means and standard deviations are based on unweighted data.

140

Table 3.2.: Summary statistics (continued)
PWNS

Individual characteristics
Age
Female
Black
Native American
Asian
Other race
Hispanic
Very unattractive
Unattractive
Average attractiveness
Attractive
Very attractive
Height (feet)
Weight (pounds)
ADHD
Learning disability
Family characteristics
Family income as adolescent ($10,000s)
Parent-married
Parent-less than high school education
Parent-high school
Parent-some college
Parent-college
Parent-more than college

PWS

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

30.00
0.54
0.23
0.01
0.03
0.06
0.10
0.03
0.04
0.47
0.36
0.10
5.58
186.03
0.05
0.12

1.774
0.498
0.424
0.116
0.172
0.230
0.304
0.178
0.203
0.499
0.480
0.294
0.327
50.819
0.220
0.321

30.05
0.43
0.34
0.03
0.04
0.08
0.13
0.01
0.09
0.52
0.32
0.06
5.62
197.902
0.12
0.25

1.809
0.497
0.475
0.168
0.193
0.267
0.337
0.120
0.282
0.501
0.468
0.233
0.332
55.722
0.320
0.432

4.77
0.72
0.18
0.26
0.30
0.15
0.11

4.841
0.424
0.388
0.438
0.456
0.359
0.312

4.05
0.65
0.22
0.28
0.32
0.12
0.06

4.614
0.461
0.415
0.449
0.469
0.320
0.243

”PWS” = people who stutter. ”PWNS” = people who do not stutter. Summary
statistics are based on the public-use version of the Add Health data, which consists
of 5,114 people in Wave IV. Of those 5,114 respondents, 208 said that they stutter.
Each of the labor market outcomes and labor market characteristics are measured in
Wave IV of the data, when respondents were 24-32 years old. Individual and family
characteristics come from Wave I of the survey when respondents were in grades 7-12.
All means and standard deviations are based on unweighted data.
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Table 3.3.: OLS and probit estimates of the effect of stuttering on labor market
outcomes
All
(1)

Males
(2)

Females

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Panel I: Log Hourly Earnings
PWS
-0.174**
-0.131*
(0.071)
(0.070)
Background
No
Yes
N
2346
2346

-0.192***
(0.072)
No
1167

-0.190**
(0.085)
Yes
1167

-0.199*
(0.113)
No
1179

-0.169*
(0.103)
Yes
1179

Panel II: Employed
PWS
-0.080**
(0.036)
Background
No
N
3215

-0.056
(0.038)
Yes
3215

-0.125***
(0.042)
No
1461

-0.127**
(0.049)
Yes
1461

-0.017
(0.064)
No
1754

0.039
(0.077)
Yes
1754

Panel III: In the Labor Force
PWS
-0.076**
-0.076**
(0.031)
(0.033)
PWS
No
Yes
N
3215
3215

-0.107***
(0.026)
No
1461

-0.145***
(0.042)
Yes
1461

0.011
(0.058)
No
1754

0.026
(0.074)
Yes
1754

Panel IV: Underemployed
PWS
0.035
0.022
(0.046)
(0.043)
Background
No
Yes
N
3765
3765

-0.008
(0.055)
No
1748

-0.001
(0.053)
Yes
1748

0.124*
(0.064)
No
2017

0.105*
(0.063)
Yes
2017

0.125***
(0.042)
Yes
1795

0.147**
(0.061)
No
2056

0.039
(0.053)
Yes
2056

Panel V: Public Assistance Receipt
PWS
0.135*** 0.083*** 0.143***
(0.033)
(0.032)
(0.040)
Background
No
Yes
No
N
3851
3851
1795

Each panel-by-column is a separate regression. Columns (1), (3), and (5) include only
an indicator variable for stuttering as the independent variable. Columns (2), (4), and
(6) add controls for individual and family background characteristics for gender, age,
race, ethnicity, attractiveness, height, weight, parental income, parental education,
parental marital status, and fixed effects for school of residence in Wave I. Results
for hourly earnings are based on OLS regression. Results for the other outcomes
are based on probit estimates and show marginal effects. Standard errors (shown in
parentheses) are clustered by school of residence in Wave I. All estimates are based
on weighted regression using the Add Health weights. Statistical significance is as
follows: * 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1% level.
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Table 3.4.: Robustness of results to controls for ADHD and learning disabilities
All
(1)

Males
(2)

Females

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Panel I: Log Hourly Earnings
PWS
-0.124*
-0.085
(0.069)
(0.070)
Background
Yes
Yes
ADHD/learn
No
Yes
N
2305
2305

-0.190**
(0.083)
Yes
No
1138

-0.135*
(0.082)
Yes
Yes
1138

-0.160
(0.104)
Yes
No
1167

-0.145
(0.103)
Yes
Yes
1167

Panel II: Employed
PWS
-0.057
(0.039)
Background
Yes
ADHD/learn
No
N
3142

-0.049
(0.039)
Yes
Yes
3142

-0.130**
(0.050)
Yes
No
1201

-0.120**
(0.049)
Yes
Yes
1201

0.038
(0.078)
Yes
No
1710

0.035
(0.077)
Yes
Yes
1710

Panel III: In the Labor Force
PWS
-0.077**
-0.066**
(0.034)
(0.033)
Background
Yes
Yes
ADHD/learn
No
Yes
N
3011
3011

-0.153***
(0.043)
Yes
No
839

-0.137***
(0.041)
Yes
Yes
839

0.031
(0.076)
Yes
No
1628

0.035
(0.077)
Yes
Yes
1628

Panel IV: Underemployed
PWS
0.017
0.019
(0.043)
(0.043)
Background
Yes
Yes
ADHD/learn
No
Yes
N
3702
3702

-0.011
(0.054)
Yes
No
1685

-0.007
(0.053)
Yes
Yes
1685

0.098
(0.063)
Yes
No
1982

0.084
(0.064)
Yes
Yes
1982

0.131***
(0.041)
Yes
Yes
1556

0.038
(0.053)
Yes
No
1954

0.028
(0.051)
Yes
Yes
1954

Panel V: Public Assistance Receipt
PWS
0.091***
0.080**
0.146***
(0.032)
(0.031)
(0.042)
Background
Yes
Yes
Yes
ADHD/learn
No
Yes
No
N
3732
3732
1556

Each panel-by-column is a separate regression. Columns (1), (3), and (5) include
controls for individual and family background characteristics. Columns (2), (4), and
(6) add controls for ADHD and other learning disabilities. See the notes from Table
3.3 for additional details.
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Table 3.5.: Propensity score matching estimates of the effect of stuttering on labor
market outcomes
All
Unmatched
(1)

Males
PSM
(2)

PSM
(4)

Unmatched
(5)

PSM
(6)

Panel I: Log Hourly Earnings
PWS -0.201***
-0.149*
-0.229***
(0.069)
(0.083)
(0.086)
N
2217
300
1083

-0.202**
(0.102)
196

-0.196*
(0.112)
882

-0.093
(0.156)
104

Panel II: Employed
PWS
-0.082**
-0.135***
(0.036)
(0.046)
N
3034
504

-0.165***
(0.040)
1378

-0.138**
(0.057)
324

-0.008
(0.061)
1502

-0.046
(0.079)
188

Panel III: In the Labor Force
PWS
-0.050*
-0.082**
-0.137***
(0.030)
(0.038)
(0.028)
N
3034
504
1378

-0.140***
(0.046)
324

0.028
(0.055)
1502

0.014
(0.068)
188

0.020
(0.065)
336

0.107*
(0.065)
1826

0.122
(0.081)
208

0.143***
(0.055)
372

0.167***
(0.058)
1898

0.043
(0.078)
216

Panel IV: Underemployed
PWS
0.023
0.080
(0.042)
(0.051)
N
3599
548

Unmatched
(3)

Females

-0.036
(0.055)
1663

Panel V: Public Assistance Receipt
PWS 0.138***
0.086*
0.145***
(0.035)
(0.046)
(0.041)
N
3696
588
1700

Results are based on nearest neighbor matching with replacement that matches each
person who stutters with three people who do not stutter whose estimated propensity
of stuttering was within 0.004. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the mean difference in
outcomes between PWS and PWNS for the unmatched sample. Columns (2), (4), and
(6) show the mean difference in outcomes between matched people who stutter and
people who do not stutter. The 2% of PWS whose estimated propensity of stuttering
were furthest from their match were dropped. Matching variables included individual
and family background characteristics. The differences in these characteristics before
and after matching are shown in Table B.2.
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Table 3.6.: Remaining difference after controlling for labor market characteristics
All
(1)

Males
(2)

Females

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Panel I: Log Hourly Earnings
PWS
-0.127*
-0.065
(0.070)
(0.066)
Background
Yes
Yes
ADHD/learn
Yes
Yes
Labor market
No
Yes
N
1968
1968

-0.178**
(0.083)
Yes
Yes
No
1035

-0.060
(0.092)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1035

-0.147
(0.104)
Yes
Yes
No
933

-0.131
(0.124)
Yes
Yes
Yes
933

Panel II: Employed
PWS
-0.050
(0.040)
Background
Yes
ADHD/learn
Yes
Labor market
No
N
3126

-0.027
(0.041)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3126

-0.108**
(0.050)
Yes
Yes
No
1186

-0.092*
(0.051)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1186

0.002
(0.073)
Yes
Yes
No
1701

0.032
(0.069)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1701

Panel III: In the Labor Force
PWS
-0.063*
-0.050
(0.034)
(0.034)
Background
Yes
Yes
ADHD/learn
Yes
Yes
Labor market
No
Yes
N
2995
2995

-0.127***
(0.042)
Yes
Yes
No
834

-0.118***
(0.040)
Yes
Yes
Yes
834

-0.000
(0.071)
Yes
Yes
No
1617

0.030
(0.067)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1617

Panel IV: Underemployed
PWS
0.017
0.041
(0.044)
(0.046)
Background
Yes
Yes
ADHD/learn
Yes
Yes
Labor market
No
Yes
N
3693
3693

-0.009
(0.053)
Yes
Yes
No
1679

0.020
(0.056)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1679

0.084
(0.083)
Yes
Yes
No
1979

0.110
(0.087)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1979

0.103**
(0.045)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1549

0.027
(0.051)
Yes
Yes
No
1949

0.009
(0.050)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1949

Panel V: Public Assistance Receipt
PWS
0.072**
0.052
0.126***
(0.031)
(0.034)
(0.041)
Background
Yes
Yes
Yes
ADHD/learn
Yes
Yes
Yes
Labor market
No
Yes
No
N
3718
3718
1549

Each panel-by-column is a separate regression. Columns (1), (3), and (5) include
controls for individual and family background characteristics and for ADHD and
other learning disabilities. Columns (2), (4), and (6) add controls for labor market
characteristics. The labor market characteristics include education level and selfstigma for panels II-V. Panel I also includes occupation fixed effects, hours, tenure,
and limits the sample to full-time workers. See the notes from Table 3.3 for additional
details.

Table 3.7.: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the effect of stuttering on log hourly earnings
All
(1)
Panel I: Explained and Unexplained Difference
Total difference

Males
(2)

0.225*** 0.225***
(0.072)
(0.072)
Difference due to characteristics (explained)
0.097*
0.160**
(0.057)
(0.069)
Difference due to coefficients (unexplained)
0.127**
0.065
(0.062)
(0.057)
Panel II: Contribution of Covariates to Explained Difference
Background controls, ADHD, learning disability
0.097*
0.019
(0.057)
(0.050)
Occupation
0.055
(0.038)
Education
0.066***
(0.019)
Self-stigma
0.027*
(0.014)
Tenure
-0.007
(0.021)
Hours
0.001
(0.007)

Females

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.213***
(0.075)
0.034
(0.064)
0.178***
(0.068)

0.213***
(0.075)
0.152*
(0.090)
0.060
(0.077)

0.214***
(0.113)
0.066
(0.090)
0.147
(0.090)

0.214***
(0.113)
0.082
(0.098)
0.131
(0.100)

0.034
(0.064)

-0.013
(0.078)
0.111**
(0.049)
0.039**
(0.019)
0.037**
(0.018)
-0.015
(0.027)
-0.007
(0.010)

0.066
(0.090)

-0.013
(0.084)
0.004
(0.065)
0.074**
(0.034)
-0.009
(0.010)
0.018
(0.021)
0.007
(0.009)
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Panel I shows the total unconditional difference in hourly earnings, the portion of that difference that is due to differences in
observable characteristics, and the portion that is due to differences in coefficients. Panel II shows the contribution of each
covariate to the explained difference. Columns (1), (3), and (5) controls for individual and family background characteristics
and for ADHD and other learning disabilities. Columns (2), (4), and (6) add controls for labor market characteristics shown
in the table.

Table 3.8.: Robustness of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to removing self-stigma
All
(1)
Panel I: Explained and Unexplained Difference
Total difference

Males
(2)

0.225*** 0.225***
(0.072)
(0.072)
Difference due to characteristics (explained)
0.160**
0.147**
(0.069)
(0.072)
Difference due to coefficients (unexplained)
0.065
0.078
(0.057)
(0.058)
Panel II: Contribution of Covariates to Explained Difference
Background controls, ADHD, learning disability
0.019
0.028
(0.050)
(0.050)
Occupation
0.055
0.057
(0.038)
(0.038)
Education
0.066*** 0.067***
(0.019)
(0.019)
Self-stigma
0.027*
(0.014)
Tenure
-0.007
-0.007
(0.021)
(0.021)
Hours
0.001
0.001
(0.007)
(0.008)

Females

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.213***
(0.075)
0.152*
(0.090)
0.060
(0.077)

0.213***
(0.075)
0.130
(0.091)
0.083
(0.078)

0.214***
(0.113)
0.082
(0.098)
0.131
(0.100)

0.214***
(0.113)
0.095
(0.098)
0.119
(0.099)

-0.013
(0.078)
0.111**
(0.049)
0.039**
(0.019)
0.037**
(0.018)
-0.015
(0.027)
-0.007
(0.010)

0.002
(0.073)
0.109**
(0.049)
0.040**
(0.020)

-0.013
(0.084)
0.004
(0.065)
0.074**
(0.034)
-0.009
(0.010)
0.018
(0.021)
0.007
(0.009)

-0.011
(0.085)
0.006
(0.066)
0.074**
(0.035)

-0.014
(0.026)
-0.007
(0.010)

0.019
(0.021)
0.008
(0.010)
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Panel I shows the total unconditional difference in hourly earnings, the portion of that difference that is due to differences
in observable characteristics, and the portion that is due to differences in coefficients. Panel II shows the contribution of
each covariate to the explained difference. Columns (1), (3), and (5) are equivalent to columns (2), (4), and (6) from Table
3.7. Columns (2), (4), and (6) remove self-stigma from the specification.

Hourly Earnings Difference

20

15

10

5

0

Total

Background

Occupation

Education
Males

Self-Stigma Tenure/Hours Unexplained

Females

Fig. 3.1.: The vertical axis shows the percentage point difference in hourly earnings between people who stutter and people
who do not stutter. The horizontal axis shows the total difference, the contribution of observable characteristics to the total
difference, and the unexplained difference. ”Background” includes individual and family background characteristics, ADHD,
and other learning disabilities. Results are based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results in Table 3.7.
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APPENDIX A. THE EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGES ON EMPLOYMENT: A
FACTOR MODEL APPROACH
A.1

Common correlated effects

The individual slope coefficients for the CCE estimator are given by

b̂i = (Xi0 M̄ω Xi )−1 Xi0 M̄ω yi ,
where Xi and yi are the independent and dependent variables, M̄ω is given by
M̄ω = IT − H̄ω (H̄ω0 H̄ω )−1 H̄ω0 ,
and H̄ω = (D, Z̄ω ), with D being a (T x 1) vector of ones, which produces an individual
fixed effect, and Z̄ω being the (T x (k+1)) matrix of cross sectional averages of the
dependent and independent variables.
[Pesaran, 2006] then suggests two versions of the CCE estimator. The Commom
Correlated Effects - Mean Group (CCEMG) is the average of the individual CCE
coefficients,

b̂CCEM G = N

−1

N
X

b̂i ,

i=1

while the Common Correlated Effects - Pooled (CCEP) is given by

b̂CCEP =

N
X

!−1
θi Xi0 M̄ω Xi

i=1

N
X

θi Xi0 M̄ω yi .

i=1

The CCEP assumes that βi = β for all i, although it does allow the slope coefficients
of the common effects to differ across i.
The variance of the CCEMG estimator is given by
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Σ̂CCEM G = (N − 1)

−1

N
X

(b̂i − b̂CCEM G )(b̂i − b̂CCEM G )0 .

i=1

The variance of the CCEP estimator is given by

Σ̂CCEP = N −1 Ψ̂−1 R̂Ψ̂−1 ,
where Ψ̂ and R̂ are given by

Ψ̂ =

N
X

N

−1

i=1

Xi0 M̄ω Xi
T

!

and

N
X
1/N
−1
√
R̂ = (N − 1)
N −2
i=1

A.2

!
!
0
M̄
X
Xi0 M̄ω Xi
X
ω i
i
(b̂i − b̂CCEM G )(b̂i − b̂CCEM G )0
.
T
T

Interactive fixed effects

[Bai, 2009] notes that, given F and Λ, the regression coefficients could be estimated
in the usual way after subtracting the factor structure out of the data,

β̂(F ) =

N
X
i=1

!−1
Xi0 Xi

N
X

Xi0 (Yi − F λi ),

i=1

and, given β, principal component analysis could be used to compute F and Λ from
the pure factor model,

Wi = Yi − Xi β.
In practice, both the regression coefficients and the factor structure are unknown.
Therefore, [Bai, 2009] proposes an iterative procedure:
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Step 1: Ignore the factor structure and estimate the regression coefficients. Given these regression coefficients, estimate the factors and factor
loadings. Given these factors and factor loadings, re-estimate the regression coefficients. Iterate until the percent change in the sum of squared
residuals in the regression coefficient estimation is less than a specified
threshold1 .
Step 2: Ignore the regression coefficients and estimate the factors and
factor loadings. Given these factors and factor loadings, estimate the
regression coefficients. Given these regression coefficients, re-estimate the
factors and factor loadings. Iterate until the percent change in the sum of
squared residuals in the factor and factor loading estimation is less than
a specified threshold.
Step 3: Keep the estimates from the previous step that had the lowest
final sum of squared residuals.

The data is demeaned in both directions before estimation to account for unit and
period fixed effects. Bias correction is performed using equations (23) and (24) in
[Bai, 2009].
The variance of the IFE estimator is given by
1 −1
D DZ D0−1 ,
NT 0
P
PN 2 −1 PT 0
2
0
−1
where D0 = (N T )−1 N
t=1 zit zit ), with σ̂i =
i=1 Zi Zi , DZ = N
i=1 σ̂i (T
P
P
0
0
−1
0
T −1 Tt=1 ˆ2it , Zi = MF̂ Xi − N −1 N
k=1 [γ̂i (L̂ L̂/N ) γ̂k ]MF̂ Xk , and L̂ = (γ̂1 , ..., γ̂N ) .
Σ̂IF E =

1

The CCEMG estimates were also used as an alternative way to initiate step 1. In this case, the
initial estimate of the regression coefficients is based on the CCEMG results. Given these estimates,
the factor structure is estimated using principal components. The regression coefficients are then reestimated, given these factors and factor loadings, using the IFE estimate of the regression coefficients
described above. Iteration then continues as described in step 1. This approach convergences much
faster than when the initial estimate of the regression coefficients is based on traditional OLS and
finishes with approximately the same final sum of squared residuals. The results are nearly identical.
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APPENDIX B. THE IMPACT OF STUTTERING ON ADULT LABOR MARKET
OUTCOMES
B.1

Construction of the composite self-stigma index

The composite self-stigma index is constructed using a subset of questions from
Wave IV of the Add Health data that correspond to a particular commonly held
stereotype about PWS. The stereotypes come from Kalinowski, Stuart, and Armson
(1996). The questions and the stereotype that they correspond to are shown in Table
B.1.
The first five questions are recorded in a five-option format (”strongly agree”,
”agree”, ”neither agree nor disagree”, ”disagree”, ”strongly disagree”). These are
re-coded into a dichotomous (0 or 1) variable indicating any of level agreement that
would correspond with the stereotype. For example, for the question ”I don’t talk
most of the time,” which corresponds to the stereotype ’quiet,’ the respondent would
be given a 1 if they answered ”agree” or ”strongly agree.” For the question ”I am
relaxed most of the time,” which corresponds to the stereotype ’nervous,’ the respondent would be given a 1 if they answered ”disagree” or ”strongly disagree.” The sixth
question, ”You feel you are just as good as other people,” is recorded as a four-option
format (”never or rarely”, ”sometimes”, ”a lot of the time”, ”most of the time or
all of the time”). We re-coded this question into a dichotomous variable with a 1 if
the respondent answered ”never or rarely.” We re-coded the variables into dichotomous variables to avoid potential issues due to anchoring; respondents with the same
reactions to a statement may evaluate the strength of their agreement differently depending on where they anchor their scale. However, anchoring is less likely to impact
whether the respondent agrees in principle.
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Table B.1 shows the fraction of PWS and PWNS who answered each question
with a response that corresponds to the stereotype listed. For each question, PWS
were much more likely to answer according to the stereotype. The difference in the
mean response between PWS and PWNS is statistically significant at the one-percent
level for each question.

Table B.1.: Questions used to construct the composite self-stigma index
Question

Corresponding Stereotype

PWNS
Mean SD

I don’t talk a lot
I am relaxed most of the time
I keep in the background
I go out of my way to avoid having to deal with problems in my life
There is really no way to solve the problems that I have
You feel you are just as good as other people

Quiet
Nervous
Lacking Assertion
Avoidant
Self-derogatory
Insecure

0.24
0.14
0.24
0.19
0.03
0.20

0.006
0.005
0.006
0.006
0.002
0.006

PWS
Mean SD
0.38
0.21
0.42
0.27
0.09
0.40

0.034
0.028
0.034
0.031
0.020
0.034

Each question comes from Wave IV of the Add Health dataset. The response to each question is re-coded into a dichotomous
(0 or 1) variable, with 1 indicating a response that corresponds with the stereotype. See the appendix text for additional
details.
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B.2

Propensity score matching

Table B.2.: Difference in covariates before and after propensity score matching
Unmatched

Matched

Person
who
stutters

Person
who
does
not
stutter

P-value

Person
who
stutters

Person
who
does
not
stutter

P-value

female

0.400

0.510

0.046**

0.400

0.436

0.661

age

30.024

29.927

0.613

29.947

29.996

0.868

Black

0.388

0.198

0.000***

0.360

0.396

0.656

Native American

0.035

0.011

0.040**

0.013

0.013

1.000

Asian

0.024

0.023

0.995

0.027

0.018

0.714

other race

0.047

0.047

0.993

0.053

0.053

1.000

Hispanic

0.106

0.090

0.619

0.107

0.116

0.864

unattractive

0.106

0.043

0.006***

0.053

0.076

0.582

average attractiveness

0.412

0.463

0.356

0.453

0.489

0.665

attractive

0.412

0.364

0.369

0.413

0.369

0.580

very attractive

0.035

0.096

0.060*

0.040

0.031

0.771

height (feet)

5.702

5.611

0.011**

5.687

5.685

0.977

weight (lbs)

202.400

188.370

0.016**

194.790

213.750

0.048

Results are based on nearest neighbor matching with replacement that matches each
person who stutters with three people who do not stutter whose estimated propensity of stuttering was within 0.004. The 2% of PWS whose estimated propensity of
stuttering were furthest from their match were dropped.
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Table B.3.: Difference in covariates before and after propensity score matching (continued)
Unmatched

Matched

Person
who
stutters

Person
who
does
not
stutter

learning disability

0.224

0.109

ADHD

0.153

0.050

family income as adolescent

4.739

4.952

0.722

Parent - HS

0.306

0.267

Parent - some college

0.294

Parent - college

Pvalue

Person
who
stutters

Person
who
does
not
stutter

Pvalue

0.001*** 0.200

0.169

0.626

0.000*** 0.107

0.067

0.387

4.955

4.094

0.337

0.429

0.307

0.311

0.953

0.305

0.825

0.267

0.240

0.710

0.118

0.164

0.256

0.133

0.142

0.876

Parent - more than college

0.106

0.119

0.715

0.120

0.102

0.731

Parent - married

0.659

0.727

0.170

0.693

0.653

0.604

Results are based on nearest neighbor matching with replacement that matches each
person who stutters with three people who do not stutter whose estimated propensity of stuttering was within 0.004. The 2% of PWS whose estimated propensity of
stuttering were furthest from their match were dropped.
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